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The last decade has seen a shift in emphasis from centralised to decentralised systems
to meet the demanding coordination requirements of today’s complex computer sys-
tems. In such systems, the aim is to achieve effective decentralised control through
autonomous software agents that perform local decision-making based on incomplete
and imperfect information. Specifically, when the various agents interact, the system
behaves as a computational ecology with no single agent coordinating their actions. In
this thesis, we focus on one specific type of computational ecology, the Continuous
Double Auction (CDA), and investigate market-oriented approaches to decentralised
control. In particular, the CDA is a fixed-duration auction mechanism where multiple
buyers and sellers compete to buy and sell goods, respectively, in the market, and where
transactions can occur at any time whenever an offer to buy and an offer to sell match.
Now, in such a market mechanism, the decentralised control is achieved through the de-
centralised allocation of resources, which, in turn, is an emergent behaviour of buyers
and sellers trading in the market. The CDA was chosen, among the plenitude of auction
formats available, because it allows efficient resource allocation without the need of a
centralised auctioneer.
Against this background, we look at both the structure and the behaviour of the CDA
in our attempt to build an efficient and robust mechanism for decentralised control. We
seek to do this for both stable environments, in which the market demand and supply
do not change and dynamic ones in which there are sporadic changes (known as market
shocks). While the structure of the CDA defines the agents’ interactions in the market,
the behaviour of the CDA is determined by what emerges when the buyers and sellers
compete to maximise their individual profits.
In more detail, on the structural aspect, we first look at how the market protocol of
the CDA can be modified to meet desirable properties for the system (such as high
ii
market efficiency, fairness of profit distribution among agents and market stability).
Second, we use this modified protocol to efficiently solve a complex decentralised task
allocation problem with limited-capacity suppliers that have start-up production costs
and consumers with inelastic demand. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the structure
of this CDA variant is very efficient (an average of 80% and upto 90%) by evaluating
the mechanism with very simple agent behaviours. In so doing, we emphasise the effect
of the structure, rather than the behaviour, on efficiency.
In the behavioural aspect, we first developed a multi-layered framework for designing
strategies that autonomous agents can use for trading in various types of market mech-
anisms. We then use this framework to design a novel Adaptive-Aggressiveness (AA)
strategy for the CDA. Specifically, our bidding strategy has both a short and a long-
term learning mechanism to adapt its behaviour to changing market conditions and it
is designed to be robust in both static and dynamic environments. Furthermore, we
also developed a novel framework that uses a two-population evolutionary game the-
oretic approach to analyse the strategic interactions of buyers and sellers in the CDA.
Finally, we develop effective methodologies for evaluating strategies for the CDA in
both homogeneous and heterogeneous populations, within static and dynamic environ-
ments. We then evaluate the AA bidding strategy against the state of the art using these
methodologies. By so doing, we show that, within homogeneous populations, the AA
strategy outperformed the benchmarks, in terms of market efficiency, by up to 3.6% in
the static case and 2.8% in the dynamic case. Within heterogeneous populations, based
on our evolutionary game theoretic framework, we identify that there is a probability
above 85% that the AA strategy will eventually be adopted by buyers and sellers in the
market (for being more efficient) and, therefore, AA is also better than the benchmarks
in heterogeneous populations as well.
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Introduction
Over the last decade, there has been a shift in emphasis from centralised to decen-
tralised computer systems, to meet the increasingly demanding requirements of com-
plex systems and the need to be more flexible and robust in dynamic environments.
Now, in many of these cases, an agent-oriented approach, with its emphasis on au-
tonomous actions and flexible interactions (Jennings, 2001), is an appropriate compu-
tational model. Specifically, in such systems, the constituent agents are typically ca-
pable of local decision-making based on incomplete and imperfect knowledge about
the system, and, when placed together, the overall system behaves as a computational
ecology in which the agents interact and strategically compete for resources. However,
because there is no centralised system-wide control, it is a major challenge to coordi-
nate behaviour in the system. Against this background, this thesis is concerned with
developing techniques for the decentralised control of such complex computer systems.
In many computational ecologies, decentralised control can be achieved by the alloca-
tion of (scarce) resources in a decentralised manner. Moreover, decentralised resource
allocation is a subject that has long been studied in economics (Mas-Collel et al., 1995).
Given this, this work is specifically concerned with using economic metaphors and tools
to achieve decentralised control. Broadly speaking, such work can be non-price-based
(employing a mechanism that does not involve price or payment for resources) or price-
based (using price as an economic motivator). In the former, resource allocation can be
based on techniques involving game-theoretic models (with selfish agents that seek to
maximise their individual return) (Yemini, 1981) or techniques based on decentralised
algorithms (with non-selfish agents that cooperate and have the individual aim of max-
imising the social welfare) (Kurose and Simha, 1989). The latter is a market-oriented
approach and is the one we focus on in this thesis. We adopt such an approach because
of its ability to facilitate resource allocation based on very little information (i.e. it just
1
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works based on price), its flexibility through its distributed nature and its reliance on lo-
cal decision-making and its ability to be robust in dynamic environments (by adapting
effectively to changes).
In more detail, markets are price mechanisms1 that allow selfish and profit-motivated2
agents to buy and/or sell resources. In so doing, the interaction of these self-interested,
profit-motivated agents in a free market3 can result in a close to optimal allocation of
resources (Smith, 1962). Thus, efficient resource allocation in markets is an emergent
behaviour from the interaction of these self-interested agents. Now, market mecha-
nisms can exist in a multitude of forms including fixed-price markets in which a center
or central agent arbitrarily sets a fixed price, dynamic-price markets where a center ar-
bitrarily changes the price of goods, and auctions where the price is dynamically set in
a decentralised manner. Each of these has its own particular properties and characteris-
tics. However, probably the most popular is the auction, here defined as a mechanism
that establishes prices based on participants’ offers to buy or sell resources (Wurman,
2001). Auctions can be categorised as being single-sided (Krishna, 2002) (such as the
first-price open-cry auction commonly known as the English Auction or the online auc-
tion eBay (http://www.ebay.com) in which there is a single buyer (or seller) and
multiple sellers (or buyers), or double-sided (Friedman and Rust, 1992) (such as the
clearing-house double auction or the Stock Exchange) in which there are multiple buy-
ers and multiple sellers. Here, our focus is on the double-sided variety as it perfectly
addresses our aim to develop decentralised resource allocation solutions in systems with
multiple consumers and suppliers. Within this context, probably the most prominent
mechanism is the Continuous Double Auction (CDA) (Friedman and Rust, 1992). In
this, multiple buyers and sellers compete for resources that are allocated whenever buy-
ers and sellers reach an agreement to trade. Given our focus and objectives, the CDA is
particularly interesting in that it allows resource allocation among multiple consumers
and suppliers and it is decentralised in nature (no center computes the allocation) and
yet very efficient in terms of solving the resource allocation problem (Davis and Holt,
1993). Thus, we focus on the CDA as our exemplar economically-inspired mechanism
for decentralised control.
1A mechanism defines how traders interact in the market, and how their actions lead to an allocation
of resources. In a price mechanism, price is used as an indicator of the resource’s value.
2The objective of a profit-motivated agent is profit, whether it cooperates or not. Thus, a selfish profit-
motivated agent is after profit, but never cooperates to meet its objective. In a market mechanism, we
consider such agents, with buyer and seller agents competing for profit.
3A free market economy is one in which the allocation for resources is determined only by the demand
and supply, through the traders’ interactions (Mas-Collel et al., 1995). This contrasts with a centralised
system where a single agent (that is aware of all traders’ preferences) computes the allocation.
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Within this context, there are two aspects to the CDA that need to be considered. The
first is the structural one, that defines the framework within which traders operate. This
covers issues such as what market information should be revealed to which agents, the
format of the offers to buy and to sell, when a transaction occurs and the price of that
transaction. The second is the behavioural one that is concerned with the strategic in-
teractions of the traders that determine the behaviour of the CDA. This covers issues
such as the strategies that buyers and sellers should adopt and how efficient these strate-
gies are with respect to how efficient the market is. Given this, in Section 1.1, we first
investigate the structure and the behaviour of the CDA in more detail. Then, in Section
1.2, we discuss the research aims of this work, and list our contributions to advance the
state of the art in Section 1.3. Finally, Section 1.4 gives the structure of this thesis.
1.1 The Continuous Double Auction
Market trading is governed by a market mechanism. Such mechanisms are designed
to define the exchange process between buyers and sellers, by specifying the set of
messages that can be exchanged (e.g. the traders’ actions such as submitting a bid or an
ask, or agreeing to a transaction) and by specifying the resource allocation process given
the received messages (e.g. when transactions occur given the exchanged messages and
at what price these transactions occur). In the CDA, there is usually a fixed-duration
trading period (typically referred to as a trading day), and buyers and sellers can submit
bids and asks, respectively, at any time during the trading day and the market clears
continuously. Specifically, the market clears whenever there is a match between open
bids and asks (i.e. a transaction is possible). In a single-unit, single-attribute CDA, the
market clears (with a single trade) whenever the outstanding bid is at least as high as the
outstanding ask. All messages submitted by traders are usually public and announced
to all the participants in the market.
CDAs are important and popular because they are highly efficient market institutions:
‘Markets organised under double-auction trading rules appear to generate
competitive outcomes more quickly and reliably than markets organised
under any alternative set of trading rules.’ (Davis and Holt, 1993)
Given this, the CDA is currently one of the most common forms of electronic market-
places. It has emerged as the dominant financial institution for trading securities and
financial instruments and the major foreign exchanges (FX) or stock exchanges (like
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the NASDAQ and the New York Stock Exchange - NYSE) use variants of it. Indeed,
today, the total value of trades on the NYSE stands at around 12.4 trillion dollars4 of
yearly transactions while foreign exchanges are worth in excess of 1.9 trillion dollars5
of daily transactions. Thus, while decentralised resource allocation is the main motiva-
tion for our work on the CDA, its possible application in CDA-based financial markets
is an important additional facet. Specifically, preliminary evidence already exists that
software agents can outperform their human counterparts in such settings (see Subsec-
tion 2.3.1) and we believe that future marketplaces will increasingly involve ever larger
numbers of such agents.
Now, whether we consider decentralised control or electronic trading scenarios, there
are two aspects that characterise the CDA; namely the structural and the behavioural (as
discussed above). Each of these will now be dealt with in turn.
First, we consider the structural perspective. This is determined by the market protocol
which is a set of interaction rules and a set of clearing and pricing rules. The interaction
rules define how participants interact through a set of actions. There are usually many
interaction rules in a mechanism, ranging from specifying whether a trader can be a
buyer and seller to specifying that a bid or an ask that can be submitted in the market
must have a particular format. The clearing and pricing rules determine when and at
what price a transaction occurs. The clearing rule only determines when a transaction
occurs, while the pricing rule only determines the price of that transaction.
When taken together, it is these rules that allow the CDA to be an efficient market mech-
anism. Specifically, in a CDA populated by selfish profit-motivated agents, there is an
equilibration of transaction prices towards an equilibrium price whereby the demand is
equal to the supply and the allocation of resources is optimal. This equilibration occurs
because if the demand is greater than the supply, the price of the resources rises which,
in turn, reduces demand (because a segment of the population can no longer afford it)
and increases supply (since more suppliers are willing to trade at the higher price). Sim-
ilarly, when supply exceeds demand, prices fall, which reduces supply and increases
demand. Thus, according to the micro-economics of markets, the price approaches a
market equilibrium, where the demand equals the supply. How that equilibration is
brought about during the trading day is known as the dynamics of the mechanism. The
importance of how this dynamics aggregates privately held information (about prefer-
ences) to drive the market towards a solution for the resource allocation problem was
described by Hayek:
4http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/movolume0505.pdf
5http://www.bis.org/publ/rpfx05t.pdf
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‘The problem (of how information that is held privately is accurately co-
ordinated through the trading process to reach an equilibrium) is in no
way solved if we can show that all facts (complete market information), if
they were known to a single mind, would uniquely determine the solution;
instead we must show how a solution is produced by the interactions of
people each of whom possesses only partial knowledge. To assume all the
knowledge to be given to a single mind in the same manner in which we
assume it to be given to us as the explaining economists, is to assume the
problem away and to disregard everything that is important and significant
in the real world’. (Hayek, 1945)
It is to this dynamics of the CDA that its high efficiency is attributed, and it is this high
efficiency as a decentralised resource allocation solution that motivates our work on the
CDAmechanism. Now, though the CDA is already very efficient, when we consider the
volume of trade in CDA-based financial markets with trillions of dollars worth of trans-
actions, an improvement in efficiency, even of the order of 0.1%, is highly desirable and
worthwhile. Thus, the emphasis of our work on the structure of the CDA is on how the
market rules can be modified to improve certain desirable properties of the CDA such
as price volatility, or fairness of profit distribution among buyers and sellers, as well as
efficiency. In particular, to analyse how changing the market protocol really influences
these properties of the mechanism, researchers have considered markets populated by
very basic strategies, such that the properties of the mechanism can be attributed to the
structure, rather than the behaviour, of the market. To date, however, most of this work
has been about solving a standard resource allocation problem that is defined by a fixed
demand and supply. Thus, research on the structure of the CDA has tended to overlook
more complex problems and, specifically, when the demand and supply is complex and
a market equilibrium does not exist. Thus, we believe it is important to investigate
whether the CDA can still be used to solve the more complex allocation problems in
a decentralised manner. If we can show this, then, we will augment the space of re-
source allocation problems for which the CDA can be considered as a viable solution
mechanism.
Having considered the structure of the CDA, we now turn to its behaviour. As stated
previously, this behaviour is what emerges from the interactions of the buyers and the
sellers in the market and, it depends on the strategies of all the agents in the market. In
this context, the agents strategise within the given market mechanism to determine what
actions they should take, at what time. However, because the CDA is a complex game
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that is not amenable to a game-theoretic analysis (Gode and Sunder, 1992)6, there is no
known dominant strategy which produces the highest profit in the auction, regardless
of what strategies it is playing against. Thus, over the past decade, there has been
considerable research endeavour in developing trading strategies that define how agents
should behave based on a variety of heuristic approaches (see Section 2.3 for more
details). Moreover, these strategies have generally been targeted at static environments
in which the market demand and supply does not change. However, we believe there is
still significant scope for better strategies and, in particular, for strategies that perform
well in both static environments and dynamic environments in which the market demand
and supply changes sporadically. Given this, one of our lines of research considers
the design of strategies for the CDA and its variants (to complement our work on the
structure of the CDA). Moreover, because we are looking at the CDA mechanism for
decentralised control, we require the interactions of the participating agents to result in
a system that displays certain desirable properties such as efficiency and robustness in a
wide variety of situations. To this end, we need to analyse how the strategies adopted by
agents bring about these properties in both homogeneous populations (where all agents
adopt the same strategy) and heterogeneous populations (where agents adopt different
strategies). Furthermore, because we require our decentralised resource allocation to
be robust in dynamic environments and efficiently adapt to changes in the demand and
the supply, we need to analyse the behaviour of the CDA in both static and dynamic
environments. Unfortunately, the current techniques for performing such analyses and
for predicting system behaviour have a number of shortcomings (detailed in Subsection
2.3.5) and, so, work is needed to devise appropriate means of doing this. Work on this
aspect therefore also represents an important research strand of this thesis.
1.2 Research Aims
The motivation for our research on the CDA is its widespread application and its gen-
eral effectiveness as a decentralised solution to resource allocation. Now, given such
motivations, our research needs to contribute to both the structural and the behavioural
aspects. More specifically, we will now discuss the research aims of this thesis that deal
with a number of issues in these two areas:
6As a consequence of the large space of actions and the continuous nature of the CDA game, and
the multiple players that participate, the problem is too complex for a game theoretic analysis to find a
dominant strategy.
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1) to improve certain desirable properties of the CDA. This refers to properties such
as market efficiency, price volatility and fairness of profit distribution among buyers
and sellers that are attributable to the CDA’s structure. The reasons for wanting to
do this are two-fold: (i) so that the CDA is more widely adopted as a market-based
mechanism for resource allocation and (ii) to incentivise more buyers and sellers to
join a market governed by such a mechanism.
2) to modify the structure of the CDA so that it can solve complex allocation prob-
lems. While the standard version of the CDA solves a relatively simple resource
allocation problem, we want to observe how efficient a CDA can be in more com-
plex situations. The motivation here is to demonstrate the feasibility of applying the
CDA to a wider range of problems than has been considered.
3) to design a more efficient strategy for the CDA. As there is no known dominant
strategy for the CDA, a multitude of heuristic-based strategies have been developed.
However, these are typically developed for static environments. Thus, we believe
that a more efficient strategy can be designed and, furthermore, that equal emphasis
should be placed on designing such a strategy for both static and dynamic environ-
ments. The motivation here is to improve the behaviour of the CDA as a decen-
tralised allocation system in both types of environments.
4) to develop methodologies for evaluating strategies in the CDA. Such methodologies
should be able to analyse the CDA in homogeneous and heterogeneous populations,
within static and dynamic environments, and for different (symmetric and asymmet-
ric) demand and supply. In particular, we need to be able to evaluate properties,
including the efficiency of the strategies, and the price volatility and the fairness of
profit distribution among buyers and sellers. Moreover, for heterogeneous popula-
tions, because strategies can be adopted by buyers and sellers in different proportions
in the market, we need to be able to analyse the evolution of these proportions and
identify those which are most likely to be adopted. The motivation here is to obtain a
better understanding of the complex interplay of the agents’ behaviours and to make
better predictions about what will happen in various circumstances.
This thesis addresses each of these four aims within the over-arching objective of devel-
oping a decentralised system for resource allocation based on the CDA market mecha-
nism and demonstrating its efficiency in a wide variety of circumstances.
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1.3 Research Contributions
Given the research aims outlined above, we now highlight the following specific contri-
butions to the state of the art made by the research contained in this thesis:
1) We develop an efficient CDA-based mechanism for a complex decentralised re-
source allocation problem. To address research aim (2), we develop a CDA variant
that solves a more complex allocation problem than the standard CDA. Specifically,
this is the first work that modifies the CDA protocol to cope with multiple suppliers
with limited production capacities and a cost structure composed of a fixed over-
head cost and a constant marginal cost, and multiple buyers that have an inelastic
demand7. We then go on to empirically evaluate the structure of our CDA variant by
using a zero-intelligence behaviour8, to emphasise the effect of the structure, rather
than behaviour, on the efficiency of the mechanism. Despite such simple behaviour,
we showed that our mechanism is efficient (which is an average of 80% and up
to 90%). Furthermore, to address aim (1) for desirable properties, we demonstrate
how our modified protocol allows an equal distribution of profits among buyers and
sellers.
2) We develop a multi-layered framework for designing strategies. This work ad-
dresses the issues in aim (3) where we observe that a multitude of strategies have
been developed for the CDA and, because there is no known dominant one, we
can always expect the design of new strategies. Because there is no current frame-
work for designing strategies for the CDA, we develop such a framework in order
to provide a blueprint that will assist the strategy designer with the different aspects
involved in this process. Specifically, it will help the designer to identify the issues
such as gathering information, processing information and using that processed in-
formation to strategise in the market. At present, bidding strategies are typically
designed in an ad hoc and intuitive manner with little regard for discerning best
practice or attaining reuseability in the design process, and our framework puts the
development on a more systematic footing.
7A trader with an inelastic demand does not vary its demand according to price and has a positive
utility for their requirement, and a utility of 0 for anything else. This contrasts with the standard assump-
tion of elastic demand in which price is more responsive to changes in demand and the trader varies its
demand according to price.
8A zero-intelligence behaviour is given by a strategy that ignores all market information and makes
a random (and uninformed) decision on the offer to buy or sell to submit in the market (see Subsection
2.3.4.2).
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3) We develop a bidding strategy for the CDA that is more effective than any previous
strategy. This work addresses aim (3) for a more efficient strategy. Our Adaptive-
Aggressiveness (AA) strategy is based on aggressiveness in the market. Specifically,
it has both short and a long-term learning that allows such agents to adapt their bid-
ding behaviour to be efficient in a wide variety of environments. For the short-term
learning, the agent updates the aggressiveness of its bidding behaviour (more ag-
gressive means that it will trade off profit to improve its chance of transacting, less
aggressive that it targets more profitable transactions and is willing to trade off its
chance of transacting to achieve them) based on market information observed after
every bid or ask appears in the market. The long-term learning then determines how
this aggressiveness factor influences an agent’s choice of which bids or asks to sub-
mit in the market, and is based on market information observed after every transac-
tion (successfully matched bid and ask). The principal motivation for the short-term
learning is to update the agent’s aggressiveness to immediately respond to short-
term market fluctuations, while for the long-term learning it is to adapt to long-term
changes in market conditions and to enable the agent to perform efficiently in dy-
namic environments. Our strategy addresses the issue that strategies have previously
not been explicitly designed for dynamic environments and, in our approach, we
identify the market shocks in the market and explicitly adapt the agent’s behaviour
in response to them.
4) We develop a framework for analysing strategic interactions in the CDA. This work
addresses aim (4) of evaluating strategies in heterogeneous populations. In particu-
lar, the standard model is predicated upon the assumption that buyers and sellers have
to adopt the same strategies. This is a serious simplification and shortcoming and,
so, to address it, we develop a new model that separately analyses the strategic be-
haviour of buyers and sellers in the market. Specifically, we adopt a two-population
evolutionary game theoretic approach, where we consider buyers and sellers as sep-
arate populations in the market. In so doing, our model offers new insights into how
the choices of strategies affect the buyers’ and sellers’ economic efficiency and, so,
we can better evaluate strategies in heterogeneous populations.
5) We develop methodologies for evaluating CDA strategies in both homogeneous
and heterogeneous populations. This work fulfils aim (4). In our methodology
to evaluate strategies in homogeneous populations, we look at the daily market ef-
ficiency and price volatility for different (symmetric and asymmetric) market de-
mand and supply, rather than simply the overall efficiency for a symmetric demand
and supply as is commonly done in the literature. This is an advance because our
methodology provides better insights into how the efficiency of a strategy changes
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as the strategies learn over the different trading days and because it identifies the
drastic decrease in efficiency after a market shock. In terms of our methodology to
evaluate strategies in heterogeneous populations, we use our novel two-population
evolutionary game theoretic framework to analyse the buyers’ and sellers’ strategic
behaviours in the CDA. Specifically, we use our methodologies to benchmark AA
against the state of the art CDA strategies in static and dynamic environments under
different market settings and, indeed, our evaluation provides insights that were not
possible with previous methodologies. In so doing, we also empirically demonstrate
the superiority of our AA strategy. In the homogeneous scenario, it outperformed
the state of the art by up to 3.6% in the static case and 2.8% in the dynamic case. In
the heterogeneous scenario, we identified that there is a probability above 85% that
the AA strategy will eventually be adopted by buyers and sellers in all the settings
we investigate.
The following papers have been published in support of these contributions:
• R. K. Dash, P. Vytelingum, A. Rogers, E. David and N. R. JenningsMarket-based
task allocation mechanisms for limited capacity suppliers. IEEE Trans on Sys-
tems, Man and Cybernetics (Part A), 2007. This deals with contribution 1.
• P. Vytelingum, R. K. Dash, M. He, and N. R. Jennings. A framework for designing
strategies for trading agents. Proc. IJCAI Workshop on Trading Agent Design and
Analysis, pages 7-13, 2005. This deals with contribution 2.
• P. Vytelingum, R. K. Dash, M. He, A. Sykulski and N. R. Jennings. Trading strate-
gies for markets: A design framework and its applications. Lecture Notes in
Artificial Intelligence, pages 171-186, 2006. This deals with contribution 2.
• P. Vytelingum, D. Cliff and N. R. Jennings. Strategic Bidding in Continuous Dou-
ble Auctions. Submitted to the Artificial Intelligence Journal, 2006 (paper se-
lected at ECAI 2004 for fast track revision). This deals with contributions 3, 4
and 5.
• P. Vytelingum, R. K. Dash, E. David, and N. R. Jennings. A risk-based bidding
strategy for continuous double auctions. Proc. 16th European Conference on
Artificial Intelligence, pages 79-83, 2004. This deals with contribution 3.
• P. Vytelingum, D. Cliff, and N. R. Jennings. Evolutionary stability of behavioural
types in the continuous double auction. Proc. AAMAS Joint Workshop on Trading
Agent Design and Analysis and Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce VIII, pages
153-166, 2006. This deals with contribution 4.
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1.4 Thesis Structure
This thesis contributes to the two main avenues of research on the CDA, namely on its
structure and its behaviour. In this section, we outline the structure of this thesis and its
focus on these two areas.
We begin with a literature review of the CDA. In Chapter 2, we provide an overview of
the micro-economics of markets, and on the structural and behavioural aspects of the
CDA. First, we look at the work on the structure of the CDA. Specifically, we review
existing research on modifying the market protocol to improve market efficiency or to
reduce the price volatility in the CDA. Second, we review the work on the behaviour
of the CDA. Here, we begin by looking at the software agent-human interaction in the
CDA. Thereon, we focus on bidding strategies for software agents and, in particular, we
look at frameworks for designing strategies and at how to categorise strategies. We then
detail the common CDA strategies and, finally, we describe the standard one-population
evolutionary game theoretic approach to analyse the behaviour of the CDA.
Next, we look at the structural and the behavioural perspective of this thesis.
Part I. The Structural Perspective
We describe, in Chapter 3, our novel CDA-based mechanism for decentralised task allo-
cation, where sellers have limited capacity and have a start-up production cost and buy-
ers have inelastic demand. We first describe the resource allocation problem which is to
minimise the total production cost of suppliers. We then detail a centralised mechanism
to solve the problem and the market protocol of our novel decentralised mechanism,
including the pricing and clearing rules. Given the optimal centralised solution, we are
then able to calculate the efficiency of our decentralised mechanism as the ratio of the
total production cost of the decentralised case to that of the centralised case. Then, we
describe in detail the structure of our novel mechanism (i.e. its market protocol).
Given the centralised and decentralised solution, we then evaluate the latter mechanism.
To this end, we develop a zero-intelligence behaviour for our mechanism, such that
structure, rather than behaviour, affects the efficiency of the system. Given this simple
behaviour and the structure of our mechanism, we evaluate our CDA variant for different
numbers of market participants.
Part II. The Behavioural Perspective
In Chapter 4, we describe our IKB framework that provides systematic guidelines for
designing strategies for markets. We apply our model to analyse different strategies
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in the CDA and, in particular, describe its application in designing a strategy that we
entered into the International Trading Agent Competition.
In Chapter 5, we describe our AA bidding strategy, designed using our IKB framework.
We describe, in detail, the different components of the strategy, including the short-term
and the long-term learning mechanisms.
In Chapter 6, we describe our two-population evolutionary game theoretic model to
analyse the behaviour of both buyers and sellers in the market. We then describe the
application of our model in analysing the CDA given a particular scenario, and compare
this analysis to that with the standard one-population EGT model to identify the insights
that are overlooked by the latter model.
In Chapter 7, we first develop our methodologies to evaluate the main state of the art
strategies in homogeneous and heterogeneous populations. Using these methodologies,
we benchmark AA against the state of the art within static and dynamic settings and with
symmetric and asymmetric demand and supply. We demonstrate that AA outperforms
the current state of the art in all these situations.
Finally, in Chapter 8, we summarise the contributions of this work and conclude, high-
lighting how this thesis introduces new areas for future work.
Chapter 2
Literature Review
In this chapter, we begin by introducing the classical micro-economic theory of demand
and supply of markets, which is generally used to explain the high efficiency of the
allocation in the CDA (Section 2.1). Next, we introduce the CDA mechanism, and
describe the structure that is typically considered in the literature and that we will be
using in our work to be consistent with this body of work. We then review the main
related work on the structural and behavioural aspects of the CDA (sections 2.2 and 2.3
respectively). Finally, in Section 2.4, we summarise the reviewed work and, given our
research aims, we analyse to what extent the related work on the structure and behaviour
of the CDA satisfies these aims and identify the issues that require subsequent research.
2.1 Background on the Microeconomics of Markets
In a market, it is generally accepted that the higher the price of the commodity (good
or service), the lower the demand and, conversely, the lower the price, the lower the
supply. This demand and supply characteristic can be represented by a demand and
supply curve, which is a function of the demand and the supply with respect to price (see
Figure 2.1). The demand and supply curves meet at the competitive market equilibrium:
Definition 2.1. The competitive market equilibrium is when demand meets supply in
a free market populated by profit-motivated and selfish agents. According to the classi-
cal micro-economic theory, the transaction prices in the CDA are expected to converge
towards that competitive equilibrium price p∗. As p∗ can only be calculated if the de-
mand and supply are available, which is not the case here because of the decentralised
nature of the CDA and the fact that no single agent knows all the agents’ preferences,
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p∗ cannot be known a priori. The equilibrium is referred to as competitive because it is
the competition among buyers and sellers that drive transaction prices to p∗.
At the competitive market equilibrium price, p∗ the social welfare of the system (i.e.
the benefit of the system as a whole) is maximised (i.e. the profit of all traders is max-
imised). The market equilibrium quantity, q∗, also known as the clearing quantity, is
the optimal number of trades to maximise the profit of all traders. Now, in Figure 2.1,
because the demand and supply curves intersect over a range of quantities and we are
dealing with discrete quantities, we have a volume tunnel, where the equilibrium quan-
tity can be q∗ − 1 or q∗. However, since we assume goods are desirable, an allocation
takes place even though there is no profit involved and, thus, the equilibrium quantity
is at q∗. In cases when the demand and supply curves do not intersect over a single
price (see Figure 2.2), we have a price tunnel between p∗s and p
∗
b and p
∗ lies somewhere
within this range.
FIGURE 2.1: Demand and supply curve.
Now, in a centralised system, we have an agent (also known as the auctioneer) that
has complete and perfect information (Mas-Collel et al., 1995) of the system. That
is, it knows all the agents’ limit prices (the maximum and the minimum a buyer and a
seller is willing to offer respectively). Knowing this, the auctioneer can maximise social
welfare by determining which agents will trade and at what price. Agents on the left of
the equilibrium point (buyers with limit prices ≥ p* and sellers with limit (cost) prices
≤ p∗) are known as intra-marginal traders and will be trading at price p* (with intra-
marginal buyers willing to trade above p∗s and intra-marginal sellers below p
∗
b). Agents
with limit prices equal to the equilibrium price will be trading at zero-profit (trading
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FIGURE 2.2: Demand and supply curve. p∗ lies between p∗s and p∗b .
at the margin), as we assume that goods are desirable. The other participants are the
extra-marginal sellers whose cost prices are too high and extra-marginal buyers whose
limit prices are too low to trade in the market.
Definition 2.2. The limit price is the maximum bid a buyer is currently willing to offer,
and the minimum ask a seller is willing to offer.
Definition 2.3. `i, is the limit price of buyer i.
Definition 2.4. cj , is the limit price of seller j.
The centralised approach to the resource allocation problem (in such situations), be-
tween a set I of buyers and a set J of sellers, is an optimisation problem. Specifically,
it is a maximisation of the objective function which is the profit from all traders. The
solution is given in Equation 2.1 where cj is the cost price of seller j ∈ J , `i ∈ I is the
limit price of buyer i as the equilibrium price, p∗, and the set I of intra-marginal buyers
and the set J of intra-marginal sellers that transact. Here, p∗ can lie over a range of
values when we have a price tunnel (see Figure 2.2). Given the solution to the resource
allocation problem, the market efficiency is said to be maximised.
p∗ = argmax
p
{∑
i∈I
max(0, p− `i) +
∑
j∈J
max(0, cj − p)
}
I = {x ⊂ I| `i ≥ p∗ ∀i ∈ x}
J = {y ⊂ J | cj ≤ p∗ ∀j ∈ y} (2.1)
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Definition 2.5. The market efficiency is the ratio of all agents’ surpluses in the market
to the maximum possible surplus that would be obtained in an allocation where the
profits of all buyers and sellers are maximised.
In a centralised market mechanism, market efficiency is optimal. While the objective of
a decentralised system is also to maximise social welfare, an efficient allocation cannot
be computed since there is no single agent that has the complete and perfect information
that is needed to compute such an allocation. Rather, in the case of a CDA, it is the
emergent behaviour of the market mechanism that computes the allocation and this is
therefore non-optimal. Now, in many practical situations, it is often better to trade-off
some of this efficiency for the desirable properties of a decentralised mechanism (as
outlined at the beginning of Chapter 1). Given this, in this thesis we consider the CDA
as such a decentralised market mechanism.
In his seminal work, Vernon Smith demonstrates that markets governed by the CDA
mechanism and populated by selfish and profit-motivated (human) traders, can achieve
a close to optimal market efficiency (Smith, 1962). Moreover, there is an equilibration
of transaction prices to the competitive market equilibrium price, p∗, that is predicted
by the micro-economics of free markets. Thus, despite the selfish nature of participants
and the decentralised nature of information, it is shown that a close to optimal market
efficiency can be reached in a CDA institution. He also demonstrated that if there was
a market shock (a sudden change in demand and supply at the beginning of a trading
day), transaction prices would converge to the new competitive equilibrium price (if it
changes). An example of such a market shock is given in Figure 2.3 where p∗ increases
from 2.0 to 3.0.
Definition 2.6. A market shock1 is a sudden change in the agents’ preferences (their
limit prices) and, hence, in the market demand and supply. Note that changing the
demand and supply does not necessarily mean a change in the competitive market equi-
librium as the new demand and supply curves could still meet at the same market equi-
librium.
Smith also introduced a coefficient of convergence, α, given the history of n transaction
prices, p˜i, i ∈ {1..n} (see Equation 2.2). Here, α is proportional to the standard devia-
tion of transaction prices around the theoretical equilibrium price and it can be evaluated
1There are different types of dynamic changes in real markets that are not referred to as market
shocks, for example rallies (the sustained upward movement of the competitive equilibrium price), sell-
offs (the sustained downward movement of the competitive equilibrium price), movements or trends (less
sustained upward or downward shifts respectively). However, because it is not a focal aspect of this work,
we generalise the meaning of market shocks to cover all of these phenomena for simplicity.
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FIGURE 2.3: Example of a market shock. The red full line represents the transaction
prices, while the dashed and black line represents the competitive market equilibrium
price. p∗ increases from 2.0 to 3.0 as from transaction 62.
over different periods in the history of transaction prices to estimate their trend of con-
vergence. This coefficient of convergence can also be considered as the price volatility
in the market:
α =
√
1
n
∑n
i=1(p˜i − p∗)2
p∗
(2.2)
Having looked at the micro-economics of demand and supply of markets and how it can
be used to predict the efficient outcome in markets governed by the CDA institution,
we now describe the CDA in more detail (looking at the structural element in the next
section and the behavioural element in the subsequent one).
2.2 The Structural Aspect of the CDA
Amarket mechanism is defined by themarket protocol that determines the nature of bids
and asks allowed in the market, the information published to the buyers and sellers in
the market, the clearing rule that indicates when a transaction occurs and the pricing rule
that indicates the price at which a transaction occurs. The CDA is one such mechanism.
However, there exist many variants, based on different market protocols. The most
popular example is that used in financial institutions like the NYSE. This variant of
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the CDA includes things like the fact that a commission is charged for placing a bid
or an ask, and that some traders have different levels of privilege with better access
to other traders’ messages than is available to unprivileged traders (usually to improve
the overall efficiency of the system). Dash et al. (2007), on the other hand, describe
a variant of the CDA for market-based control applications, where the clearing rules
ensure that partial clearing2 of multi-unit bids is not allowed (see Section 3.3).
However, these examples of the CDA are highly domain specific and are, therefore,
difficult to generalise from. Thus, most research in this area (e.g. (Gode and Sunder,
1993; Cliff and Bruten, 1997; Tesauro and Das, 2001)) has generally been structured
around the market protocol initially proposed in (Smith, 1962). In this, multiple buyers
and sellers are allowed to submit shouts (bids and asks) in a market for homogeneous,
single-attribute goods, and the market clears (with a single trade) whenever a bid and
an ask match (hence, the continuous nature of the CDA), and clears at a price between
(and including) the matched bid and ask. The k-pricing rule is usually adopted where
the market clears at a weighted average of the bid and the ask as given in the following
equation:
p˜ = k.pb + (1− k)pa (2.3)
where p˜ is the transaction price, pb is the matched bid and pa is the matched asked. The
parameter k is typically set to 0.5 in the CDA.
Furthermore, the protocol includes the NYSE spread-improvement and the no order
queuing rules. The former requires that a submitted bid or ask improves on the out-
standing bid (the highest unmatched bid) or the outstanding ask (the lowest unmatched
ask) respectively, while the latter specifies that offers are single-unit, are not queued
in the system, and are simply erased when a better offer is submitted. The CDA lasts
several trading days, with a trading day itself lasting several trading rounds which is the
period during which bids and asks are submitted (with the bid-ask spread decreasing)
until the market clears. To more formally analyse the CDA, we now explore some of
these basic notions in more detail:
Definition 2.7. A trading day is the period (with a deadline) during which traders are
allowed to submit bids and asks (resulting in transactions whenever these match), at the
end of which the market closes. In Smith’s model of the CDA, at the beginning of a
2In a classical multi-unit CDA, partial clearing of multi-unit bids (to buy multiple units of goods) and
multi-unit asks (to sell multiple units of goods) are allowed (Friedman and Rust, 1992).
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trading day, traders are endowed with a set of goods to buy or sell (that determine the
market demand and supply).
Definition 2.8. A bid is an offer to buy submitted in the market. The bid is published
as a quote that is viewable by the other participants.
Definition 2.9. An ask is an offer to sell submitted in the market. The ask is published
as a quote that is viewable by the other participants.
Definition 2.10. A shout is a generic term for a bid or an ask.
Definition 2.11. An outstanding bid or an outstanding best bid, obid, is the current
maximum (uncleared) bid submitted in the market.
Definition 2.12. An outstanding ask or an outstanding best ask, oask, is the current
minimum (uncleared) ask submitted in the market.
Definition 2.13. The bid-ask spread is the difference between obid and oask.
Definition 2.14. The minimum increment,∆ is the minimum bid or ask increment in
the market.
Definition 2.15. The maximum price, pmax is the maximum bid or ask allowed in the
market (to prevent unreasonably high asks and speed up the trading process).
Definition 2.16. A trading round is the period during which bids and asks are submit-
ted until there is a match and a transaction occurs. There are typically several trading
rounds in a trading day. At the beginning of the trading round, obid = 0 and oask = pmax.
Given the standard structure of the CDA, we now review the work on modifying that
structure to improve on its desirable properties, specifically by changing the pricing and
shout improvement rules.
2.2.1 Designing Pricing Rules
We now review the work by Phelps et al. (2003) where they consider optimising the
pricing rule for the CDA. Here, the objective is to find the pricing rule that maximises
some objective fitness, V , that combines the market efficiency and the buyers’ and the
sellers’ efficiencies (also referred to as buyer and seller market power respectively):
V =
market efficiency
2
+
buyers’ efficiency+ sellers’ efficiency
4
(2.4)
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They propose two approaches to designing the pricing rule, which we now describe in
detail.
First, the authors propose to optimise the k parameter in the CDA pricing rule (see
Equation 2.3). This is a simple enough operation that can be achieved by using brute
force and calculating the fitness, V , over the space k ∈ [0, 1]. Having done this, their
simulation results showed that the best value for k is shown to be 0.5 (see Figure 2.4),
validating the use of k = 0.5 in the traditional CDA.
FIGURE 2.4: Fitness V (with standard deviation) plotted against k for a market of 12
traders (taken from (Phelps et al., 2003)).
Second and, perhaps more interestingly, the authors do not limit their approach to the
typical pricing rule given in Equation 2.3, but rather consider the space of all arithmetic
combinations of pb and pa. The pricing rule was then allowed to evolve over such a
space using genetic programming. The evolved (and automatically acquired) pricing
rule was an extremely complex function (see (Phelps et al., 2003) for more details),
which, however, was shown to be approximately equal to 0.5pb + 0.5pa, apart from a
small variation when the ask is small or when the difference between the bid and ask is
marginal.
In summary, this line of work can be seen to address our first aim of improving the
properties of the CDA and, specifically, it shows how the structure of the CDA can be
evolved (by evolving its protocol) for this purpose. Furthermore, it indicates that the
0.5pb + 0.5pa pricing rule is the most efficient and, thus, we shall adopt such a pricing
rule in our work on the standard CDA model.
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2.2.2 Improving Pricing and Shout Improvement Rules
Having seen an automated approach to designing pricing rules, we now consider an-
other notable work on the structural aspect of the CDA where the objective is to reduce
price fluctuations. In particular, (Parsons et al., 2006) investigate how modifying the
traditional k-pricing rule and the NYSE shout improvement rule can meet their objec-
tive. The motivation for such work is that with reduced fluctuations, participants would
then be guaranteed transaction prices close to the competitive equilibrium price, and
such guarantees for fair transaction prices would incentivise more participants to join
the market.
First, the authors look at the pricing policy in the CDA. In particular, they modify the
traditional policy, referred to as KPricingPolicy (given in Equation 2.3) to the NPricing-
Policy commonly used in the Clearing-House double auction (where the market only
clears at the end of the auction) (Friedman and Rust, 1992). The NPricingPolicy keeps
a sliding window of size N of matching pairs of bids and asks used to set the trans-
action prices. It is important to understand that though this policy might reduce the
price fluctuation in the market, it would not change the market efficiency, but would
simply redistribute the profits among the participants and thus change the efficiency of
the buyers and sellers. Equation 2.5 describes the policy exactly:
pT =
1
2N
T∑
i=T−N+1
(pai + pbi) s.t. paT ≤ pT ≤ pbT (2.5)
where pbi and pai are the accepted bid and ask corresponding to the ith transaction
respectively, T is the latest transaction and pT is the price at which the transaction is
set using the KPricingPolicy. Here, p˜ is bounded between pbT , the maximum a buyer
is willing to offer, and paT the minimum a seller is willing to offer. Note that the
NPricingPolicy becomes the KPricingPolicy when n = 1, and the auction is then a
traditional CDA. On the other hand, whenN is equal to the total number of transactions,
the auction is then a traditional Clearing-House Double Auction. Thus, N ranges over
a continuous space of double auctions, with the Continuous Double Auction and the
Clearing-House Double Auction at either end.
The authors then replace the KPricingPolicy by the NPricingPolicy, with n = 4, and
compare the price fluctuations (by considering Smith’s α, see Equation 2.2) of the CDA
given a simple and non-intelligent behaviour, with ZI-C agents (see Subsection 2.3.4.2)
and a more complex and intelligent behaviour, with GD agents (see Subsection 2.3.4.4).
The results, given in figures 2.5 and 2.6, showed that the price fluctuations were reduced
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in both markets, with the better improvement in the ZI-C markets (as indicated by the
relatively larger decrease in α). This is because ZI-C agents randomly submit bids and
asks, and the spread of matching bids and asks is typically quite high. On the other hand,
the more intelligent GD agents submit bids and asks that tend to converge towards the
competitive equilibrium price, such that the spread is then greatly reduced, and the new
pricing policy is then only marginally more effective.
FIGURE 2.5: Transaction prices, plotted as 10 different runs, for the KPricingPolicy
(in (a) and (b)) and for the NPricingPolicy (in (c) and (d)) (taken from (Parsons et al.,
2006)).
FIGURE 2.6: Metrics for KCDAs, nCDAs and nCDAEEs measured over 10 trading
days. Bold face indicates the corresponding market outperforms or equals its kCDA
counterpart. Bold italic points out the best results in the ZI-C and GD markets (taken
from (Parsons et al., 2006)).
Second, the authors then go on to look at shout improvement in the market. They re-
place the traditional NYSE rule (detailed in Section 2.2) with a novel EE (or Estimated
Equilibrium) shout improvement rule. In particular, the latter rule considers an estimate
of the competitive equilibrium price, denoted by pˆ∗, by maintaining a sliding window
of them latest transactions:
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pˆ∗ =
1
m
T∑
i=T−m+1
pt,i (2.6)
where pt,i is the transaction price as calculated in Equation 2.5.
Thus, rather than improving on bids and asks as in the NYSE rule, the buyers have to
bid above (pˆ∗ − δ), and the sellers below (pˆ∗ + δ). Here, δ is some parameter to relax
the range of bids and asks allowed, and was introduced because the transaction prices
typically deviate greatly from the competitive equilibrium price at the beginning of the
auction. The efficiency and price fluctuations with the new shout improvement rule (de-
noted by CDAEEδ∗) are given in Figure 2.6. First, the authors consider δ = 0. Clearly,
α is then considerably smaller for nCDAEE-ZI-C (i.e. the CDA with NPricingPolicy
and EE with δ = 0 and populated by ZI-C agents), though the new shout improvement
rule decreases efficiency in that case. However, with GD agents, the performance is
even worse, with price fluctuations actually increasing and the market efficiency de-
creasing. The authors conjectured that the GD agent adapts its bids or asks even though
it is on the wrong side of the estimate and got rejected, and they have insufficient time
to adapt sufficiently to be efficient. This led the authors to consider relaxing the shout
improvement rules and consider different values for δ, and the results using such rules
are given in Figure 2.6. As can be seen, the markets with δ ≥ 5 were indeed more
efficient with either ZI-C or GD agents, than with δ = 0, though when they increased δ,
the price fluctuations decreased with GD agents, but increased with ZI-C agents.
The work we review here is relevant to our first research aim of reducing price fluc-
tuations by modifying the protocol of the CDA. In particular, Parsons et al. change
the pricing and shout improvement rules, and empirically show that price fluctuations
can be reduced to incentivise agents to adopt the mechanism. However, one shortcom-
ing of the work is that it only demonstrated improvement with non-intelligent agent
behaviours, and none with more intelligent agent behaviours. With the ZI-C strategy
usually providing the lower bound on market efficiency and price fluctuations because
of its zero-intelligence nature (see Subsection 2.3.4.2), the new rules do indeed improve
these lower bounds. However, they are not so effective with the higher bounds set by the
state of the art intelligent strategies such as GD. With these strategies generally adopted
for their higher efficiencies, the insights of this work are still not of great significance,
though their future work on analysing the market with other complex and intelligent
strategies within a dynamic setting (with market shocks) is indeed promising. Thus, we
intend to still use the standard KPricingPolicy, as well as the NYSE shout-improvement
rule as we will be working with intelligent strategies of the calibre of GD.
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When considering both this work and the previous work on designing pricing rules, we
see some endeavour towards our first research aim, though none towards our second of
solving more complex resource allocation problems than the standard CDA. Next, we
look at the behavioural aspect of the CDA. Before doing so, however, we observe that
the literature on the behaviour is considerable greater than on the structure. We believe
this is so because the CDA is a well established mechanism whose structure is generally
assumed to be efficient (and used as is) and research on the behaviour is driven by the
belief that breakthroughs will come through the design of more efficient behaviours for
the CDA. However, we believe the impact of the CDA as a decentralised allocation
solution will depend on the research on both the structure and the behaviour, which is
why this thesis looks at both.
2.3 The Behavioural Aspect of the CDA
In this section, we look at the behaviour of the CDA determined by the strategic inter-
action of trading agents in the market. Before considering how traders strategise in the
CDA, we give some background on their setup within a market. As discussed, most
extant work has used a market setup, based on Smith’s seminal work in experimental
economics with human traders (see Section 2.1). In this case, agents are assigned fixed
roles; that is they are either buyers or sellers. There are also typically several trading
days and at the beginning of each, participants are given a list of limit prices, for each
unit to be sold or bought. The allocation of limit prices is held constant over the days,
but sometimes the allocations are modified after several days to evaluate the responsive-
ness of the mechanism to market shocks. Finally, it is assumed that agents are selfish
traders and that no collusion occurs in the market. In our work, we adopt this setup so
as to conform to the prior work.
Given this background, in this section, we begin by reviewing the seminal study of how
human traders and software agents compete within a CDA institution (see Subsection
2.3.1). We then focus on software agents and review the literature on the design of bid-
ding strategies (see Subsection 2.3.2), before looking at some of the most common such
strategies available to software agents (see Subsection 2.3.4). Finally, we review the
existing work on frameworks and methodologies for evaluating strategy effectiveness
and predicting system performance (see Subsection 2.3.5).
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2.3.1 Agent-Human Strategic Interaction
Software agents that are endowed with trading strategies (on behalf of profit-motivated
humans), are playing an increasingly pivotal role in electronic marketplaces, with hu-
man traders competing against autonomous software traders. Thus, the interaction be-
tween software agents and human economic agents in a diverse range of market mech-
anisms is becoming of increasing interest. Specifically, the successful demonstration of
the superiority of artificial traders over their human counterparts in these mechanisms is
fundamental if humans are to entrust their money, preferences and economic decision-
making to software agents.
To this end, Das et al. (2001) designed a set of experiments that allowed human traders
to interact with software bidding agents in the CDA. In their experiments, in which there
was the simultaneous participation of humans and software agents, it was shown that
software agents can, on average, consistently outperform their human counterparts. In
particular, they noted significant interaction between agents and humans with roughly
30% of all transactions falling into this category. Moreover, the average efficiency of
human traders was typically below the very high efficiency noted in Smith’s human-
human experiments (Smith, 1962), while the efficiency of software traders was higher
than 100% (that is the surplus achieved was higher than the surplus that they were
expected to achieve in an optimal allocation). The results showed that software agents
were consistently exploiting human traders and strongly suggest that agents are usually
more performant as a group, in contrast to a single agent in a population of human
traders. In prior simulations of the CDA with all human traders, the efficiency of human
traders tended to improve during the trading period and this was typically attributed to
learning and human intelligence. However in agent-human simulations of the CDA,
human traders were consistently outperformed over the length of the trading period.
While this is but just one study, we believe it is very important. In particular, empirically
demonstrating that software agents economically outperform human traders motivates
the use of these agents in marketplaces, as well as the need for sophisticated strategies
that these agents can adopt.
With the rationale for software bidding agents having been motivated, we go on to
review the work on bidding strategies for software agents trading in the CDA.
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2.3.2 Methodologies for Designing Bidding Strategies
First, we consider methodologies for designing bidding strategies, partly addressing our
research aim to design strategies. We believe this line of work is important because such
a framework would be useful in providing a systematic approach to designing strategies
for the CDA mechanism and in analysing the design of the different types of bidding
strategies.
One notable work (Vetsikas and Selman, 2003), proposes a methodology for deciding
the strategy of bidding agents participating in simultaneous auctions. Their methodol-
ogy decomposes the problem into sub-problems that are solved by partial or interme-
diate strategies and then they advocate the use of rigorous experimentation to evaluate
those strategies to determine the best overall one across all the different auctions. How-
ever, their methodology is very much tailored to simultaneous auctions in general and
the Trading Agent Competition (TAC) in particular. Thus, it cannot readily be gener-
alised to other auction formats or other market mechanisms.
There are a number of other approaches, including (Chavez and Maes, 1996; Gimnez-
Funes et al., 1998; Fasli et al., 2002) that look at the strategic behaviour of agents.
However, they avoid issues related to how information and knowledge are used by trad-
ing agents in their strategies and focus instead mainly on their strategic behaviour. In
so doing, they ignore the fundamental steps in the process that leads to a decision in the
market.
Thus, in general, we can conclude that there is no systematic framework for designing
bidding strategies for the CDA (our principal motivation here). Given its importance,
we believe this is a serious shortcoming and, so, we seek to develop just such a method-
ology in Chapter 4.
2.3.3 Categorising Bidding Strategies
Before we look at the details of different examples of bidding strategies for the CDA, we
provide a categorisation of strategies to help identify their main aspects. In this context,
it is possible to categorise the behaviour of strategies by distinguishing whether they use
a history of market information or not, and whether they consider external information
or not:
1. No History. Strategies that do not use a history of market information are usually
reactive (make a decision based on the immediate changes in market conditions)
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and make myopic decisions based only on current market conditions. Such strate-
gies also usually exploit the more complex bargaining behaviour of competing
strategies (use them for their own selfish objectives) and thus require less compu-
tational resources to strategise. One such example is the eSnipe strategy3 which
is frequently used on eBay to submit an offer to buy near the end of the auction.
2. History. Strategies that use a history of market information are usually more
complex and efficient, being able to monitor changes in the market and exploiting
those changes. We further subdivide this into:
(a) Non-predictive: These strategies are typically belief-based (use some be-
lief of the market) and form a decision based on some belief of the current
market conditions. Given its belief over a set of actions, the agent then de-
termines the best action over the short or long term.
(b) Predictive: These strategies make some form of prediction about the mar-
ket state in order to adapt to it. Now, because future market conditions
that the trading agent adapts to cannot be known a priori, this type of strat-
egy typically makes its prediction using the history of market information.
By tracking such changes and adapting its behaviour accordingly, the agent
aims to remain competitive in changing market conditions.
3. No External Information. In this case, the strategy has access only to infor-
mation pertaining to the market, and it does not consider any signals that are
external (e.g. the falling market price of a good affecting the client’s preferences
for another type of good in another auction or the floods affecting the supply of
a commodity). However, the agent can choose whether or not to use the internal
information (e.g. the eSnipe strategy uses the internal market information, while
the ZI Strategy, described in Subsection 2.3.4.2, does not make use of any market
information in the CDA).
4. External Information. It is possible that signals external to the market can in-
fluence the preferences of the participants. Such signals are independent of the
market and cause the clients’ preferences in the market to change (e.g. unfore-
seen weather conditions affecting the production of wheat and thus the market for
wheat indirectly). Thus, external information can be a valuable source of infor-
mation that the agent can use to strategise in the market.
Given our categorisation for bidding strategies, we now review the most common ones
for the CDA in this light.
3www.esnipe.com
Chapter 2 Literature Review 28
2.3.4 Examples of Bidding Strategies
Because there is no known dominant strategy for the CDA, a wide variety of approaches
have been developed over the years for trading agents that attempt to maximise their
profits. We now describe the most common such strategies. In terms of the nomencla-
ture of sub-section 2.3.3, none of these strategies employ external information (i.e. they
have no access to external information). This is because we are looking at a controlled
environment, which is more practical for analysing the mechanism.
2.3.4.1 Kaplan
The first strategy that we consider is Kaplan, also known as a sniping strategy. It is
a simple reactive and non-predictive strategy that outperformed all other strategies in
the Double Auction Tournament held at the Santa Fe Institute in 1990 (Friedman and
Rust, 1992). The Kaplan strategy does not adapt to market activity or infer the market
equilibrium, but rather exploits the bidding behaviour of other strategies and forms an
offer whenever one of the following conditions is satisfied:
1. The best ask is less than the minimum transaction price in the previous period.
2. The best ask is less than the maximum transaction price in the previous period,
and the ratio of the bid-ask spread and the best ask is less than a spread factor,
while the expected profit is more than a minimum profit factor.
3. The fraction of time remaining in the period is less than a time factor (hence the
term sniping strategy).
Kaplan won the tournament because it snipes at any profitable deal (based on some
simple heuristics) and, thus, it lets the other strategies do all the negotiating. However,
a system populated by agents using Kaplan does not perform efficiently because there
is no longer this competition among buyers and sellers that will drive the market to an
efficient outcome, but rather agents that are all waiting for a profitable transaction. On
its own, the Kaplan strategy does not constitute a good basis for decentralised control
in a complex system.
2.3.4.2 Zero-Intelligence
One of the most prominent strategies that have been developed over the years is Gode
and Sunder’s Zero-Intelligence (ZI) trading strategy (Gode and Sunder, 1993). The ZI
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agent is not motivated to seek trading profits and ignores all market conditions when
forming a bid or ask by selecting a bid or an ask drawn from a uniform distribution over
a given range (hence the term zero-intelligence). In terms of our categorisation, ZI is
non-history-based and non-reactive as it does not consider the market condition in its
decision-making process.
FIGURE 2.7: Result from one of Gode and Sunder’s experiments (taken from (Gode
and Sunder, 1993)). Results from ZI-U (top), from ZI-C (middle) and from human
traders (bottom). Plots on the left-hand side show the demand and supply used in the
experiments and those on the right-hand side are the history of transaction prices for
the different populations.
Specifically, Gode and Sunder considered the performance of both constrained and un-
constrained ZI traders, which they respectively term ZI-C and ZI-U traders. The former
are subject to budget constraints and are not allowed to trade at loss. The latter, however,
are allowed to enter loss-making transactions (i.e. they are allowed to submit a bid (ask)
that is higher (lower) than their limit (cost) prices). In more detail, the ZI-C buyer draws
a bid from a uniform distribution between the minimum allowed bid and its limit price.
The ZI-C seller forms an ask from a value drawn from a uniform distribution between
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its cost price and pmax, beyond which we assume no transaction can take place. For the
ZI-U traders, the shout price is drawn from a uniform distribution between 0 and pmax.
The results of the simulations of markets with ZI-C and ZI-U traders are shown in Fig-
ure 2.7. The qualitative differences between the price histories of the ZI-U, ZI-C and
human traders, can be clearly seen in the figure. Specifically, the ZI-U markets ex-
hibited little systematic pattern and no tendency to converge toward any specific level.
In human markets, transaction prices converged to stable values close to the theoreti-
cal equilibrium price, as a result of subjecting intelligent and profit-oriented bargaining
behaviour to market discipline. Gode and Sunder noted a slow convergence to the equi-
librium price during each day of trading in the ZI-C markets (see figure 2.7). They
explained this convergence by considering the narrowing of the feasible range of trans-
action prices, assuming that the traders with the highest valuation (i.e the buyers with
the highest limit prices and the sellers with the lowest cost prices) trade first. Thus,
intra-marginal ZI-C traders on the left of the demand and supply curve have a higher
probability of submitting a shout that results in a transaction. With each good traded,
the demand and supply curve shifts to the left until only extra-marginal traders remain.
As the demand and supply curve shifts, the range of feasible transaction prices narrows
with their mean converging towards the competitive equilibrium price.
The simulations also showed that the CDA institution can sustain high market efficiency
even if agents are not profit-motivated and do not exhibit strategic behaviour. In this
context, Gode and Sunder argued that the difference in performance between the ZI-
U and the ZI-C traders, and between the ZI-C and human traders, could indicate the
different extent to which overall market efficiency is dependent on the market structure
or behaviour. Thus, if ZI-C traders are considered to have zero rationality, the difference
in market performance would be attributable to the systematic rationality of human
traders. In this case, the difference between ZI-U and ZI-C traders is attributable to
market structure, where the trader is not allowed to submit a loss-making offer. ZI-C
traders have the same imposed budget constraints as human traders, but have none of
the intelligence or ability to learn from experience. Thus, the performance difference
between the ZI-C and human traders could indicate how intelligent bidding behaviour
affects market efficiency.
According to Gode and Sunder, given that the efficiency of ZI-C agents is close to that
of human traders, market efficiency appears to be almost entirely a result of market
structure. Their results therefore question previous assumptions that the efficiency of
human markets is a consequence of human intelligence (Smith, 1962). Furthermore,
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human traders had the lowest profit dispersion4, while the profit dispersion of ZI-C
traders was much closer to that of the humans than the ZI-U traders. From this, they
noted that these results suggest that individual aspects of market performance might be
sensitive to human intelligence, in contrast to market efficiency.
2.3.4.3 Zero-Intelligence Plus
The Zero-Intelligence Plus (or ZIP) strategy was first designed by Cliff and Bruten
(1997) to show that more than zero-intelligence is required to achieve efficiency close
to that of markets with human traders (see Figure 2.7). ZIP has subsequently been used
in a number of works as a benchmark for strategy evaluation (e.g. (Das et al., 2001;
Tesauro and Das, 2001; Walsh et al., 2002)).
Specifically, while the ZI strategy ignores the state of the market and past experience,
the ZIP strategy uses a history of market information and is of the predictive class,
adapting the agent’s profit margin to the future market conditions. That is, the agent
increases or lowers its profit margin to remain competitive in the market. In this context,
the profit margin determines the difference between the agent’s limit price and the shout
price.
At the beginning of the trading day, the agent has an arbitrarily low profit margin which
it increases or decreases, depending on the different market events (submitted offers by
buyers and sellers and any successful transactions) during the trading period. The ZIP
buyer increases its profit margin whenever events in the market indicate that it could
acquire a unit at a lower price than its current shout price, given by its profit margin.
For a ZIP seller, if its last shout resulted in a transaction and its shout price was less than
the transaction price, this indicates that it could transact at a lower price which would
necessarily increase its profit margin.
Conversely, ZIP buyers and sellers reduce their profit margin when this margin is too
high to remain competitive. In this case, the buyer would have market power (to influ-
ence the trend of ask prices) if the seller were to decrease its profit margin whenever an
unsuccessful bid is submitted (since a series of unsuccessful bids would unnecessarily
decrease the seller’s margin). Similarly, the buyer should not lower its profit margin
after each unsuccessful ask submitted in the market. Thus, a buyer lowers its profit
margin only after a submitted bid is rejected, while a seller lowers its profit margin only
after an unsuccessful ask. It is also necessary to consider the trader’s strategy after a
4 Profit dispersion is the root-mean-square error between actual profit and the profit given an optimal
allocation.
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successful shout. If the last bid was successful, the unsuccessful seller lowers its profit
margin so as not to be undercut by the competing sellers. The unsuccessful buyer low-
ers its profit margin after an ask was accepted by a competing buyer. We summarise the
bidding behaviour of the ZIP trader in Figure 2.8, where pbi(t) and p
s
j(t) are the most
profitable offer to buy or sell of ZIP buyer i and seller j respectively, at any time during
the trading period and s(t) denotes the price of the most recent shout. In particular, we
have 6 different rules that specify when to increase or decrease the profit margin.
Adaptive Rules for the ZIP Seller:
if (last shout was accepted at price s(t))
1. any seller j for which psj(t) ≤ s(t) should raise its profit margin
2. if (last shout was a bid)
1. any active seller j for which psj(t) ≥ s(t) should lower its margin
else
2. if (last shout was an offer)
1. any active seller j for which psj(t) ≥ s(t) should lower its margin
Adaptive Rules for the ZIP Buyer:
if (last shout was accepted at price s(t))
1. any buyer i for which pbi (t) ≥ s(t) should raise its profit margin
2. if (last shout was an offer)
1. any active buyer i for which pbi (t) ≤ s(t) should lower its margin
else
2. if (last shout was a bid)
1. any active buyer i for which pbi (t) ≤ s(t) should lower its margin
FIGURE 2.8: The ZIP Trading Strategy.
In this case, the profit margin is modified using a simple adaptive mechanism based
on the Widrow-Hoff algorithm (Widrow and Hoff, 1960). This is a continuous-space
learning mechanism that back-projects the error between the current value and some
desired value onto that current value. At any given time t, the ZIP trader i calculates the
shout-price, pi(t), given its limit price, `i, and trader’s profit margin, µi(t), according to
the following equation:
pi(t) = `i(1 + µi(t)) (2.7)
Chapter 2 Literature Review 33
The ZIP seller’s margin is raised by increasing µi(t) and is lowered by decreasing µi(t),
µi(t) ∈ [0,∞). Conversely, the ZIP buyer raises and lowers its profit margin by de-
creasing and increasing µi(t) respectively. The initial profit margin, µi(0), is drawn
from a uniform distribution over the range [0.1, 0.5] at the beginning of the simulation.
The aim of dynamically modifying µi(t) is for the trader’s shout price to remain com-
petitive against that of other participants. The learning mechanism of the profit margin
is given in the following equations:
µi(t+ 1) = (pi(t) + Γi(t+ 1))/`i − 1
Γi(t+ 1) = γiΓi(t) + (1− γi)∆i(t),
where Γi(0) = 0 ∀i (2.8)
∆i(t) = βi(τi(t)− pi(t))
τi(t) = Ri(t)s(t) + Ai(t) (2.9)
where the learning coefficient, βi ∈ [0.1, 0.5], determines the rate of convergence of
the trader’s shout price toward the target price τi(t). Here, Ri is a randomly generated
coefficient that sets the target price relative to the submitted shout price q(t), with Ri ∈
(1, 1.05] to increase τi(t) (when increasing the profit margin) andRi ∈ [0.95, 1) to lower
τi(t) (when reducing the profit margin). Ai(t) is an absolute perturbation, so the target
price differs by at least a few units (of the minimum increment on the outstanding bid or
ask), from even relatively small shout prices. Ai(t) is drawn from a uniform distribution
over [0, 0.05] for an absolute increase and over [−0.05, 0] for an absolute decrease. If
we were to set τi(t) to q(t), the trader would never be able to submit an offer.
Furthermore, Cliff and Bruten (1997) improved their learning mechanism to minimise
the effect of high-frequency changes in bids or asks, by considering the momentum
(trend) of shout prices. The momentum-based updates are given in Equation 2.8. Specif-
ically, the momentum coefficient, γi ∈ [0, 1], determines the weight of previous shout
prices on the change in the profit margin. When γi is equal to 0, the learning mecha-
nism is myopic and ignores past quotes, while a high γi gives more weight to the trend
of shout prices. In their simulations, γi is uniformly distributed over the range [0.2, 0.6].
Thus, the ZIP strategy has a set of 8 different parameters (βi, γi, Ri and Ai to increase,
Ri and Ai to decrease the margin, µi(0) for the buyer and the seller) that determine how
to increase or decrease the profit margin which is specified by the 6 different rules.
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FIGURE 2.9: The right panel shows the results from simulations with ZIP traders
(taken from (Cliff and Bruten, 1997)). The left panel illustrates the demand and supply
used for the first 11 trading periods. Thereon, the competitive equilibrium price is
increased to 225.
The results of simulations of the ZIP strategy in the CDA are presented in Figure 2.9. As
can be seen, the transaction prices converge towards the competitive equilibrium price
after a few trading days, and remain at that level with low variance. The ZIP strategy
was shown to readily achieve results that were closer to human traders than ZI-C traders,
even though the initial parameters of the ZIP trader were not optimised for the demand
and supply of the market. Cliff and Bruten (1997) also showed that the profit dispersion
of ZIP traders was significantly lower than that of ZI-C traders. Furthermore, a sudden
change in endowment of limit and cost prices to buyers and sellers respectively (i.e. a
market shock) at the beginning of period 12, is considered. In that case, the competitive
equilibrium price increases from 200 to 225. The result in Figure 2.9 shows that the
ZIP strategy rapidly adjusts to the new equilibrium price given by the new demand and
supply.
The ZIP strategy was subsequently extended to ZIP60. Because more computation
capability meant that the set of 8 parameters employed in ZIP did not need to be the
same for all the 6 different learning rules (that specify when to increase or decrease the
profit margin), Cliff (2005) proposed an extension of the number of parameters to 60.
Thus, ZIP was extended to ZIP60 (Cliff, 2005). In more detail, first, the 8 parameters to
update the margin were extended to 10 (see (Cliff, 2005) for further details), and rather
than using the same set of 10 parameters for each of the updating rules, he now had a
set of 10 parameters for each rule. Thus, 8 parameters are extended to 60 such that the
strategy can be better tailored to the market environment. The 60 parameters are chosen
as the solution to a Genetic Algorithm (GA) search to find the point in a 60-dimensional
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space that improves the convergence of transaction prices and effectively minimises α
(see Equation 2.2).
The extensive results given in (Cliff, 2005), clearly show that the ZIP60 strategy per-
forms better than ZIP, with up to 10% improvement in certain cases. Furthermore, the
author did a principal component analysis of the parameters to identify any correlation
between the data and, indeed, he validated his approach by ensuring that the param-
eters were not simply a combination of the original set of 8 parameters of the ZIP.
Furthermore, the author observed that some parameters contributed marginally to the
effectiveness of the strategy, such that a ZIP50 would in theory suffice. Such reduction
of the parameter space implies faster discovery of the best parameters.
However, one shortcoming with the method is that the strategies are evolved for a spe-
cific set of demand and supply. Given that in almost all cases this is unknown a priori,
some doubts have to be cast on the effectiveness of such an approach. Having said this,
this work does provide useful insights on how strategies can be evolved to satisfy a par-
ticular market. The approach could be extended to consider a space of market demand
and supply (assuming that the ZIP60 agent is only aware that it is participating in a
particular market randomly selected from a known space), rather than specific ones.
2.3.4.4 Gjerstad-Dickhaut
We now look at a different class of strategies, namely the history-based and non-predictive
GD family. The GD strategy, developed by (Gjerstad and Dickhaut, 1998), is based on
a belief function that an agent builds to indicate whether a particular shout is likely to
be accepted in the market. It was later extended to GDX (Tesauro and Bredin, 2002)
which also considers the time left before the auction closes.
In the GD strategy, buyers form beliefs that a bid will be accepted and similarly sellers
form beliefs that an ask will be accepted in the market. The traders form their beliefs on
the basis of the history of observed market data and, particularly, on the frequencies of
submitted bids and asks and of accepted bids and asks resulting in a transaction. Given
this information, the bidding strategy is to submit the shout that maximises the trader’s
own expected surplus, which is the product of its belief function and its risk-neutral5
utility function. The GD strategy also implicitly considers the notion of recency, by
5The risk-neutral agent uses a linear utility function and submits the price that maximises its expected
profit.
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limiting the trader’s memory length, L, to a few transactions (L was set to 5 in Gjer-
stad and Dickhaut’s simulations). The most recent history of shouts and transactions is
considered.
In Gjerstad and Dickhaut’s model, the seller’s belief function, p̂(a), is based on the
following assumptions. If an ask a′ < a has been rejected, then an ask, a, will also be
rejected. Similarly, if an ask a′ > a has been accepted, then an ask submitted at a will
also be accepted. Furthermore, if a bid b′ > a is made, then an ask a′ = b′ would have
been taken, since they assume that this ask a′ would be acceptable to the buyer who bid
b′. Similar assumptions are made about the buyer’s belief function, q̂(b). We now define
the bid and ask frequencies ∀d ∈ D, where D is the set of all permissible shout prices
in the market, used in the belief function.
Definition 2.17. Bid Frequencies: ∀d ∈ D, B(d) is the total number of bid offers
made at price d, TB(d) is the frequency of accepted bids at d, and RB(d) the frequency
of rejected bids at d.
Definition 2.18. Ask Frequencies: ∀d ∈ D, A(d) is the total number of ask offers
made at price d, TA(d) is the frequency of accepted asks at d, and RA(d) the frequency
of rejected asks at d.
Definition 2.19. The Seller’s Belief Function for each potential ask price, a, is defined
as:
p̂(a) =
∑
d≥a TA(d) +
∑
d≥aB(d)∑
d≥a TA(d) +
∑
d≥aB(d) +
∑
d≤aRA(d)
(2.10)
Definition 2.20. The Buyer’s Belief Function for each potential bid price, b, is defined
as:
q̂(b) =
∑
d≤b TB(d) +
∑
d≤aA(d)∑
d≤a TB(d) +
∑
d≤aA(d) +
∑
d≥aRB(d)
(2.11)
The seller’s belief function is modified to satisfy the NYSE spread reduction rule (see
Section 2.2). Thus, for any ask that is higher than the current outstanding ask, the belief
function is set to 0 (i.e. that ask cannot be accepted). Similarly for the buyer, the belief
that any bid submitted that is below the outstanding bid is accepted is 0 (i.e. that bid
cannot be accepted).
Furthermore, because the belief function is defined over the set of all bids and asks
within the trader’s memory, the belief is extended to the space of all potential bids or
asks allowed in the market, constrained by the outstanding bid and ask and the step-size
of the belief function. Then, cubic spline interpolation is used on each successive pair
of data items to calculate the belief of points in between the pair of data. In particular, a
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cubic function6, p(a) = α3a3 + α2a2 + α1a+ α0, that ensures each two successive pair
of points is constructed with the following properties:
1. p(ak) = p̂(ak)
2. p(ak+1) = p̂(ak+1)
3. p′(ak) = 0
4. p′(ak+1) = 0
The coefficients, αi ∀i = {0..3}, that satisfy the above properties, are then given by the
solution to the following equation:

a3k a
2
k ak 1
a3k+1 a
2
k+1 ak+1 1
3a2k 2ak 1 0
3a2k+1 2ak+1 1 0


α3
α2
α1
α0
 =

p̂(ak)
p̂(ak+1)
0
0
 (2.12)
Then, the buyer’s belief function, q(b), is constructed similarly using the pairs (bk, q̂(bk))
and (bk+1, q̂(bk+1)). Having defined the belief functions, Gjerstad and Dickhaut proved
that the beliefs are monotonically non-increasing (see (Gjerstad and Dickhaut, 1998)
for further details). Thus, the belief of an ask, a > a′ being accepted has to be lower
than the belief of a′ being accepted, and, similarly, the belief of a bid, b < b′, has to be
lower than that of b. On this basis, we can clearly see that monotonicity of beliefs is an
essential property that the belief function of the GD strategy must satisfy.
FIGURE 2.10: A typical belief function of a buyer (function q(b) on the right) and a
seller (function p(a) on the left).
6We noted that the Gjerstad and Dickhaut use a particular type of interpolation where the gradient
of the function at the known values is 0. While smoother functions could have been used, experiments
demonstrated no further improvement using such functions.
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Given the belief function, the GD strategy forms an offer to buy or sell that maximises
the trader’s expected surplus (which is defined as the product of its belief function and
its utility function, pi(a)). Because Gjerstad and Dickhaut consider risk-neutral traders,
the utility function is linear and equals the profit of the traders; that is, the difference
between the seller’s ask price and its cost price, and the difference between the buyer’s
bid price and its limit price. When the trader’s maximum expected surplus is negative,
there is no incentive to submit a bid or an ask and the trader abstains from bidding. The
trader’s utility function and its surplus maximisation is formulated as follows:
For a buyer i,
pi(b) =
{
`i − b if b < `i
0 if b ≥ `i
For a seller j,
pi(a) =
{
a− cj if a > cj
0 if a ≤ cj
b∗ = arg max
b∈(oask,obid)
[pi(b).q(b)] (2.13)
a∗ = arg max
a∈(oask,obid)
[pi(a).p(a)] (2.14)
The performance of the GD strategy was empirically evaluated through a set of labora-
tory experiments. The results of the simulations showed that the efficiency of markets
with GD traders was close to optimal with rapid convergence of transaction prices to
the competitive equilibrium price with an equilibrium quantity of trade (a volume tun-
nel between 5 and 7) during each trading day (see Figure 2.11). By shifting the demand
and supply after five trading days, it was also shown that GD traders responded to the
changing market dynamics, and transaction prices adjusted to the new competitive equi-
librium. Furthermore, GD was evaluated in heterogeneous populations, against ZI, ZIP
and Kaplan. It was shown that the GD (with a slight modification) was the most effi-
cient, closely followed by ZIP. Specifically, GD extracted 1.7% more profit than ZIP in
a heterogeneous population of the two strategies. While GD was the state of the art in
the non-predictive class, ZIP was the state of the art in the predictive class.
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FIGURE 2.11: Left panel illustrates demand and supply of the market. Note the change
in demand and supply (after 5 trading days). D denotes the demand curve, S the supply
curve, P price and Q quantity. Results from market simulations with GD traders are
shown in the right panel. The x-axis is divided into the different trading days, with
the x-axis values corresponding to transacted quantities for each period (taken from
(Gjerstad and Dickhaut, 1998)).
Now, although GD was successful, Tesauro and Bredin believed they could improve
upon it by factoring time into its decision making process as the expected number of
bidding opportunities before the auction closes. This means that the GDX agent has the
opportunity to trade later on during the trading day and can thus wait for more profitable
transactions than GD which assumes it has a single bidding opportunity whenever it is
submitting a bid or an ask.
In particular, GDX calculates the belief in a similar manner as GD, but uses dynamic
programming (coupled with the expected profit maximisation process) to decide on the
best price and when to submit a bid or an ask. The following equation and the algorithm
given in Figure 2.12 describe exactly the price formation process in GDX:
p∗(T ) = arg max
p∈(oask,obid)
(f(p, T ) [sM(p) + γV (M − 1, N − 1)] +
(1− f(p, T ))γV (M,N − 1)) (2.15)
where V (m,n) is the expected profit of themth allocation a trader has to bid or ask for
at the nth bidding opportunity, and is computed by the algorithm given in Figure 2.12,
with V (m, 0) = 0 ∀m and V (0, n) = 0 ∀n. Here, γ ∈ [0, 1] represents a discount factor
associated with bids or asks and f(b, T ) is the belief function, at time T, of the buyer or
the seller, and sM(p) is the profit for an offer p for the M th unit a trader has to buy or
sell. The optimal bid or ask to submit at time T is then p∗(T ).
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FIGURE 2.12: Calculating V (m,n) using a dynamic programming algorithm (taken
from (Tesauro and Bredin, 2002)).
FIGURE 2.13: An example of a GDX bid price based on the number of bidding oppor-
tunities (taken from (Tesauro and Bredin, 2002)).
Whenever the GDX agent is triggered to submit a bid or an ask in the market, it estimates
the number of bidding opportunities, N , before the auction closes, and calculates the
optimal bid or ask given the agent’s belief function that a bid or an ask will be accepted
in the market. It assumes that the belief function is invariant of time such that GDX
and GD use the same belief function. Figure 2.13 gives an example of the different bids
calculated given the number of bidding opportunities N . Note that the bid price for a
single bidding opportunity is equal to a GD bid price. The strategy is then benchmarked
against GD and ZIP in a balanced heterogeneous population (where the two strategies
are represented equally), and agents are endowed with either a single unit or a set of
units (10 in this case) to buy or sell.
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FIGURE 2.14: The average profit difference between GD and GDX in a balanced
heterogeneous population, over 1000 runs. Each agent has a single unit to trade and
the theoretical population surplus is 1500.0 (taken from (Tesauro and Bredin, 2002)).
First, the results of GDX against GD are given in Figures 2.14 and 2.15, where the dif-
ference in average profit between GDX and GD is compared over the space of feasible
discount factors, γ, for single unit and multi units respectively. In the former case, GDX
extracts more profit than its GD counterpart, with a maximum difference of about 2.5%
when γ = 0.99. In the latter case, with multi-unit allocations, GDX does not always
extract more profit, but generally performs better than GD, with a maximum difference
in average profit of about 0.5% when γ = 0.9. We also note a drop in performance of
GDX when γ approaches 1 (see Figure 2.15), and the authors suggest that this is due to
the poor accuracy of the forecast of their belief function far into the future. Generally,
the GDX strategy clearly showed improvement over GD, though in some cases, this
improvement was not significant.
Next, the authors benchmarked GDX (and GD) against ZIP in a multi-unit allocation
setting, with GDX adopting the best discount factor of 0.9 identified in the results from
previous experiments (see Figure 2.15). The results are summarised in Table 2.1. As
can be seen, both GD and GDX performed better than ZIP, though the average profit
difference was higher for GDX. Thus, the benefits of the time-dependent and dynamic
programming approach are indeed validated with the increase of average profit differ-
ence from 3.3% to 3.9%.
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FIGURE 2.15: The average difference between GD and GDX in a balanced heteroge-
neous population, over 1000 runs. Each agent has 10 units to trade and the theoretical
population surplus is 1500.0 (taken from (Tesauro and Bredin, 2002)).
Groups Profit Difference (and % of total theoretical surplus)
GDX vs ZIP +102.8 (3.9%)
GD vs ZIP +87.1 (3.3%)
TABLE 2.1: The average surplus difference when GD and GDX (γ = 0.9) compete
against ZIP in a balanced heterogeneous population. The theoretical population surplus
is 2612.0.
2.3.4.5 Fuzzy Logic
The FL (fuzzy logic based) bidding strategy (He et al., 2003) is non-predictive and uses
a history of transaction prices. It employs heuristic fuzzy rules and fuzzy reasoning
mechanisms (Zadeh, 1965) in order to determine the best bid or ask offer given the
current state of the market. We begin by introducing some of the notations used.
Definition 2.21. The reference price, PR, is the median of the ordered history of trans-
action prices.
Definition 2.22. The valid bids set, Db, is the set of the valid bids that a buyer can
submit:
Db =
{
b|b0 < b ≤ min(a0, lbi )
}
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where b is the price at which a buyer submits a bid and lbi is the limit price of buyer i.
Definition 2.23. The valid asks set, Ds, is the set of the valid asks that a seller can
submit:
Ds =
{
a|max(b0, lsj) ≤ a < a0
}
where a is the price at which a seller submits an ask and lsj is the cost price of seller j.
Definition 2.24. A triangular fuzzy number, z, is used to represent a real number, and
is represented as follows:
z = (m, θ, χ)
where m is the center, and θ and χ are the left and right spreads respectively (see figure
2.16). The triangular number is described in detail in (He et al., 2003).
FIGURE 2.16: Triangular fuzzy number z = (m, θ, χ) (taken from (He et al., 2003)).
Now, when an FL agent submits an offer, it considers the outstanding bid, the out-
standing ask, its limit price or cost price and the reference price PR (see Definition
2.21). While the authors do not relate it explicitly to the competitive market equilib-
rium (discussed in Section 2.1), they regard it as a suitable transaction price. Now,
when PR ≤ b0 < a0 or b0 < a0 ≤ PR, a set of heuristic rules is used to decide whether
or not to submit an offer, and, if so, at what price. These rules are summarised in Figure
2.17 for both the FL buyer and the FL seller. For example, in rule SR1, when b0 is
much bigger than PR, the agent accepts the outstanding bid, b0. Otherwise, the agent
submits an ask given by the triangular fuzzy number (a0 − βs,1, θ, χ). The fuzzy sets in
Figure 2.18, represent the different relations, such as ‘b0 is much bigger than PR’, used
in the fuzzy heuristic rules. Furthermore, the β parameters used in the fuzzy rules, θ
and χ, are specified at the beginning of the trading day. Parameters P1, P2, P3 and P4
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FIGURE 2.17: Fuzzy heuristic rules for the FL buyer (BR1 and BR2) and the FL seller
(SR1 and SR2).
(see Figure 2.18) are associated with the different rules and β parameters, and are also
decided prior to the CDA game.
When b0 ≤ PR < a0, however, the bidding process is more complex and is handled
by a fuzzy reasoning mechanism. In this case, the rules for the FL buyer are presented
in Figure 2.19 and those of the FL seller in Figure 2.20. Here, the distance between
a0 or b0 and the reference price is expressed using the fuzzy linguistic terms far from,
medium to and close to defined in figure 2.21. The λ parameters, θ and χ, are also
initialised at the beginning of the trading day.
The fuzzy heuristic rules and the fuzzy reasoning mechanism output a triangular fuzzy
number that represents a bid (zb(b)) or an ask (zs(a)). Based on that fuzzy number,
zs(a) = (ms, θs, χs), the seller submits an ask given by the following formulae:
DSs =
{
a|a ∈ Ds ∩ {a|zs(a) ≥ pis}}
ask =
 b0 if b0 ∈ DSsargmax
a∈DSs
{zs(a)} otherwise (2.16)
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FIGURE 2.18: Fuzzy sets in heuristic rules (taken from (He et al., 2003)). (a) Out-
standing bid is much bigger than PR (SR1). (b) Outstanding ask is much smaller than
PR (SR2). (c) Outstanding ask is much smaller than PR (BR1). (d) Outstanding bid is
much bigger than PR (BR2) (taken from (He et al., 2003)).
FIGURE 2.19: Fuzzy Rule Base for FL buyers.
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FIGURE 2.20: Fuzzy Rule Base for FL sellers.
FIGURE 2.21: Fuzzy sets used in fuzzy reasoning (taken from (He et al., 2003)).
Using the output fuzzy number, zb(b) = (mb, θb, χb), the buyer submits a bid given by
the following formulae:
DSb =
{
b|b ∈ Db ∩ {b|zb(b) ≥ pib}}
bid =
 a0 if a0 ∈ DSbargmax
b∈DSb
{zb(b)} otherwise (2.17)
Furthermore, the authors extended the FL strategy and described how a different set
of parameters for the fuzzy sets can be chosen for the FL agent to adopt different risk
attitudes (see Figure 2.22 where the agent has different utility functions for different
attidutes), and how a set of simple learning rules can be used to change the FL agent’s
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risk attitude to be more profitable in the market. The learning is based on how frequently
the agent is trading (with ‘how frequently’ defined by the fuzzy sets given in Figure
2.23) and a set of rules given in Figure 2.24.
FIGURE 2.22: Utility functions of FL agents with different risk attitudes: risk-neutral
(N), risk-seeking (S) and risk-averse (A) (taken from (He et al., 2003)).
FIGURE 2.23: Two fuzzy sets for transaction rate. This rate is calculated by the number
of transactions made by an agent divided by the total transaction numbers in the market
after the latest change of the FL agents attitude towards risk (taken from (He et al.,
2003)).
FIGURE 2.24: Learning rule of the FL agent. A(i)attitude denotes the attitude of agent i,
r is the learning rate, and δ is the minimum change in the risk attitude.
The FL strategy was benchmarked against some of the most common strategies in the
CDA, namely the ZI and the GD which we have seen in this section, and the CP strategy
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(Preist and Tol, 1998), a variant of the ZIP strategy in heterogeneous populations with
5 buyers and 5 sellers each adopting one of the 5 strategies we investigate. The results
are shown in Figure 2.25. As can be seen, the FL and GD buyers and sellers obtained
higher profits than with the other strategies. The authors attribute the performance of
FL to two factors. First, the FL agent considers the outstanding bid and ask, as well
as a reference, which they believe is a very important factor in bidding. Second, the
FL strategy can dynamically vary the rate of increase (decrease) in bid (ask) offers
according to the prevailing market conditions. Thus, the FL strategy can jump from a
very low bid to a transaction price, as opposed to the benchmark strategies which only
increase (decrease) their bids (asks) gradually.
Furthermore, we observe that some of the results are questionable as CP, based on ZIP,
is sometimes outperformed by ZI, which was shown otherwise in (Tesauro and Das,
2001). We believe this can be accounted for by their non-conventional methodology
with 5 buyers with 5 strategies and 5 sellers with 5 strategies. We also observe that the
performance of FL is only marginally better than GD. However, the authors also point
out that, in a homogeneous population of FL agents, the efficiency is around 85% which
is considerably lower than that of GD and GDX (which is around 99%). Because FL
does best when it can exploit the bidding behaviour of other strategies, its behaviour
can be compared to that of Kaplan which also does not do well in a homogeneous
population. For these reasons, FL cannot be adopted in a decentralised system for
resource allocation.
FIGURE 2.25: Performance of agents with different strategies (taken from (He et al.,
2003)). The horizontal axis represents the demand and supply of the market and the
vertical axis represents the total profit of the corresponding agent using a specific strat-
egy in one session. Panel (a) shown buyers’ total profits and panel (b), sellers’ total
profits.
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2.3.5 Evaluating Strategies
Given the avalanche of strategies for the CDA and our research aim to evaluate these
strategies, we now review the methodologies that exist for doing this. In particular, we
divide the review into separate categories for homogeneous and heterogeneous envi-
ronments because we wish to observe how a strategy performs on its own and when
opposed to other strategies. For the homogeneous case, the emergent behaviour of the
market is more interesting from a system designer’s perspective. For the heterogeneous
case, the emergent behaviour of the market is of interest, though, from an agent’s per-
spective, the efficiency of the different strategies in the market would be insightful. We
now look at each case in turn.
2.3.5.1 Homogeneous Populations
Related work on evaluating strategies for the CDA has typically looked at the aver-
age efficiency of a strategy over several trading days, in static markets with symmetric
demand and supply (e.g. (Gjerstad and Dickhaut, 1998; Tesauro and Das, 2001)). How-
ever, we believe this has a number of shortcomings.
First, analysing the daily efficiency of the strategy provides more insight into how ef-
fective a strategy is in learning from market interactions. This view is partly supported
by (Cliff and Bruten, 1997), though they focus on the daily price volatility. Specifically,
we believe that as the agent learns to be more competitive in a static market and the
transaction prices converge towards the competitive equilibrium price, we expect its ef-
ficiency to improve. Such an analysis would allow us to observe just that. Thus, it is
important to measure efficiency on a daily basis because it gives us insights into how the
behaviour of the market is changing and, in particular, is improving. Moreover, such
observations would not be possible if we just focused on average efficiency because
we end up with a scalar value that does not say anything about the trend of the daily
efficiencies. Second, we believe that daily price volatility should also be looked at. To
date, however, only Cliff and Bruten (1997) consider such a metric. Because the com-
petitive market equilibrium is usually central in a strategy, the price volatility, calculated
as Smith’s parameter (see Section 2.1), is important because it gives insights into how
the agents adjust their behaviours such that the transaction prices converge to that equi-
librium. The rate of convergence usually determines how fast the market reaches a high
efficiency and, thus, would be useful in analysing the effectiveness of a strategy in a
homogeneous population. Third, only Cliff and Bruten (1997) have looked at dynamic
environments with different market demand and supply. However, they only describe
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how transaction prices change, and not how daily efficiency and price volatility change
in such environments. This is important because, as discussed in Section 1.1, we are
considering decentralised resource allocation in both static and dynamic environments.
Thus, it would be interesting to analyse how daily efficiency and price volatility change
in both types of environments. Furthermore, because demand and supply cannot be
known a priori, we must ensure that the strategies are evaluated in markets with differ-
ent types of representative demand and supply, and not simply the standard cases (with
symmetric demand and supply) to ensure the significance of our analysis.
Given these shortcomings, we need to use an analytical method that considers both
market efficiency and price volatility, on a daily basis, to highlight this learning in both
static and dynamic markets with different market demand and supply.
2.3.5.2 Heterogeneous Populations
When we consider methodologies for evaluating strategies in heterogeneous popula-
tions, we come across two principal approaches. The first one (adopted in (Tesauro
and Das, 2001; Tesauro and Bredin, 2002; Vytelingum et al., 2004)) consists of com-
paring the efficiency of strategies in balanced populations (where strategies are adopted
in equal proportions). However, this approach fails to consider unbalanced populations
where strategies are present in different proportions. The second one proposed byWalsh
et al. (2002) and adopted in (Phelps et al., 2004; Vytelingum et al., 2006) does allow
unbalanced populations. This approach is important because a strategy might perform
better or worse based on the number of buyers and sellers that adopt it, an insight which
would allow us to better evaluate a strategy and, thus, we consider this approach in this
thesis.
In particular, Walsh et al. propose an evolutionary game-theoretic (EGT) approach
based on computing the mixed-Nash equilibrium of heuristic strategies and the dy-
namics analysis of equilibrium convergence (Weibull, 1995). Now, because an EGT
analysis is infeasible for all but the simplest games (such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma
(Weibull, 1995)), Walsh et al. describe how complex games that involve repeated inter-
actions with more elaborate actions and payoffs, can be made amenable to such analy-
sis. Specifically, their model considers the high-level, heuristic strategies of the trading
agents as simple actions, and the payoff to these strategies is the average profit extracted
in the market (by so doing, they essentially abstract a complex iterated game to a simple
normal-form one). To illustrate their approach, they apply it to two different games,
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namely the Automated Dynamic Pricing (ADP) game and the CDA game. In the for-
mer, they analyse how sellers endowed with a set of heuristic strategies interact in the
market, and what strategies these sellers are most likely to adopt. In the latter, they
consider the strategic interaction of agents that use the same strategy as a buyer and
a seller. Their methodology has now been widely adopted and, in particular, (Phelps
et al., 2004) used it to compare two different auction mechanisms (the continuous and
the call double auction mechanism) with similar strategies were available for both.
Given this background, we first describe Walsh et al.’s EGT model in more detail and,
specifically, how they compute the heuristic payoff table that details the expected pay-
off to each agent (as a function of the S strategies that agents are allowed to play and
the combination of the A agents playing those strategies). We then describe how this
table can be used to compute the mixed-Nash equilibrium of the game and the well-
documented replicator dynamics model (Weibull, 1995) (which is a standard way of
representing the population distribution changes), to analyse the CDA. Finally, we de-
scribe how they apply their model to the CDA.
Computing the Heuristic Payoff Table: With the heuristic payoff table, the expected
payoff of a player playing a strategy, j, given the strategies adopted by the other (A−1)
players is required. Now, because of the non-deterministic and complex nature of the
CDA game, some simplifications are required:
1. The payoff of a strategy is the average payoff of an agent playing that strategy in
the CDA game, given the different strategies all the A agents are playing in that
game.
2. All agents have the same set of strategies to play, and have the same payoff when
playing the same strategy. Thus, as described in (Walsh et al., 2002), we can
restrict our analysis to symmetric games (Weibull, 1995), and significantly reduce
the complexity of the problem. Rather than having a table of size SA, we reduce
it to
(
A+S−1
A
)
entries.
Given these, a heuristic payoff table7 can be built by considering the exhaustive set of
strategies the A agents can play, and the number of agents playing each strategy (rather
than considering which strategy each of the A agents is playing). Now, because payoff
in the CDA game is non-deterministic, a significant number of independent simulations
7A table entry for a 20-player game with 3 strategies would be (|S1|, |S2|, |S3|, U1, U2, U3) where
Sj is the set of agents playing strategy j, |Sj | is the number of agents playing strategy j, and Uj is the
average payoff of an agent playing strategy j. Note
∑3
j=1 |Sj | = 20 and there are 231 entries.
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are required for each table entry to ensure that these are representative values. Thus, for
each entry, a statistically significant number of CDA games is required with A agents,
each assigned a strategy and a type (buyer or seller) to play, ensuring there is an equal
number of buyers and sellers, with a probability of 0.5 that there will be an additional
buyer or seller if A is odd.
Given the heuristic payoff table, we now look at the EGT analysis as is done with a
normal-form game.
Computing the Equilibrium: Here, we describe how Walsh et al. compute the mixed-
Nash equilibrium of the CDA. An agent i chooses the strategy it plays according to
its mixed-strategy, pˆi = (pˆi,1, ..., pˆi,S) and
∑S
j=1 pˆi,j = 1, where pˆi,j represents the
probability that agent i plays strategy j. At the equilibrium, pˆ∗i , an agent i cannot
receive a higher payoff by unilaterally deviating to another mixed-strategy, assuming
that the other agents do not change their strategies (Weibull, 1995). Now, because they
assume a symmetric game, all agents have the same mixed-strategy and the same mixed-
Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, because a very large population is being considered,
they validate that p is equal to the mixed-strategy. Given this, they denote both the
population distribution and the mixed-strategy as p = (p1, ..., pS), and the mixed-Nash
equilibrium as pnash hereafter.
In the EGT analysis, they denote the expected payoff of an agent playing a strategy j,
given the mixed-strategy p, as u(ej, p). To compute u(ej, p), they consider the results
from a large number of CDA games with an agent playing strategy j and (A−1) agents
selected from the population, with a mixed-strategy p. For each game and every strategy,
they average8 the individual payoffs (obtained from the heuristic-payoff table) of agents
using strategy j. The mixed-Nash equilibrium is then formulated as the argument to
the minimisation problem given in Equations 2.18 and 2.19. Specifically, pnash is a
mixed-Nash equilibrium if and only if it is a global minimum of v(p) (Walsh et al.,
2002; McKelvey and McLennan, 1996), and they validate that p is a global minimum if
v(p) = 0.
v(p) =
S∑
j=1
(
max
[
u(ej, p)− u(p, p), 0])2 (2.18)
where u(p, p) =
∑S
j=1 u(e
j, p)pj is the average payoff of an agent in a population with
distribution p.
8In effect, here, they are not running the CDA game for every simulation, but only selecting the
appropriate payoff from our heuristic payoff table each time.
Chapter 2 Literature Review 53
pnash = argmin
p∈∆
[v(p)] (2.19)
Solving such a non-linear minimisation problem is non-trivial and computationally de-
manding. Thus, they use the Amoeba non-linear optimiser (see (Walsh et al., 2002) for
more detail) to find the zero-points of the function v. Because the algorithm used is
a non-linear local minimiser, they restarted the algorithm repeatedly at random points
within the unit-simplex until they had found 30 previously-discovered equilibria in a
row.
Now, while the mixed-Nash equilibrium gives a theoretical and static perspective of the
simplified CDA game, the dynamics of the game and how the equilibria are reached
often provide more insight. Given this, they turn to the replicator dynamics which
have been shown to be a good model for agent learning (with agents learning using
reinforcement learning to reach the equilibrium (Tuyls and Nowe, 2005)).
Computing the Replicator Dynamics: The replicator dynamics, p˙ = (p˙1, ..., p˙S), de-
scribe how the population distribution p changes (where p = (p1, p2, ..., pS), p ∈ ∆ is an
element of a unit-simplex ∆, and
∑S
j=1 pj = 1). This approach assumes that an agent
deviates to another strategy that appears to be receiving a higher payoff. Specifically, p˙
is a vector given as follows:
p˙j =
[
u(ej, p)− u(p, p)] pj (2.20)
To observe the dynamics of the game, we calculate trajectories (i.e. how the mixed
strategies change). In more detail, we start with any mixed strategy p, and calculate the
dynamics p˙. The replicator dynamics show the strategy trajectories and how they con-
verge to an equilibrium, though they do not necessarily settle at a fixed point (Weibull,
1995). In this context, an equilibrium to which trajectories converge, and settle, is
known as an attractor, while a saddle point is an unstable equilibrium at which trajec-
tories do not settle. The region within which all trajectories converge to a particular
equilibrium is known as the basin of attraction of that equilibrium. The basin is a very
useful measure of the adoption of the attractor equilibrium and its area determines how
likely the population is to converge to that equilibrium. More formally:
Definition 2.25. A trajectory is the change in mixed strategy, starting from a particular
mixed strategy, and following the replicator dynamics.
Definition 2.26. An attractor is a mixed-Nash equilibrium towards which the replica-
tor dynamics (trajectories) converge.
Chapter 2 Literature Review 54
Definition 2.27. A saddle point is a mixed-Nash equilibrium from which replicator
dynamics (trajectories) diverge9.
Definition 2.28. A basin of attraction of a mixed-Nash equilibrium is the space of
mixed strategy from which trajectories will converge to that equilibrium.
Here, they compute p˙ by starting at different population distributions p inside the unit-
simplex and following the trajectory given by Equation 2.20.
Having outlined the basic concepts, we now show how they can be used to analyse the
dynamic behaviour of strategies in a CDA. Specifically, we describe Walsh et al.’s EGT
analysis of a 20-agent CDA with three different strategies, namely Kaplan, ZIP and GD
(see Subsection 2.3.4).
FIGURE 2.26: (a) The replicator dynamics of a 20-agent CDA. Here, there are two
attractors: A and C and a saddle point: B. (b) Replicator dynamics if the payoffs were
perturbed such that 5% of the payoffs of Kaplan and ZIP were transferred to GD (taken
from (Walsh et al., 2002)).
The replicator dynamics of the analysis are given in Figure 2.26(a). The different ver-
tices correspond to one of the pure strategies, while the gray shading denotes the mag-
nitude of the dynamics |p˙|. Specifically, we have two attractors A and C, towards which
all the trajectories converge, and a saddle point B from which trajectories diverge10.
When we have a majority of ZIP agents, we can see that it is more profitable to deviate
to Kaplan, suggesting that Kaplan does well when in the minority. However, as too
9The term deflector would be more intuitive. However, we use saddle point to be consistent with the
literature.
10Note that D is not a saddle point. In the three-strategy game, at D, there are incentives to deviate to
Kaplan. Because at a saddle point, there are no incentive to deviate to any strategy, D is one.
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many agents adopt Kaplan, there are fewer agents for Kaplan to exploit (see Subsection
2.3.4.1 for more detail). Then, when Kaplan is in the majority, agents are economically
motivated to deviate to ZIP. This results in a balance of the population at the mixed-Nash
equilibrium A.We observe a similar behaviour with Kaplan and GD, with a mixed-Nash
equilibrium B. Furthermore, we generally observe that agents tend to deviate from GD
to Kaplan and ZIP when GD is in the majority. As the behaviour of the agents evolves,
it usually settles at either A or C. However, there is a considerably larger probability11
that A will be adopted.
Walsh et al. also describe how to predict the replicator dynamics if a strategy were to be
improved. Specifically, they showed how the dynamics change when 5% of the profits
of Kaplan and ZIP were distributed to GD. These dynamics are given in Figure 2.26(b).
In this case, there are a new set of equilibria, with two attractors A′ and C′, and three
saddle points B′, D′ and E′. The area of the basin of attraction for C′ is then considerably
larger than that of A′, implying that there is now a much larger probability that C’ will
be adopted. Furthermore, we observe that the equilibrium C′ is now the pure strategy
GD such that it nearly always benefits to deviate to GD in a population with Kaplan
and GD agents. Thus, if GD could be sufficiently improved, it would then be nearly
dominant and always be adopted. Such a method to predict the market dynamics by
artificially inflating payoffs could be useful to motivate the improvement of particular
strategies. However, it fails to provide useful insights into the design issues with the
strategies that need to be addressed.
The EGT approach to evaluating strategies in heterogeneous populations is indeed more
insightful than simply comparing the efficiencies of strategies in balanced populations.
However, a key assumption of this approach is that an agent will adopt the same heuris-
tic strategy even when it has to perform different roles (such as being a buyer and a
seller). In games like the ADP, where agents have a single role (as a competing seller),
such an assumption does not constrain the analysis, and their methodology is appro-
priate. However, in double-sided games, like the CDA, such an assumption is both
unrealistic and unnecessarily restrictive. In practice, buyers and sellers usually have
different bidding behaviours whose efficiency depends on a number of factors includ-
ing what strategies other buyers and sellers adopt, and the demand and supply of the
market then determines the complex interactions of these strategies which in turn, de-
termines their overall effectiveness. To maximise its profit, we believe an agent should
be allowed to select whatever is the best strategy for it when acting as a buyer and what-
ever is the best for it as a seller. The present constraint of compromising on both and
11This probability that an attractor will be reached is equal to the area of the basin of attraction of that
attractor.
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having to select the same strategy for both roles can only have a negative effect on the
agent’s economic efficiency. We believe that such an assumption should not be made
because this approach would then miss some important phenomena. Thus, an approach
to analyse how the buyer and seller strategies separately evolve in the market is needed.
2.4 Summary
In this chapter, we began with some background on the micro-economic theory of de-
mand and supply, and the competitive market equilibrium in a free market, and de-
scribed the structural and behavioural aspects of the CDA. In more detail, in the former
aspect, we looked at the somewhat limited work that has analysed the structure of the
CDA, and how the market protocols can be modified to improve its effectiveness. In
the latter aspect, we first reviewed the work on software agent and human interactions
in the market, followed by a comprehensive review of bidding strategies, as well as
frameworks for designing and analysing bidding strategies for software agents.
Given the research aims discussed in Section 1.2, we now discuss the extent to which
the state of the art addresses these aims. The purpose of such a discussion is to identify
the issues which this thesis needs to address to meet its aims:
(a) The Structure of the CDA:
• We observe that the work on the structure of the CDA has primarily been
concerned with improving the effectiveness (e.g. improving the efficiency or
reducing price fluctuations) of the mechanism by modifying the market proto-
cols, including the pricing and clearing rules. Broadly speaking, this satisfies
our research aim (a). However, all these lines of work are based on the simple
resource allocation problem described in Section 2.1. Thus, to fulfil research
aim (b), we need to investigate if the CDA would still be efficient if it were
to be modified to solve a more complex resource allocation problem. In par-
ticular, we wish to consider markets where sellers have limited capacity and a
production function with a start-up cost and buyers have an inelastic demand.
Given a CDA variant for such a market, we then need to determine how it
can be further modified to achieve certain desirable properties in this new de-
centralised system and, thus, we would partly be addressing our research aim
(a).
(b) The Behaviour of the CDA:
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• Our research aim (c) is about designing new strategies. However, there is
presently no framework for designing strategies for market mechanisms. We
believe that such a framework is desirable because it would provide an engi-
neering approach to designing bidding strategies by providing guidelines for
the strategy designer. In so doing, we would partly fulfil research aim (c).
Specifically, we can see from the existing work that an agent’s bidding strat-
egy is about collecting (internal and external) market information, processing
such information along with the agent’s private information (given limited
computational resources), and using such processed information (knowledge)
in a rational and profit-motivated behaviour to bid efficiently in the market.
Our framework should thus reflect all those different aspects of a strategy.
• We believe that existing bidding strategies can be improved upon and, in par-
ticular, we believe this to be especially true of the predictive class of strategies.
The state of the art in that particular class is the ZIP family of strategies where
the profit margin is updated in a linear manner over a feasible range. However,
we believe a more flexible approach is possible by having the profit margin
change non-linearly over that range (as it might be more efficient to vary the
rate of change of the profit margin). Furthermore, we believe that the notion
of a reference price (as per the FL strategy − see Subsection 2.3.4.5) is im-
portant (because it provides a suitable reference to what a profitable price is).
But, we believe that a prediction of the competitive equilibrium price would
be a better choice as transaction prices converge towards that price (than the
median of the transaction price as in FL). Thus, to tackle research aim (c) to
design more efficient strategies, we will develop a novel bidding strategy for
the CDA based on these intuitions.
• In Subsection 2.3.5.2, we highlighted the shortcomings of Walsh et al.’s stan-
dard EGT approach for analysing complex interactions in the CDA because
of its restrictive assumption that buyers and sellers adopt the same behaviour.
Specifically, the evolution of the buyers’ and sellers’ behaviours should not be
the same, since the payoffs for deviating to another strategy are different for
the different roles. Thus, we believe that a model that separately analyses the
evolution of the buyer and seller strategies is more appropriate and, indeed,
more insightful. Given that such an analysis can be used to evaluate strategies
in heterogeneous populations, we will develop such a model, and partly fulfil
our research aim (d) on designing methodologies for evaluating strategies.
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• Finally, we observed that the methodologies to analyse the efficiency of strate-
gies in the CDA differ considerably. The evaluation of strategies in homo-
geneous populations has typically been limited to static environments with
symmetric demand and supply. Cliff’s work, on the other hand, looked at dy-
namic settings with market shocks, and different demand and supply, but was
limited to the ZIP strategy only. For heterogeneous populations, while some
work simply considered a balanced population, other work used the Walsh et
al.’s EGT model which allows unbalanced situations. Furthermore, evaluat-
ing strategies in heterogeneous populations has been limited to a static set-
ting, as well as a symmetric demand and supply. Thus, to meet our research
aim (d) and address the issues with existing methodologies, we will develop
new approaches for evaluating strategies in both homogeneous and heteroge-
neous populations, that consider the best aspects of the different methodolo-
gies. Specifically, because EGT is the best approach for the heterogeneous
case, we will use it as our point of departure. Given these methodologies, we
will then benchmark the novel strategy we will design against the state of the
art strategies from the predictive and non-predictive classes, namely ZIP12 and
GDX, in different market environments.
12Note that we do not use ZIP60 as it is tailored to particular markets. Because, we are looking at
static and dynamic systems where the problem (represented by the demand and supply in our market-
based approach) is unknown a priori, we do not have a ZIP60 strategy that is optimized for a range of
demand and supply, and we do not believe that an educated guess of the 60 parameters can result in ZIP60
being more efficient than the ZIP. Furthermore, Cliff proposes the set of 8 parameters of the ZIP, evolved
for a set of different environments (Cliff, 2001) and, thus, we will use the ZIP with these 8 parameters as
a benchmark.
Part I
THE STRUCTURAL PERSPECTIVE
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The structure of the CDA defines how the buyers and sellers interact in the market. In
particular, it is specified by the market protocol, a set of rules that define who is allowed
to participate in the market, what types of bids or asks can be submitted, and when a
transaction occurs, and at what price. To this end, in this part of the thesis, we address
our research aims to develop a new CDA-based mechanism, with certain desirable prop-
erties, to solve a more complex resource allocation problem than that usually looked at
in the standard CDA. As stated in Section 1.1, we do this to demonstrate the broader
space of application of the CDA as a decentralised resource allocation solution.
In more detail, in Chapter 3, we first describe the resource allocation problem, which
in this case is minimising the total production cost of sellers. Next, we describe a
centralised mechanism that gives an optimal solution to our problem, and then go on to
give the design of the protocol of our decentralised mechanism to satisfy the constraints
of the new problem. Furthermore, we describe how we modify this protocol to allow
a fair distribution of profits among buyers and sellers. Note that the purpose of the
centralised mechanism is to calculate the efficiency of our mechanism as the ratio of
total production cost in our decentralised mechanism to the total production cost in a
centralised and optimal (globally minimum) solution. Next, we evaluate the efficiency
of our decentralised mechanism and, to this end, we develop a simple zero-intelligence
strategy. The purpose of such a simple behaviour is to attribute the efficiency of the
system to the structure, rather than the behaviour, of the mechanism (as per Gode and
Sunder’s work). We compare the efficiency of our mechanism with such a behaviour for
different market sizes and, in so doing, we empirically demonstrate that our mechanism
is very efficient in terms of minimising total production cost.
The overall purpose of this work is to demonstrate that the CDA can be an efficient
solution to non-conventional and complex resource allocation problems. Furthermore,
because we evaluate our system using a zero-intelligence behaviour, we are then be are
able to provide a lower bound on the efficiency of the system. This enables a system
designer to choose such a solution if the efficiency trade-off for the desirable properties
the decentralised solution offers is sufficiently low.
Chapter 3
Designing a CDA Mechanism for
Limited-Capacity Suppliers
In this chapter, we present our work on the structural aspect of the CDA. In particular,
we consider how to modify the protocol of the CDA and show that we can develop a
variant to solve a more complex resource allocation problem than in the standard CDA.
Furthermore, we evaluate the efficiency of the mechanism. Now, in order to calculate
the efficiency of this protocol, we have to compare the total production cost of our de-
centralised mechanism to that of a optimal solution. Thus, we develop a centralised
mechanism that solves the problem optimally using dynamic programming. We then
develop a zero-intelligence behaviour to find the efficiency of our system that is at-
tributable to the structure, rather than the behaviour of the mechanism by adopting the
approach of Gode and Sunder (see Section 2.3.4).
Our problem involves suppliers with a particular form of cost structure (consisting of
a fixed overhead cost and a constant marginal cost) and finite production capacities
(which are both privately known to them), and consumers with inelastic demand. We
pick this scenario because these traits are typical of many real world applications such as
electricity markets and job-shop scheduling. For example, a power plant will typically
have a fixed start-up cost and a constant marginal cost of running the plant up to its
maximum capacity, and the classic job shop scheduling problem consists of running
periods composed of an initial machine set-up time (overhead cost) plus a cost per unit
time (the marginal cost) and a finite capacity which these machines can run up to.
Now, most work on CDAs assumes a cost structure that consists of an increasing marginal
cost for each unit supplied and no startup cost. This choice of cost structure is quite nat-
ural in macro-economic models and it results both in a competitive market equilibrium
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price for the commodity and in efficient allocations (see Section 2.1). Unfortunately,
the particular cost structure of our domain implies that no such equilibrium exists. This
is because the average unit cost of producing lower quantities is greater than that when
producing larger quantities as a result of the start-up cost (this is akin to models where
there are economies of scale in which the start-up cost is shared over a greater product
run (Mas-Collel et al., 1995)). The presence of a capacity constraint further complicates
matters since, in general, a single seller will not be able to fully satisfy the total demand.
Furthermore, since we are developing a protocol for task allocation, we consider buyers
with inelastic demand (i.e. buyers do not vary their demand according to price) which,
in turn, means that the CDA is focused on finding the cheapest set of seller(s) given
an exact demand from the buyers1. Given these points, we need to modify the standard
CDAmechanism by designing suitable clearing rules and constraining the type of offers
allowed in the market in order to deal with the aforementioned issues.
We now look in detail at our allocation problem in Section 3.1, and present a centralised
and a decentralised mechanism to solve it in sections 3.2 and 3.3 respectively. Finally,
we evaluate the decentralised mechanism in Section 3.4.
3.1 The Market Allocation Problem
Here, we discuss in more detail the problem structure that we consider in the remain-
der of this chapter. The system which we wish to control consists of n suppliers of a
resource and a number of consumers with total demand D. Each supplier, j, is charac-
terised by a maximum capacity that it can provide, capj , and a cost function Cj . The
cost function is defined as a combination of a fixed price, fj , payable for any amount of
production and a separate per unit price uj:
Cj =
0 if xj = 0,fj + xjuj if 0 < xj ≤ capj (3.1)
where xj is the quantity of production allocated to seller j. Thus, an allocation vector
x ∈ X is one in which each agent j is asked to supply a quantity xj . We assume
that both the demand and the details of the cost function are private information of
1Inelastic demand also ensures a fair comparison with the centralised case. This is because allowing
for elastic demand will result in an allocation which satisfies a demand defined by the demand and supply
curves rather than a prior demand that has been made by the buyers (which would occur with inelastic
demand). It also allows us to characterise the cost of decentralising the market-based mechanism in terms
of its efficiency loss.
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the producers (also referred to as suppliers or sellers) since they represent distinct self-
interested stakeholders. Given this, the overall aim of the system is to satisfy the total
demand by allocating production between the different producers. Here, we assume that
the resource is bought and sold in small indivisible units (as is common in most billing
systems) and thus xj ∈ N.
As the designer of the whole system, we are interested in ensuring that the overall allo-
cation, x∗, of the resource under consideration is optimum in the sense that it minimises
the total cost of production. In this case, it is an optimisation problem where we min-
imise the sum of the individual production costs, whilst satisfying the total demand,∑
j xj = D, and the capacity constraints of each individual producer:
x∗ = argmin
x
∑
j
(αifj + ujxj) (3.2)
such that 0 ≤ xj ≤ cj and where:
αi =
 0 if xi = 01 otherwise.
3.2 The Centralised Allocation Mechanism
Our centralised mechanism builds upon the standard VCG mechanism since this mech-
anism has a number of desirable economic properties with respect to task allocation (see
(Mas-Collel et al., 1995) for more details). Specifically, it is efficient, incentivises the
agents to reveal their costs truthfully to the auctioneer in dominant strategy (i.e. an agent
finds no better option than to reveal its costs truthfully) and guarantees a non-negative
utility to the participating agents.
The standard VCG mechanism for task allocation represents the producers as agents
participating in a reverse auction to satisfy the demand of the auctioneer. The agents
submit their respective private information about their costs, known as their types, θi, in
sealed bids to the auctioneer. After this stage, the auctioneer finds the efficient allocation
and then calculates the transfers (i.e. the amount of money that is to be paid to each
agent). It is this transfer scheme that results in the agents having truthful reporting as a
dominant strategy.
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However, there are two key differences between our setting and that of a standard VCG
mechanism. First, each agent’s type has three dimensions that characterise its cost
function instead of the usual one. Specifically, these dimensions are the fixed price or
setup cost, fi, the unit cost, ui, and the capacity, capi. Second, the capacity of the agent
does not directly impact on the cost of supplying an allocated quantity of a resource, but
rather puts a limit on the amount that it can supply. This differs from the standard setting
of a VCG where an agent’s type directly impacts on its cost. Thus, an agent overstating
its capacity does not change its payment in the traditional VCG mechanism (as shown
in (Dash et al., 2007)), but does change the efficient set of suppliers calculated by the
centre.
To deal with these differences, the standard VCG needs to be extended in three ways.
The first change is to have agents report the attributes that define their cost functions
rather than a single cost price. The second change is to have a separate allocation and
payment phase (as opposed to the traditional VCG mechanism where this is amalga-
mated into a single phase) since it is the very reports of the agents (i.e that of their
capacities) which define the space of feasible allocations. The third change is the in-
troduction of a penalty scheme that incentivises the agents to report truthfully on their
capacities.
The following describes the centralised mechanism:
1. First the seller agents, Si, provide reports of their types θ̂i = (f̂i, ûi, ĉapi) (wherêdenotes reported) to the centre.
2. The centre, having gathered total demand from the buyer agents, solves equation
3.2 and assigns production to the agents according to the optimal allocation vector
x̂∗ with reported types.
The payment of the center to the agents is conditioned such that the agents report their
types truthfully and θ̂i = θi (see (Dash et al., 2007) for more details). The centre
can calculate the task allocation to the agents exactly using dynamic programming.
Specifically, we wish to calculate C[n,D] – the minimum total cost to satisfy a demand
of D with access to n producers. This can be solved using the recursive expressions:
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C[0, d] =
0 if d = 0∞ if d > 0
C[i, d] = min
x
C[i− 1, d]C[i− 1, d− x] + fi + xui
such that 0 < x ≤ capi. As the production allocated to each producer is in indivisible
units, we can calculate C[n,D] by evaluating all nD possible values. This results in an
algorithm which operates in pseudo-polynomial time.
In particular, a simple algorithm for this solution is presented in figure 3.1. Here we
calculate all the values of the array, C[n,D], starting from the known case C[0, 0] = 0
and using the recursive expressions above to calculate subsequent values. Moreover,
the same approach can be used to calculate the resulting task allocation to the agents.
Calculate initial row of matrix C
C[0,0]← 0
for d = 1 to D do C[0,d]←∞
Loop through the total number of producers
for i = 1 to n do
Loop through the total demand
for d = 0 to D do
C[i,d]← C[i-1,d]
Loop through the total capacity of producer i
for x = 1 to min{d,capi} do
Compare the previous result to the current
result and select the minimum of the two
C[i,d]← min{C[i,d],C[i-1,d-x]+fi+xui}
Return the final result
return C[n,D]
FIGURE 3.1: Pseudo-code representing the dynamic programming solution to find the
optimum centralised solution in pseudo-polynomial time.
3.3 The Decentralised CDA-Based AllocationMechanism
In this section, we develop a decentralised allocation mechanism based on the CDA. Our
allocation problem involves multiple suppliers and multiple buyers, and the matching
of the two is determined by the sellers and buyers who successfully transact with one
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another. The most common CDA format assumes buyers and sellers have an increasing
marginal cost and no startup cost and the offers in the trade are via price alone (see
Section 2.1). However, in our case, the total production cost depends on both the startup
cost and the number of units to be sold (given the marginal cost). In fact, since the
startup cost is distributed over the sale quantity, the cost price is not fixed for different
numbers of units sold. As a result, the supplier cannot firmly decide on an asking price
(based on the production cost per unit or cost price) that would allow it to be profitable
and to participate in the task allocation (by transacting with potential buyers). This is
because the sale quantity cannot be known a priori. To overcome this, we assume that it
is possible for the supplier to make a prediction about the amount of units it expects to
sell (since exact demand can only be estimated)2. In traditional cost settings (increasing
marginal cost and no fixed cost), a supplier can start making bids for a low quantity
and slowly ramp up its price so as to ensure it does not make a loss. However, in
our scenario, low quantities correspond to higher unit prices. Thus the supplier is faced
with the problem that reducing its price may not guarantee that it transacts and in certain
cases may lead to a loss (if a buyer specifies a demand such that the ask price becomes
lower than the cost price). We therefore allow sellers to communicate the amount they
wish to sell to the market via a multi-dimensional bid consisting of both quantity and
price. We also specify in our clearing rules that a transaction only occurs when a buyer’s
bid can be fully satisfied (i.e. no partial clearing is allowed for the buyer because of its
inelastic demand).
Given this background, a key objective for the decentralised mechanism is to be indi-
vidually rational (see Section 2.1). In this case, this means ensuring the suppliers can
be profitable in the market so that they are incentivised to enter it in the first place. Fur-
thermore, while the mechanism has to be individually rational, our global objective is
to achieve the most efficient outcome (task allocation) that we can. Now, this is equiva-
lent to finding the allocation that minimises the total production cost. In a typical CDA
mechanism, the optimal allocation occurs when the total profit of all buyers and all sell-
ers is maximised (see Section 2.1) and this occurs when the combined cost of sellers is
minimised, as the sellers with the lowest cost would be successful.
However, given our additional constraints of limited capacity and a startup cost, the
seller’s strategic behaviour would be more complex than that of the buyer, since, as we
mentioned before, it additionally has to strategise over the quantity it is expected to sell.
2In fact, in CDA scenarios demand cannot be known even after the bids have been submitted (Cliff
and Bruten, 1997). This is why sellers try to predict the demand in order to be more profitable (He et al.,
2003).
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In this context, we cannot achieve full efficiency because no agent has complete infor-
mation about every other agent in the market and the sellers do not have the increasing
marginal costs which would guarantee an equilibrium price for trade (Mas-Collel et al.,
1995).
Given this, our aim is to design a protocol that achieves a level of efficiency that is rea-
sonably close to the optimal solution given by our centralised mechanism. The protocol
we propose is a variant of the multi-unit CDA. Specifically, buyers and sellers can sub-
mit offers to buy and sell multiple units of the resource, respectively, and those orders
are queued in an order book which is cleared continuously (with additional constraints
as a result of buyers’ inelastic demand). The protocol proceeds as follows:
• Buyer i submits an offer, bid(qb, b, i), to buy exactly qb (qb ≥ 1) units of the good
at the unit price b. The utility of buyer i for a quantity other than qb is 0.
• Conversely, supplier j submits an offer, ask(qa, a, j), to sell a maximum of qa
(qa ≥ 1) units at unit price a.
• These bids and asks are queued in an orderbook, which is a publicly observable
board listing all the bids and asks submitted to the market (see table 3.1). The
bids in the order book are sorted in decreasing order of price and the asks are in
increasing order (higher bids and lower asks are more likely to result in transac-
tions).
• The clearing rule in the market is as follows. Whenever a new bid or ask is sub-
mitted, an attempt is made at clearing the order book. The order book is cleared
whenever a transaction can occur (that is, when the lowest asking price is lower
than the highest bidding price and any bidding offer can be cleared completely
and the bidding quantity for each offer is completely satisfied by the supply to be
cleared). The transaction price is set at the bidding price which we experimentally
find to result in the total market profits being equally divided between the buyers
and the sellers3.
To further illustrate this process, we present a graphical representation of the clearing
rule in Figure 3.2. As can be seen, the offers queued in the order book are used to build
demand and supply curves. All bids with a unit price lower than the lowest unit ask price
3We chose this option because we require the desirable property of fairness of profit distribution
among buyers and sellers (see research aim 1). We use the approach described in Subsection 2.2.1 where
the k parameter of the k-pricing rule is optimised for a desirable property of the mechanism which, in
our case, is the equal distribution of profits.
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Order Book
Bids Asks
(quantity, price, buyer) (quantity, price, seller)
(30, 2.95, 2) ( 60, 2.20, 3)
(40, 2.75, 5) ( 25, 2.60, 1)
(30, 2.70, 1) ( 40, 3.22, 2)
(24, 2.16, 3) (100, 3.50, 5)
( 25, 3.69, 7)
...
TABLE 3.1: Multi-unit CDA Order Book before clearing.
and, similarly, all asks with a unit price higher than the highest unit bid price, cannot
result in any transaction and are not represented in Figure 3.2. The transaction price and
quantity are clearly shown in Figure 3.2 (2.75 and 70 respectively), as the point where
the demand curve crosses the supply curve under the additional constraint that bid offers
are not divisible. At this transaction price, the total profit of all participants involved in
the transactions is maximised (it is equivalent to the solution of an optimisation problem
where we maximise the total profit given the set of all the transactions possible in the
order book), with all constraints specified by our protocols satisfied. The order book in
Table 3.1 can thus be cleared as shown in Figure 3.2 resulting in the new order book
given in Table 3.2.
Order Book
Bids Asks
(quantity,price,buyer) (quantity,price,seller)
(30, 2.70, 1) ( 15, 2.60, 1)
(24, 2.16, 3) ( 40, 3.22, 2)
(100, 3.50, 5)
( 25, 3.69, 7)
...
TABLE 3.2: Multi-unit CDA Order Book after clearing.
3.4 Evaluating the Decentralised Mechanism
Here, we describe how we evaluate our decentralised mechanism. Specifically, we con-
sider its efficiency, calculated as the ratio of the total production cost of the centralised
mechanism to that of the decentralised mechanism. Furthermore, because we wish to
Chapter 3 Designing a CDA Mechanism for Limited-Capacity Suppliers 69
FIGURE 3.2: Panel A shows the demand and supply (curves) of the order book, with
the shaded region representing allocations. Panel B points out the clearable bids and
asks in the order book. Those bids and asks are considered to generate the demand and
supply curves in panel A.
evaluate the structure of the mechanism, we adopt a zero-intelligence behaviour and, to
this end, we develop a zero-intelligence strategy which we describe next.
3.4.1 The ZI2 Bidding Strategy
One of the principal concerns in developing a market mechanism is to ensure that it is
efficient even when the participants adopt a simple strategic behaviour. The underlying
intuition here is that by considering such behaviour, we are able to establish a lower
bound on the efficiency of the mechanism and we can consider the extent to which
the structure of the market mechanism itself affects the efficiency of the market (as
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discussed in Subsection 2.3.4.2). The ZI strategy (as discussed in Subsection 2.3.4.2) is
widely used for this purpose since it is not motivated by trading profit and effectively
ignores the state of the market and past experience when forming a bid or an ask. Since
in our mechanism, the asks consist of price and quantity, we extend the ZI strategy to
the ZI2 strategy which randomises over both price and quantity.
We now focus on the behaviour of the strategy. As discussed earlier, any sophisticated
strategy, on the sell side, would make some form of prediction on the number of units
it is likely to sell as part of its price formation process (because information about
the actual demand is not available and there is uncertainty as to whether the agent is
more competitive than the other participating suppliers). Instead, our ZI2 supplier j,
randomises over the expected transaction quantity to form a limit price cj which is used
as in the original ZI strategy. Thus the ZI2 strategy is4:
For buyer i,
bi ∼ U(0, `i)
offer = bid(qi, bi, i) (3.3)
For seller j,
qˆj ∼ UQ(0, capj)
cj = (fj + qˆjuj)/qˆj
aj ∼ U(cj, pmax)
offer = ask(capj, aj, j) (3.4)
Buyers are endowed with high limit prices at the beginning of the auction (because
they have inelastic demand), while sellers are endowed with their cost functions and
capacities (collectively referred to as the production function). Buyer i submits offers
to buy the quantity, qi, it requires at a unit price drawn from a uniform distribution
ranging from 0 to its limit price `i (see Equation 3.3). Conversely, seller j submits
an ask between its limit price and pmax as per Equation 3.4, where capj is its total
production capacity, fj is its startup cost and uj is its marginal cost.
4X ∼ U(A,B) describes a discrete uniform distribution between A and B, with steps of 0.01, the
typical minimum currency. X ∼ UQ(A,B) describes a discrete uniform distribution between A and B,
with steps of 1.
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FIGURE 3.3: The multi-unit CDA simulator.
Sellers
S1 S2 S3
Capacity 100 150 175
Fixed Price 100 200 120
Unit Price 1.5 1 2
TABLE 3.3: A set of three producers bidding to satisfy a demand of 200 units.
3.4.2 The Experimental Setup
In order to perform empirical evaluations, we developed an implementation of this dis-
tributed mechanism (see Figure 3.3) based on the protocol and strategies described here.
As the experimental setup, we ran the simulations over 2000 rounds5 for different mar-
kets and, here, we analyse in details a small market with 3 buyers and 3 sellers (Market
A) and a larger market with 15 buyers and 15 sellers (Market B). We consider both the
small and the large markets so as to demonstrate the scaleability of our mechanism.
In each market, each seller was given a production function (supply for Market A is
given in Table 3.3), while each buyer was required to procure an exact quantity of
5The results were validated using a student t-test with two samples of 2000 runs, assuming equal
variance with means µ1 = 0.7198 and µ2 = 0.7218 and p-value p = 0.3660. This means that the
difference between the means is not significant.
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units with a relatively high limit price. We ran different simulations for each market,
with different total demands ranging from 1 to the maximum production quantity. The
total demand, D, was equally distributed among the buyers. Thus, the total demand in
Market A was varied from 1 to 425 (the maximum supply quantity of Market A), while
in Market B with 15 buyers and 15 sellers, the total demand ranged from 1 to 2400.
3.4.3 The Empirical Study
In order to empirically evaluate the efficiency of the mechanism, in terms of minimis-
ing the total cost of production, we measure this property and compare it to the optimal
solution found in the centralised mechanism. Given each total demand, the mean effi-
ciency of the market (averaged over 2000 independent rounds) is shown in Figure 3.5,
where the optimal production cost is normalised to 1, while the total production cost
of the centralised mechanism and the decentralised mechanism is shown in Figure 3.4.
As can be seen, the mechanism is efficient with an average efficiency of 83% (and a
minimum efficiency of 53% when demand is relatively low) for Market B and an aver-
age efficiency of 86% (and a minimum efficiency of 67%) for Market A. The minimum
efficiency case occurs when the demand is split amongst many excess suppliers (with
respect to the optimal allocation). This increases the overall cost of supply as a result of
the fixed cost of the extraneous suppliers. However, in the typical CDA, the worst-case
analysis considers the average efficiency of ZI agents (Gode and Sunder, 1993). This is
because although it is theoretically possible for an allocation of very low efficiency to
occur, in almost every run (higher than 99% of the runs), the CDA implemented with
agents employing the ZI strategy has a high efficiency. Thus, it is the zero-intelligence
nature of the strategy which provides a lower bound on measuring efficiency and, we
expect the average efficiency with a more intelligent strategy to be higher (Cliff and
Bruten, 1997; Vytelingum et al., 2004). We thererefore adopt this approach in dis-
cussing the inherent efficiency of our CDA mechanism.
In experiments with each market, we observe an increasing trend whereby the market
efficiency increases as total demand approaches the maximum capacity of the sellers. It
can also be seen that there is a high variance when the total demand is relatively low.
Considering specifically the set of experiments with Market A (3 buyers and 3 sellers),
the intuitions behind these observations are as follows. The variance of the market
efficiency is generally higher when the total demand is low. This is because the optimal
allocation for a total demand of 100 is completely covered by seller 1 (with a marginal
cost of 1.5 and a startup cost of 100). However, our market mechanism does not ensure
that only seller 1 will trade and, thus, sellers 2 and 3 may also be part of this allocation
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for the total demand of 100. The high variance is principally an artefact of the additional
startup costs if more than one seller were to trade. As the total demand increases past
175, the optimal allocation is covered by at least two sellers. The variance past the
demand of 175 is the result of sellers supplying different numbers of units at different
marginal costs, with at most one additional startup cost. When the total demand is very
high, close to the total capacity, all the sellers participate in the allocation, and the small
variance is solely due to the sellers providing different numbers of units (a difference
which is relatively low compared to the total startup cost). The observations in the
set of experiments with Market B can also be explained by the same reasoning, with
the higher variance occurring when demand that can be covered by a single seller is
distributed among multiple sellers.
FIGURE 3.4: Optimal and CDA production cost for 3 buyers and 3 sellers in (a) and
15 buyers and 15 sellers in (b).
FIGURE 3.5: Average market efficiency for 3 buyers and 3 sellers in (a) and 15 buyers
and 15 sellers in (b).
Furthermore, we can explain the increasing trend of the market efficiency seen in Figure
3.4. Considering Market A, a demand of up to 175 can be provided by only 1 seller.
The jumps in Figure 3.4 correspond to the optimal allocation changing between a com-
bination of one to three sellers. For example, jumps at 100 and 150 correspond to the
optimal allocation starting with seller 1, changing to seller 2 and finally to seller 3. The
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increase in efficiency as total demand increases is the result of the number of sellers
involved in the optimal allocation, changing from a single seller (up to a total demand
of 175) to three sellers (past a total demand of 325 which is the highest demand any
two sellers can cover). However, in our market, any number of sellers can trade at any
time. As total demand increases, the loss in efficiency that arises from the extra startup
costs (compared to the optimal allocation) decreases, thus explaining the generally in-
creasing trend. In the simulations with Market B, a similar trend can be observed, with
a lower efficiency when demand is lower than the minimum sellers’ capacity (210). As
in Market A, there are more inefficient allocations that can arise when demand is low
(and can be satisfied by a single seller), which would decrease the average efficiency
much more than it would, given a smaller number of inefficient allocations. Here, we
use the same intuition as in Market A to explain the jumps, which are larger in number
given the larger number of participants.
FIGURE 3.6: Performance of the decentralised mechanism in markets with different
numbers of buyers and sellers.
Given the results in figures 3.4 and 3.5, we observe that our distributed mechanism is
appreciably efficient6 in both a small and a relatively larger7 market, with a high average
efficiency in either case. In Figure 3.6, we plot the average efficiency over the space of
different market sizes varying over 2 to 20 buyers and sellers. We observe the same
6What represents a satisfactory efficiency is subjective and depends on the system designer’s require-
ments. For example, in a critical application, an efficiency below 90% would be considered as poor and
be unacceptable while in another application, an efficiency of 60% would still be acceptable given the
desirable properties of a decentralised system.
7In the future, we intend to investigate the efficiency in considerably larger markets of the order of
hundreds of agents and observe how the efficiency scales with the market size. We hypothesise that
the efficiency curve would approximate a linear function ranging from 0.7 to 1 with the average (lower
bound) efficiency at 0.85.
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FIGURE 3.7: The profit distribution among buyers and sellers in markets A and B.
high efficiency as in markets A and B, around 80%. Finally, the simulation results in
Figure 3.7 show that the sellers and buyers equally share the market profits (the ratio
of sellers’ profits to total market profit is approximately equal to 0.5) in either market.
The fact that our agents can be profitable and thus are incentivised to enter the market
means that our distributed mechanism is individually rational.
3.5 Summary
In this chapter, we first presented our work on designing a CDA variant to solve a
more complex resource allocation problem than in the standard CDA. Specifically, we
showed how the market protocol of the CDA can be modified to satisfy a scenario
where suppliers have a production function with a startup cost and limited capacity and,
consumers have inelastic demand.
Then, we evaluated our novel decentralised mechanism. For this purpose, we developed
a centralised mechanism that computes the optimal solution to the resource allocation
problem, in terms of the total minimum production cost of suppliers. The efficiency
of the system is then calculated as the ratio of the total production in the centralised
mechanism to that in the decentralised one. We then developed the ZI2 bidding strategy
to obtain a simple behaviour in the mechanism. Such a simple behaviour allows us
to evaluate the efficiency of the mechanism from a structural perspective. Because we
expect the efficiency of the mechanism to be much higher given a more sophisticated
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behaviour, we can thus consider the efficiency with the ZI2 strategy as a lower bound in
our decentralised solution to such a complex resource allocation problem.
Though this work on designing a CDA variant focuses on a single complex resource
allocation problem, the bigger picture is that the CDA has been shown to be amenable
to these more complex problems, even in scenarios where a competitive market equi-
librium does not exist. Thus, this work satisfies our aim to modify the CDA structure
to solve complex problems and further motivates the more widespread use of the CDA
mechanism as a decentralised solution.
Part II
THE BEHAVIOURAL PERSPECTIVE
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The behaviour of the CDA is emergent and depends on the strategies adopted by every
buyer and seller in the market. In this part, we address our research aims to design and
analyse the behaviour of the CDA.
To tackle the design aspect of this part of the research, we first develop a novel multi-
layered framework for devising strategies for the CDA (in Chapter 4). We then use this
framework to design a bidding strategy for the CDA in Chapter 5. The objective of the
new strategy is to address our research aim for more efficient strategies for the CDA. In
particular, we design our strategy to be robust in both static and dynamic environments,
with a short-term and a long-term learning mechanism to adapt the agent’s behaviour to
the changing market conditions.
To tackle the analysis aspect of this part of the research, we first develop a novel two-
population evolutionary game theoretic framework to analyse the strategic interactions
of buyers and sellers in the CDA, which we report in Chapter 6. Then, in Chapter 7, we
describe novel methodologies for evaluating CDA strategies in both homogeneous and
heterogeneous populations. Specifically, for the latter, we adopt our novel evolutionary
game theoretic framework to analyse the evolution of buyers’ and sellers’ behaviour
in the market and use such an analysis to evaluate the performance of strategies in
heterogeneous populations.
Chapter 4
A Framework for Designing Bidding
Strategies
In this chapter, we present our work on a framework for designing strategies for trad-
ing agents in electronic market mechanisms, work which addresses our research aim to
design bidding strategies for the CDA. Though more of a black art than a serious en-
gineering endeavour at present, we believe that the design of successful strategies can
nevertheless be viewed as adhering to a fundamental and systematic structure. Thus, we
look at a general framework for designing bidding strategies; a framework that is simple
enough to be applicable in a broad range of market mechanisms, but modular enough
to be used in the design of complex bidding behaviour. We believe such a model is im-
portant for the strategy designer because it provides a principled approach towards the
systematic engineering of such strategies which, in turn, can foster more reliable and ro-
bust strategies. Here, we do not solely look at the CDA context, because modifying the
structural aspect of the typical CDA mechanism may necessitate changing the whole
framework. Thus, we prefer to develop a general framework for market mechanisms
that we can then apply to the CDA and its variants.
As there is no systematic software engineering framework currently available for de-
signing strategies for trading agents (as discussed in Section 1.1), this work advances
the state of the art by providing the first steps towards such a model. Specifically, our
framework is based upon three main principles:
1. An agent requires information about itself and its environment in order to make
informed decisions.
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2. An agent rarely has full information or sufficient computational resources to man-
age all the extracted information.
3. Given its limited computational resources and information, an agent needs to em-
ploy heuristics in order to formulate a successful strategy.
In more detail, in order to operate in such situations, we advocate a multi-layered design
framework. We believe this is appropriate because most strategies can be viewed as
breaking down the task of bidding into a clear set of well defined sub-tasks (such as
gathering relevant information, processing that information and using that processed
information in a meaningful manner). This decomposition can be viewed as a series of
(semi-) distinct steps that are handled by different layers. Furthermore, our aim is to
ensure the model is sufficiently abstract to be used as the agent model in more general
agent-oriented software engineering frameworks, such as Gaia (Zambonelli et al., 2003)
and Agent UML (Bauer et al., 2001) and such that it overlays well with existing multi-
layered architectures for multi-agent systems (Ashri and Luck, 2001). Given this, our
framework consists of three layers: the Information, Knowledge and Behavioural layers
(hence we term our framework the IKB model hereafter) and each layer corresponds to
one of the principles we address above. In more detail, the information layer records
raw data from the market environment. This is then processed by the knowledge layer in
order to provide the intelligent data which is used by the behavioural layer to condition
the agent’s strategy. To illustrate the use of our framework, we chose two example
marketplaces that are popular for trading agents. Firstly, we consider marketplaces
that use the CDA and we place a number of the standard CDA strategies discussed in
Subsection 2.3.4 within it. Secondly, we consider a more complex scenario, the Travel
Game of the International Trading Agent Competition (TAC), where an agent has to
strategise in multiple simultaneous auctions of different formats (Wellman et al., 2002;
Fasli et al., 2002). In both cases, we employed our IKB model successfully.
4.1 The IKB Model
In this section, we detail the main components that the designer of a trading agent strat-
egy should pay attention to. In so doing, we develop a framework for designing strate-
gies in trading markets. In our model, we have a market M regulated by its protocol
that is predefined. The collection of variables representing the dynamics of the system
at time t is represented by the state variable stateM(tk). Within this market, there is
a set of trading agents, I, that approach the market through a set of actions which are
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determined by their strategies. In order to formulate its best strategy, an agent ideally
needs to know which state it is currently in (agent state), the market state and the actions
it can take.
Definition 4.1. Agent’s State. An agent i’s state, statei(t), at time t is a collection of
variables describing its resources (computational and economic) and privately known
preferences.
Definition 4.2. Market State. The market state, stateM(t), at time t is a collection of
variables describing all the (public and private) attributes of the market.
Definition 4.3. Strategy. A strategy, Si, for agent i ∈ I, defines a mapping Γi from
the history of the agent state H(statei) and of the market states H(pM), and current
agent state statei(t) and the market state stateM(t) to a set of atomic actions Ai =
{ai1, ai2, . . . , aik, . . .}, aik ∈ Ai where Ai is the set of all possible actions for agent i at
time t.
The actions chosen by strategy Si then affect the external environment such that it causes
a change in the market state. In fact, this strategy could interplay with strategies selected
by other agents, I \ i, as well as some external input(s), extn, so as to lead the market
to the new state:
stateM(t+ 1) = T (stateM(t),H(stateM),A1,A2, . . . , ext1, ext2, . . .) (4.1)
where T (.) is the state transfer function. From Definition 4.3, it is clear that in order for
an agent to know which strategy is best, it should know the complete description and
history of the states (all market information), a complete description of all actions avail-
able to it, its preferences over the states, a model of its opponents’ states, behaviours
and preferences, and the state transfer function.
In practice, however, an agent will typically not have all this information (for a number
of reasons, such as limited sensory capabilities, privacy of opponent information and
limited knowledge of relevant external signals). Furthermore, an agent’s limited com-
putational resources imply that it might not be able to keep a complete history of all
past interactions. Given this, there is a need for designing feasible strategies that use
limited computational and sensory resources. To this end, we advocate the following
design principle in which an agent manages its limited capabilities through its Informa-
tion Layer (IL), its Knowledge Layer (KL) and its Behavioural Layer (BL) (as shown
in figure 4.1).
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FIGURE 4.1: Structure of the IKB Model.
In more detail, the Market State (MS) contains public information (i.e. information
available to all agents in the market) and private/semi-private information (i.e. infor-
mation available to one/some agents). We now provide a description of each of the
layers that pertain to the agent:
• Information Layer. The IL contains data which the agent has extracted from the
MS and private information about its own state. This extraction is a filtering pro-
cess (which we represent as the Information Filter in Figure 4.1) whose objectives
are defined by the KL (e.g. filtering out only transaction prices).
• Knowledge Layer. The KL represents the gathered knowledge that is aggregated
from the data in IL (e.g. bids submitted in the market). The BL queries the KL to
obtain the knowledge it requires.
• Behavioral Layer. The BL determines the agent’s strategic behaviour by de-
ciding on how to use the information available to it in order to interact with the
market through a set of actions (e.g. submitting a bid). It queries the KL for the
relevant knowledge it requires (e.g the belief that a bid will be accepted in the
market).
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We next describe each of these layers in further detail, whilst explaining the process
through which an agent uses a plethora of raw data to select appropriate actions.
4.1.1 The Information Layer
This subsection deals with how an agent gathers information which is then passed on
to the KL. The KL will select the data being stored in the IL by modifying the infor-
mation filter (see Figure 4.1) appropriately. This filter will screen the data from the MS
with some noise (due to environmental noise or the agent’s sensory limitations). As a
result, the IL of an agent will contain a noisy, restricted view of all information which it
can observe. Furthermore, the IL will also contain information about the agent’s state,
statei(t), as well as its action set Ai.
We distinguish between information and knowledge in the following way:
Definition 4.4. Information. Information is raw data that can be sensed by an agent.
Definition 4.5. Knowledge. Knowledge is the processed data that is computed by an
agent from the information it has gathered.
Now, information is typically categorised as follows (Mas-Collel et al., 1995):
• Complete/Incomplete: An agent has complete information if it is aware of the
complete structure of the market (that is, its action sets and the result of each
action). Otherwise, it has incomplete information.
• Perfect/Imperfect: An agent has perfect information if it is certain of its state,
the history of the market’s and the agent’s states (H(stateM) andH(statei)) that
have led it into this state. Otherwise, it has imperfect information.
As argued earlier, an agent’s sensory and computational limitations imply that it will
rarely have perfect and complete information. For example, an agent might not be
aware of its complete action set (i.e. an agent might believe that its action set at time t
is A′i ⊂ Ai) or it may be unsure of which state it is in (i.e. it expresses an uncertainty
over pi(tk)). Thus, the agent will need to have certain heuristics in order to guide its
search for information. This information can be gathered from public, semi-private
and private sources. Public information is observable by all agents (i ∈ I) in the
market and includes things such as the market price in a stock exchange, the minimum
increment in an eBay auction and the number of lots of flowers on sale in a Dutch flower
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auction. Semi-private information is that which is available to a subset of the agents
(i ∈ J ⊂ I) and includes things such as the amount that a supplier might require from
an agent and the code to signalling actions by a bidder ring in an auction (Krishna,
2002). Private information is only observable by a single agent and includes items such
as its budget or the goods it is interested in. Thus, given the required information that
the KL has requested, the agent will devote its limited resources to obtaining it. Then,
having gathered the required information from the market, the agent proceeds to use
this information to infer knowledge in the KL.
4.1.2 The Knowledge Layer
The KL connects the information and the behavioural layers (see Subsection 4.1.3).
It infers knowledge from the information sensed by the agent and passes it to the BL
which acts upon it. In order to do so, the KL is first requested by the BL as to which
knowledge to acquire. This knowledge could be, for example, the current Sharpe ratio1
of a stock or a prediction of the market price based on a particular prediction model.
Based on this and the current knowledge of the agent’s state, the KL will decide upon
the information it requires and set the information filter accordingly. The KL will then
use the input from the IL so as to to infer the appropriate knowledge which it will output
to the BL.
Mirroring the IL, the KL can be segmented into knowledge about the agent’s and the
market’s state. The former is what the agent knows about itself. This includes knowl-
edge pertaining to its subgoals (such as its risk attitude or the deadline by which a good
is to be delivered) and knowledge about its state statei(tk). The latter is what the agent
knows about the market and would include items such as the degree of competitiveness
in the market, the opponents’ states and any available market indicators.
4.1.3 The Behavioral Layer
The BL represents the decision-making component of the strategy. In this context, such
strategies are targeted towards finding the most profitable action in the market. How-
ever, as outlined earlier, more often than not, there is no known optimal action, as many
markets are simply too complex and the set of actions too large to determine such an op-
timal action analytically. Then, as there is no best strategy, a heuristic approach is taken.
1The Sharpe ratio is a measure of a stock’s excess return relative to its total variability (Sharpe, 1966).
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Thus, the BL instructs the KL as to what knowledge it needs to gather from the mar-
ket which, as described in subsection 4.1.2, is computed from the market information.
With the relevant knowledge of the market and its goals, the agent i forms a decision
based on its strategy Si and interacts with the market through actionsAi. The goal of an
agent’s strategy is typically profit-maximisation, with the more sophisticated strategies
considering both short-term and long-term risk. The formulation of the strategy usually
depends on such goals and the market protocols.
Given this insight, we categorise the different behavioural properties of the strategy into
different levels and, specifically, we build upon the categorisation in Subsection 2.3.3.
In more detail, we distinguish those strategies in terms of the type of information (in
Equation 4.1) which is used (i.e. whether they use a history of market information or
not and whether they consider external information or not):
1. No History (ignores H(stateM) from Equation 4.1). Such reactive strategies
make myopic decisions based only on the current market conditions pM(t). The
myopic nature of these strategies imply a lower workload on the KL since they
require less information to sense and process. Reactive strategies also usually
exploit the more complex bargaining behaviour of competing strategies and thus
require less computational resources to strategise. One example of such a strategy
is the eSnipe strategy which is frequently used on eBay to submit an offer to buy
near the end of the auction.
2. History (considers H(stateM) in Equation 4.1). We further subdivide those
strategies that use a history of market information as being predictive or not
(i.e. whether they predict {stateM(t + 1), stateM(t + 2), . . .} or not). The non-
predictive strategies typically use H(stateM) to estimate stateM(t):
(a) Non-predictive: The non-predictive strategy is typically belief-based and
forms a decision based on some belief of the current market conditions.
The agent’s belief is computed from the history of market information in the
KL, and usually represents the belief that a particular action will benefit the
agent in the market (for example an offer to buy that is accepted). Given its
belief over a set of actions, the agent then determines the best action over
the short or long term.
(b) Predictive: A strategy makes a prediction about the market state in order to
adapt to it. Now, because future market conditions (that the trading agent
adapts to) cannot be known a priori, the adaptive strategy typically makes
some prediction using the history of market information. The KL is required
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to keep track of how the market (knowledge) is changing to predict the fu-
ture market, while the BL uses this knowledge about the market dynamics
to improve its response in the market. Being adaptive is particularly impor-
tant in situations where the environment is subject to significant changes.
By tracking such changes and adapting its behaviour accordingly, the agent
aims to remain competitive in changing market conditions.
3. No External Information (ignores ext1, . . . , extn in Equation 4.1). In this case,
the strategy does not consider any signals external to the market (e.g. the falling
market price of a good affecting the client’s preferences for another type of good
in an auction). However, the agent can choose whether or not to use the (internal)
information (e.g. the eSnipe strategy uses the internal market information, while
the ZI Strategy in the CDA does not make use of any market information).
4. External Information (considers ext1, . . . , extn in Equation 4.1). It is possible
that signals external to the market can influence the preferences of the partici-
pants, such as an event independent of the market causing the clients’ preferences
in the market to change (e.g. unforseen weather conditions affecting the produc-
tion of wheat and thus the market for wheat indirectly). Thus, external informa-
tion can be a valuable source of information that the agent can use to strategise in
the market.
Having presented our IKB model for designing trading strategies, we now discuss how
our model can be applied to the design of strategies specifically for the CDA mecha-
nism.
4.2 Applying the Model to the CDA
As discussed in Chapter 1, because there is no known dominant strategy in the CDA,
several researchers have worked on competing alternatives (see Subsection 2.3.4). In
this section, we describe how these strategies can be broken down by our IKB model
and, thus, how our framework could be used to build these strategies by reverse engi-
neering. First, we give a formalised definition of the asynchronous CDA specifically for
the IKB. The market state of the CDA at time t is stateM(t) =< g,B,S, price(t), bid(t), ask(t) >
where:
1. g is the good being auctioned off.
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2. B = b1, . . . , bnb is the finite set of identifiers of bidders in the market, where nb is
the number of current bidders.
3. S = s1, . . . , sns is the finite set of identifiers of sellers in the market, where ns is
the number of current sellers.
4. price(t) denotes the current market price of good g in the market. This corre-
sponds to the most recent transaction price.
5. bid(t) denotes the outstanding bid at time t.
6. ask(t) denotes the outstanding ask at time t.
The agent state at time t, is statei(t) =< idi, ni(t),vi = (vi1, . . . , vn(t)), `i, budgeti(t), compi(t) >
where:
1. idi defines the identity of the agent as either a buyer or a seller agent.
2. ni(t) defines the number of items an agent is currently interested in either buying
or selling.
3. vi = {v1,i, . . . , vni(t),i} is the set of limit prices ordered from highest to lowest in
the case of a bidder and vice versa in the case of a seller.
4. `i is the current limit price.
5. budgeti(t) is the budget available to agent i.
6. compi(t) is the computational resources (memory and processing power) cur-
rently available to agent i.
The action set of the agent depends on its identity (idi). If it is a buyer, it has Ai =
{bidi, silent} where bidi ∈ [0, pmax] and silent is no bid. Correspondingly, if it is a
seller its action set is Ai = {aski, silent} where aski ∈ [0, pmax]. It should be noted
that in the CDA, the elements of Ai will only be singletons (i.e. an agent can only take
a single action at a time). The state transfer function TCDA in the CDA is the rules
for acceptance and rejection of bids and asks, as well as the clearing rules (see below).
The standard CDA is not influenced by external signals (i.e. the transfer function TCDA
has no ext1, . . . , extn arguments2) and the market changes each time an agent submits
a bid or an ask and thus simultaneous bidding does not occur. Thus stateM(t + 1) =
TCDA(stateM(t), H(pM),Ai) whereby T (.) is defined by the following rules:
2Thus, a CDA strategy does not consider external information.
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Kaplan ZI-C ZIP GD
Information Limit price and Limit Limit price and Limit price and
Layer outstanding price transaction price and history of bid/ask
bid/ask Current bid/ask and and transaction price
current profit margin
Knowledge Measures for None Competitive profit Belief that bid/ask
Layer heuristics margin, success will be accepted
of trade
Behavioral No history, Random History, History,
Layer non-predictive predictive non-predictive
TABLE 4.1: Analysis of four CDA strategies under the IKB model.
• if Ai = bidi, then
– if bidi < bid(t) then bidi is rejected and stateM(t+ 1) = stateM(t).
– if bid(t) < bidi < ask(t) then bid(t + 1) = bidi and all other market
variables remain unchanged.
– if ask(t) < bidi, then price(t + 1) = cr(ask(t) + bidi) (where cr(.) is a
clearing rule stating the transaction price at which the clearing should oc-
cur)3, bid(t+ 1) = 0 and ask(t+ 1) = pmax.
• if Ai = aski, it follows the same procedure as above.
• if t + 1 = deadline, then the auction ends. deadline is the preset time when the
market closes.
Furthermore, an agent’s state will also change, conditional on whether its bid or ask
is accepted in the market. If an agent’s bid bidi results in a transaction, ni(t + 1) =
ni(t)− 1, budgeti(t + 1) = budgeti(t)− price(t + 1) and vi = {v2,i, . . . , vni(t),i} and
`i = v2,i. If an agent’s bid is unsuccessful, then the MS relays this private information
to the agent. The agent’s visibility is restricted to only bids and asks being submitted in
the market (with the agent that submitted a bid or an ask, not disclosed) and successful
transactions. This information is publicly available in the MS. Based on the information
that describes the market conditions, the agent strategises to submit a competitive offer
to buy or sell. Given this background, we now analyse a selection of the most popular
strategies for the CDA, from the perspective of the IKB model. We provide a summary
of the analysis in Table 4.1.
• The Kaplan Strategy (see Subsection 2.3.4.1): This is a non-predictive strategy
that makes a decision based only on simple heuristics (see Subsection 2.3.4.1),
3This varies according to the CDA; examples include the midway value or the earlier of the bid or the
ask (see discussion in Section 2.2).
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and ignores the history of market information. Thus, the IL collects the current
outstanding bid and ask (bid(t) and ask(t) respectively) from the MS. Thereafter,
using this information from the IL, the KL calculates the measures that are used
in the heuristic rules of Kaplan’s BL. These rules determine what action, Ai =
{bidi|aski, silent}, the agent i submits in the market.
• The Zero-Intelligence (ZI) Strategy (see Subsection 2.3.4.2): The ZI has a
random behaviour: it is non-predictive and does not use the history of market
information. It effectively ignores the market state (MS) and considers only its
limit price, `i (its private information state in the IL) when submitting a bid or an
ask in the market. The KL does not compute any knowledge and simply forwards
`i from the IL to the BL.
• The Zero-Intelligence Plus (ZIP) Strategy (see Subsection 2.3.4.3): This is a
predictive strategy that uses the history of market information to predict the future
market condition and adapt to it. It updates the profit margin of agent i (as per
Equation 2.8) to remain competitive based on a set of learning rules given the
changing market conditions (see Figure 2.8). The IL collects bid(t), ask(t) and
price(t) (as instructed by the KL). The IL forwards this data, as well as the agent’s
profit margin (private information in its IL), to the KL. That knowledge is then
used in the BL to predict the future market and adapt its profit margin, µi, to it.
The BL then submits Ai = {bidi|aski, silent}, where bidi or aski = (1 + µ)`i.
• The GD Strategy (see Subsection 2.3.4.4): This is a non-predictive strategy that
uses a history of market information. The BL decides on an action, {bidi|aski, silent},
by solving a risk-neutral utility maximisation problem (see equations 2.13 and
2.14) involving the limit price `i and the buyer’s belief q(b) or the seller’s belief
p(a) that a bid or an ask at a particular value will be successful in the market,
respectively. Thus, the BL instructs the KL that it requires such knowledge. The
KL then defines the Information Filter (see Figure 4.1), so that relevant infor-
mation, namely the history of bids, asks and transaction prices (H(bid), H(ask)
andH(price) respectively) are filtered to the IL. That information, along with the
agent’s limit price is passed to the KL. The KL can then compute the belief and
passes it, along with the limit price, to the BL.
Having discussed how the IKB model can be applied to existing strategies for the CDA,
we consider in the next section how we can use our framework to engineer a new trading
strategy given a particular market mechanism.
Chapter 4 A Framework for Designing Bidding Strategies 90
4.3 Designing a Trading Strategy for TAC
Here, we describe how we employed our IKB framework to design a novel strategy for
the TAC4. This competition involves a number of software agents competing against
each other in a number of interdependent auctions (based on different protocols) to
purchase travel packages over a period of 5 days (for the TACtown destination) for
different customers. In more detail, in a TAC Travel Game (each lasting 9 minutes),
there are 8 agents required to purchase packages for up to 8 customers (given their
preferences) and that compete in 3 types of auctions which we describe next.
1. Flight auctions. There is a single supplier for in-flight and out-flight tickets over
different days, with unlimited supply, and ticket prices updating every 10 seconds.
Transactions occur whenever the bid is equal to or greater than the current asking
price of the flight supplier.
2. Hotel auctions. There are two hotels at TACtown, namely Shoreline Shanties (SS)
and Tampa Towers (TT), with TT being the nicer hotel and each hotel having 16
rooms available over 4 different days. Thus, there are 8 different hotel auctions
(given the 2 hotels and rooms being available for 4 different days). Hotel rooms
are traded in 16th-price multi-unit English auctions, whereby the sixteen highest
bidders are allocated a room for a particular day in a particular hotel, and at the
end of every minute except the last, a hotel auction randomly closes, and the 16th
and 17th highest price of each hotel auction that is still open is published.
3. Entertainment auctions. There are three types of entertainment in TACtown,
namely a museum, an amusement park and a crocodile park, and 12 different
entertainment auctions (for the three type of entertainment tickets for each of the
four days). At the beginning of the game, each agent is randomly allocated 12
entertainment tickets tradeable in the different multi-unit CDAs which clear con-
tinuously and close at the end of the game.
Given this background on the TAC environment, our objective is to design a trading
strategy for an autonomous software agent participating in such a game. We develop
the strategy by using the IKB framework, adopting the multi-layered approach (see
Figure 4.2). We now describe the strategy within the different layers prescribed by the
IKB.
4Our IKB framework is employed in designing our agent, WhiteDolphin, which was ranked 3rd in
the final of the TAC Travel Game 2006, held at the TADA/AMEC Workshop, Hakodate, Japan (see
http://www.sics.se/tac/page.php?id=60).
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FIGURE 4.2: Structure of the WhiteDolphin Strategy for the TAC Travel Game.
4.3.1 The Behavioural Layer
The issues associated with the bidding behaviour can be summarised as follows:
1. What item to bid for?
2. How much to bid for?
3. When to bid?
We address the first issue by considering the optimal plan (see Definition 4.6). Thus,
the agent always bids for the set of items (flight tickets, hotel rooms and entertainment
tickets) required for the optimal plan, querying the optimal plan from the KL every 10
seconds. As a hotel auction closes every 60 seconds, the set of items available to the
agent is further constrained and the optimal plan has to be recalculated. We address the
other issues by considering the different auction formats.
Definition 4.6. Optimal Plan. The optimal plan is the set of travel packages, for 8
different clients, that would yield the maximum profit, given the clients’ preferences
(that determine the utility of the package) and the cost of the packages.
Definition 4.7. Marginal Profit5. The marginal profit of a hotel room (in a particular
hotel on a particular day) is the decrease in the agent’s total profit if it fails to acquire
5The marginal profit described here is similar in essence to the marginal value used in (Cheng et al.,
2003).
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that room. Thus, the marginal profit of a hotel room that is not required in the optimal
plan is 0.
First, we consider the 8 flight auctions. Given the manner in which the flight prices
update, it is possible to predict the trend of the price update. Such a trend is queried
from the KL. If the trend suggests a decrease in price, the BL then queries the predicted
lowest ask price of the flight auction, and a bid is placed in that auction when that
minimum is reached, if such flight tickets are required in the optimal plan. Conversely, if
an increasing trend is predicted in a flight auction, we face a trade-off between acquiring
all the tickets in such an auction immediately at the current lowest price, and waiting in
case the agent does not manage to acquire the scarce hotel rooms required in the optimal
plan, which could make the flight tickets redundant (since they are no longer required in
the optimal plan and represent a loss). We implement the trade-off by spreading our bids
in a flight auction over the remaining length of the TAC game. For example, if 4 tickets
are required from a particular flight auction with an increasing trend, we could buy a
single ticket every minute over the next 4 minutes, rather than buying all 4 immediately.
Next, we have the 8 hotel auctions, with a random one clearing (and closing) every
minute. Thus, every minute, as the optimal plan changes, we update our bid in those
auctions that are yet to close. Now, there is uncertainty in being able to acquire all the
items required in the optimal plan, particularly at the beginning of the game. Because
a bid in a hotel auction can only be replaced by a higher bid, and because the optimal
plan typically changes during the game, it does not pay to bid too high for an item at
the beginning of the game. This is because that item might no longer be required in
the optimal plan as the game progresses, thus might be acquired and not used. Given
this, our agent does not bid for a hotel room at its marginal profit (see Definition 4.7),
but rather bids low at the beginning of the game (at a fraction of its marginal profit) and
gradually increases its bid for a room towards its marginal profit as the game progresses,
bidding its marginal cost after the 7th minute before the last hotel auction closes.
Finally, we have the twelve entertainment auctions. Here, we use a preliminary version
of our AA strategy (see Chapter 5 for more details). In particular, we have 12 AA
traders that bid for the items required in the optimal plan. The agent further instructs
the AA trader to buy cheap in auctions that do not influence the optimal plan, and sell
high for all the items that it holds, if the agent can thus be more profitable, rather than
using these items in its optimal plan.
We now consider the knowledge required for the bidding behaviour.
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4.3.2 The Knowledge Layer
Here, we principally require the optimal plan which is given as the solution to an optimi-
sation problem6. Specifically, the agent searches for the plan that maximises its profit,
which is the total utility of the packages less their estimated cost. The utility of a pack-
age is determined by a client’s preferences, which is queried from the IL. Furthermore,
the optimisation problem is constrained by different requirements of a feasible package,
for example a client needs to stay in the same hotel for the duration of his/her stay or
the client is required to stay in a hotel during the length of his/her stay (Wellman et al.,
2002), with additional contraints imposed as hotel auctions close. We also consider the
additional knowledge of the predicted clearing price of the hotel auctions and of the
flight auctions (based on the trend of flight prices in those auctions) to estimate the cost
of a plan.
Now, for the hotel auctions, we calculate the marginal profit of hotel rooms required in
the plan, to form the bidding price in the active hotel auctions. This is carried out by
considering the next best package if a particular hotel room in the optimal plan cannot be
acquired. The drop in profit then represents the marginal profit of that hotel room. Next,
for the flight auctions, the KL estimates the trend of the flight prices, by considering its
history. Such knowledge is used in the BL to decide when to bid for flight tickets, and in
this layer, to calculate the minimum asking prices when a decreasing trend is identified.
Finally, for the entertainment auctions, the agent has the same KL as the AA traders
(see Section 5.2 for more details and for the design of the AA strategy using the IKB
framework).
4.3.3 The Information Layer
In this layer, the agent extracts all the information needed for the knowledge it requires.
Indeed, it tracks information relevant to the TAC Travel Game, such as the running time
of the game and which auctions have closed, as well as the clients’ preferences that
do not change during the game. When it considers the individual auctions, the agent
has to record the history of published information (bids and asks where available). In
the flight auctions, the history of flight prices is required to estimate the trend, which
represents vital knowledge. In the hotel auctions, the history of the publicly announced
16th highest price can be recorded up to when the auction closes. Such information
6We use ILOG CPLEX 9.0 to solve the optimisation problem, with a solution typically found within
a few milliseconds.
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can be used to estimate the clearing price of the hotel auctions in future TAC games.
Finally, for the entertainment auctions, the agent has the same IL as the AA traders.
4.4 Summary
The objective of this line of work is to provide a systematic framework for designing
strategies for market mechanisms. In particular, we required a framework that was
sufficiently general to be used for the CDA mechanism, as well as variants thereof.
To this end, we developed a framework that can be broken down into three principal
components: the behavioural layer, the knowledge layer and the information layer. In
so doing, we believe this work is an important preliminary step towards guiding the
strategy designer by identifying the key models and concepts that are relevant to this
task. We demonstrated the application of our approach by showing that CDA strategies
can be analysed using our IKB framework and by showing how it can be used to assist
in the design of a strategy for the TAC game.
The work addresses our research aim of designing strategies for the CDA. With this
framework, we assist the strategy designer by providing a systematic approach to the
design of such strategies. Furthermore, our framework is sufficiently flexible to assist
the design of strategies for CDA variants as well, which this thesis also investigates. In
the next chapter, we demonstrate its use at the preliminary stage of the design of our
novel bidding strategy for the CDA.
Chapter 5
An Adaptive-Aggressiveness Bidding
Strategy
In this chapter, we design our novel bidding strategy to fulfil our research aim for more
efficient strategies for the CDA.
To date, considerable research endeavour has been invested into devising strategies for
agents that participate in CDAs. However, there is no known dominant strategy (see
Chapter 1). Thus, many strategies have been developed as heuristic-based, decision-
making algorithms that attempt to best exploit the observable market information avail-
able to the agents in order to maximise their profits (see Subsection 2.3.4). Indeed,
several of these strategies have been shown to outperform human traders in laboratory
experiments (as discussed in Subsection 2.3.1). However, we believe that more efficient
strategies can still be developed and, in this work, we will go on to develop just such a
strategy.
In particular, the extant CDA strategies have typically been developed assuming that
the market is static, meaning there is no change in demand and supply at the begin-
ning of each trading day. However, in this work, one of the motivations for the use
of decentralised systems is their being dynamic and, furthermore, real markets such as
NASDAQ and the NYSE are typically very dynamic, with reasonably frequent market
shocks. Thus, we believe the efficiency of strategies in dynamic environments is central
to their application in practice. Now, although some of the designers have made initial
attempts to show their strategies will still do well in dynamic markets (see discussion
in Subsection 2.3.4), these strategies were not developed explicitly for such environ-
ments. We believe this is a mistake because there are some fundamental differences
between static and dynamic environments. Specifically, these are primarily to do with
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the sporadically changing competitive market equilibrium. Given this, the efficiency
of a strategy depends on how effective it is at adapting its bidding behaviour to the
new market structure and, thus, to the new competitive equilibrium price. From this,
our intuition is that different behaviours are needed when the market is relatively sta-
ble and when it is changing. In particular, in the static case, the agent can be effective
by assuming that the competitive equilibrium does not change significantly, whereas in
the dynamic case, it can make no such assumption and must learn, assuming that this
competitive equilibrium may change. Furthermore, for maximum generality, we want
to ensure that our strategy performs well in homogeneous populations in which all the
agents use it (as would typically be the case in market-based control applications) and in
heterogeneous populations in which agents can adopt a range of alternate strategies (as
would be the case in financial institutions). Given this, we simply assume that an agent
is selfish and tries to maximise its individual return and that it is unaware of whether it
is trading in a homogeneous or a heterogeneous environment.
In this chapter, we first discuss, in Section 5.1, how we consider bidding aggressive-
ness in our strategy. Thereon, in Section 5.2, we describe our strategy and Section 5.3
summarises the work.
5.1 Bidding Aggressiveness
The key intuition behind our strategy is that we can profitably vary how aggressively
an agent bids in the CDA. We focus on bidding aggressiveness1, in particular, as we
believe it is the key determinant of success in the market. It is so central because it
describes how the agent manages the trade-off between profit and probability of trans-
action. Here, an aggressive trading agent is one that tries to increase its chance of
transacting by placing bids, that are not necessarily highly profitable. In contrast, its
passive counterpart tries to transact at more profitable prices, but has to trade off its
chance of actually transacting. When the agent is not able to transact, it could choose to
become more aggressive, such that it increases its chances of being able to transact and,
conversely, when it can transact, it could choose to become more passive in order to try
to increase its profits. In other words, the agent could react to the market information
by being more or less aggressive based on how it is performing in the market:
1In some work, the trader’s risk attitude has been used to describe broadly the same behaviour (Byde,
2003). However, we believe that such a property is intrinsic to the trader, and thus, is not an appropriate
term to describe our changing behaviour in this case. Indeed, in the financial world, the behaviour of our
strategy is typically referred to as aggressiveness rather than risk and this was our main motivation for
the terminology we adopted.
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Definition 5.1. Aggressiveness is defined as the inclination to interact more actively
in the market. The aggressive trader submits better offers than what it believes the
competitive equilibrium price to be, to improve its chance of transacting, and trades
off profit for that purpose. The passive trader is less inclined to transact and more
inclined to win a profitable transaction and thus submits offers that are worse than what
it believes the competitive equilibrium price to be. The neutral trader submits offers at
what it believes is the competitive equilibrium price, which is the expected transaction
price.
Specifically, the agent can adopt behaviours that have different levels of aggressiveness,
r ∈ [−1, 1], ranging from aggressive (r < 0), through neutral at r = 0, to passive
(r > 0), coupled with a learning mechanism to decide upon this level. Specifically,
an agent that adopts a passive strategy waits for more profitable transactions than at
its estimate of p∗ (hereafter the estimate is denoted by pˆ∗) and is willing to trade-off
its chance of transacting for higher expected profit. In contrast, an aggressive strategy
trades-off profit to improve its probability of transacting in the market. The neutral
agent attempts to transact at pˆ∗ which is the expected transaction price.
Given this, we employ a short-term learning mechanism to fine-tune the agent’s aggres-
siveness whenever it submits a bid or an ask, or a transaction occurs (if the bid and
the ask match) in the market. The actual way in which the degree of aggressiveness
translates to a bid or an ask to submit in the market can be fixed or can be linear, in
which case the aggressiveness would be similar to the agent’s profit margin. However,
we believe that this mapping should be updated depending on the prevailing market
conditions. Thus, we employ a long-term learning strategy that adapts this mapping,
in a non-linear fashion, to the changing conditions and, in particular, to the volatility
of transaction prices. We refer to this learning as long-term because the occurrence of
bids and asks is a fraction of the number of transactions that occur and because the ben-
efit of learning this mapping is only really observable over a number of trading days.
The purpose of the long-term learning is especially evident in dynamic markets where
market conditions can change drastically and a different mapping should then clearly
be adopted. Hereafter, we refer to our strategy as the Adaptive-Aggressiveness (or AA)
strategy.
Having given our intuitions, we next describe our AA strategy in more detail. Chapter
7 then evaluates its effectiveness against a number of the state of the art alternatives.
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5.2 The Bidding Strategy
As market conditions keep changing, different levels of aggressiveness are likely to be
best at different times and so the agent needs a means for updating r. Thus, an AA
agent has two principal decision-making components: (i) a bidding one that specifies
what bid or ask should be submitted based on its current degree of aggressiveness, and
(ii) a learning mechanism to update its behaviour according to the prevailing market
conditions.
Given the desired behaviour of our strategy and the knowledge it requires (including
the competitive equilibrium estimate), we use our IKB framework (see Chapter 4) to
formulate the structure of our strategy. In more detail, the IL is instructed (by the KL)
to record bid(t) and ask(t) to be used to update the degree of aggressiveness of the
agent and a history of transaction prices, H(price). The KL then uses H(price) to
estimate the market equilibrium price and to learn the best aggressiveness given the
market condition. Such information, along with that about the market condition and the
agent’s limit price, vni(t),i, is obtained from the IL. It is then relayed through the KL,
in a set of bidding rules in the BL (based on knowledge of the market conditions). The
latter then decides what offer, {bidi|aski, silent}, the agent i submits.
Given how market information translates to a bid or an ask to submit in an AA agent, we
now give a model that describes how the AA strategy works, along with an indication
of how the different components that represent how knowledge (such as the equilibrium
estimate) are updated based on observed information from the market (see Figure 5.1).
The learning and bidding of the strategy are represented by two distinct components, (i)
the bidding and (ii) the adaptive component within our IKB model.
The first component determines which bids or asks to submit given a set of bidding
rules (see Subsection 5.2.4). These rules specify how to react to the current market
conditions given the target price τ which represents the agent’s most competitive2 price
in the market. Now, the aggressiveness model, as described in detail in Subsection 5.2.2,
gives a mapping function to τ of the agent’s current degree of aggressiveness, its limit
price, pˆ∗ (which is provided by the equilibrium estimator described in Subsection 5.2.1),
and an intrinsic parameter θ. In particular, θ determines the shape of that mapping
function (see figures 5.2 and 5.3 for more details).
2A bid (or ask) is competitive if it is the agent’s most profitable bid (or ask) that it believes would be
accepted in the market. Note that a bid is always less than or equal to, and the ask always more than or
equal to, its limit price. This is somewhat similar to the price given the ZIP agent’s profit margin, and the
price that maximised the GDX agent’s expected profit.
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FIGURE 5.1: The AA bidding strategy.
The second component represents the adaptive part of the strategy where the agent
updates its bidding behaviour, when triggered by a market event (when a transaction
occurs or a new bid or ask is submitted). This update causes the agent to adopt a more
passive behaviour if it believes it can transact at a higher profit or a more aggressive
one if it believes it is targeting too high a profit to transact. In particular, we have short-
term and long-term learning mechanisms that update the agent’s bidding behaviour. The
former updates the degree of aggressiveness, r, whenever a bid or ask is submitted and is
described in more detail in Subsection 5.2.3.1. The latter updates θ in the aggressiveness
model after every transaction and is described in more detail in Subsection 5.2.3.2.
In the following subsections, each component of our strategy is now described in turn.
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5.2.1 The Equilibrium Estimator
Because p∗ cannot be known a priori, we use themoving averagemethod for calculating
its estimate, pˆ∗, based on the history of transactions (see Equation 5.1). We make this
choice because the moving average is an objective analytical tool that gives the average
value over a time frame spanning from the last transaction. Moreover, it is sensitive
to price changes over a short time frame, but over a longer time span, is less sensitive
and filters out the high-frequency components of the signal within the frame. Moving
average thus allows us to emphasise the direction of a trend and smooth out large price
fluctuations and, thus, we believe this is a reasonable choice. Based on our assumption
that the transaction prices converge to the competitive equilibrium price, we introduce
the notion of recency in the moving average by giving more weight to the more recent
transaction prices. Specifically, Equation 5.1 describes how we calculate pˆ∗ given a set
of the N most recent transaction prices:
pˆ∗ =
∑T
i=T−N+1wipi∑T
i=T−N+1wi
where wT = 1 and wi−1 = λwi (5.1)
where (wT−N+1, . . . , wT ) is the weight given to the N most recent transaction prices,
(pT−N+1, . . . , pT ), and T is the latest transaction. Based on simulations, we set λ to
a value of 0.9 and N to roughly the number of daily transactions to emphasise any
converging pattern in the history (see Figure 5.6 for an example).
5.2.2 The Aggressiveness Model
The role of the aggressiveness model is to generate the current target price, τ , given
the agent’s current degree of aggressiveness r. In this context, an agent can be of two
types; namely, intra-marginal and extra-marginal (see Section 2.1). Recall that a buyer
(seller) is intra-marginal if its limit price is higher (lower) than the competitive equilib-
rium price. In contrast, the extra-marginal buyer’s (seller’s) limit price is lower (higher)
than the competitive equilibrium price. Now, in a centralised mechanism with an ef-
ficient allocation (market efficiency is 1), only intra-marginal agents transact, while
extra-marginal ones do not (recall the discussion in Section 2.1). However, in a de-
centralised mechanism, while intra-marginal agents are expected to transact, and extra-
marginal counterparts are not, the latter do sometimes succeed in transacting. This is
because transaction prices are never exactly at p∗, and, thus, extra-marginal buyers can
exploit asks below p∗ and extra-marginal sellers bids above p∗. In such cases, when the
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extra-marginal traders do transact, the allocation is no longer efficient and the market
efficiency dips below 1.
Our aggressiveness model differs for these two type of traders, fundamentally because
of their limit prices with respect to p∗. Given this, we consider them each in turn.
First, we consider the intra-marginal trader. In its aggressiveness model, a target price
equal to pˆ∗ implies that the trader is neutral. When an intra-marginal agent adopts a
passive behaviour, it considers a target price that is below (for the buyer) or an ask that is
above (for the seller) p∗, in order to obtain a higher (than expected at pˆ∗) profit margin.
Conversely, an aggressive attitude implies that the intra-marginal trader targets bids
above (asks below) the competitive equilibrium price, which improves the probability
of its bids (asks) being accepted (but decreases its profit margin).
FIGURE 5.2: Aggressiveness for the intra-marginal trader for different θ. Solid lines
represent the buyer’s function, and the dashed lines, the seller’s function.
For the intra-marginal aggressiveness model, we identified the following constraints
that it should satisfy over the different degrees of aggressiveness. In particular, when
the buyer is completely aggressive (r = −1), it targets a bid at its limit price and when
it is completely passive (r = 1), it targets a bid at 0 (for maximum profit but no chance
of actually transacting). The neutral buyer (r = 0) targets a bid at pˆ∗. Therefore, the
aggressiveness function is defined at these three specific aggressiveness levels. Similar
intuitions apply for the seller’s aggressiveness function. However, when (r = −1),
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the seller submits the maximum ask, pmax (see Definition 2.15), allowed in the market.
Given these constraints, there is an infinite solution space for such a function and so
we choose a parameterised function (see Figure 5.2) within the solution space with θ
determining the behaviour of the function (i.e. its rate of change with respect to the
degree of aggressiveness r).
Specifically, equations 5.2 and 5.3 detail the intra-marginal buyer’s and seller’s aggres-
siveness model (and its relationship between r and τ ). We adopt these particular func-
tions because they are continuous (and thus, we do not have sudden jumps of τ as r
changes) and θ allows the agent to explicitly specify the properties of the function.
When θ is high, the magnitude of the gradient tends to 0 at r = 0 and increases as θ
tends to -1. Conversely, when θ is low, the magnitude of the gradient is high at r = 0
and thus allows faster update of the target price as r changes. A slow update is required
when the transaction prices are converging to pˆ∗, while a fast update is required at the
beginning of the auction or after a market shock, when market conditions are changing
considerably. Indeed, experimental results described in (Vytelingum et al., 2004) sug-
gest that the effectiveness of our bidding strategy depends on the value θ. In particular,
we observed from market simulations that a high θ is more beneficial when the prices
are converging towards pˆ∗ and it is not profitable to deviate too much from pˆ∗. When
faced with a high price volatility (with all agents still exploring the market), an agent is
then better off with a low θ to also explore the market by allowing a faster update of its
degree of aggressiveness. In Subsection 5.2.3.2, we describe how updating θ, and thus
the aggressiveness model, after every transaction can be beneficial in the long term.
For an intra-marginal buyer i,
τ =
{
pˆ∗(1− reθ(r−1)) if r ∈ (−1, 0)
(`i − pˆ∗) (1− (r + 1) erθ) + pˆ∗ if r ∈ (0, 1)
where θ =
pˆ∗e−θ
`i − pˆ∗ − 1 (5.2)
For an intra-marginal seller j,
τ =
{
pˆ∗ + (pmax − pˆ∗) re(r−1)θ if r ∈ (−1, 0)
pˆ∗ + (pˆ∗ − cj) re(r+1)θ if r ∈ (0, 1)
where θ = log
[
pmax − pˆ∗
pˆ∗ − cj
]
− θ (5.3)
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Now, for the above equations, the marginal trader is a limiting case, where `i = pˆ∗ and
cj = pˆ
∗. However, these equations are not valid in the extra-marginal case where the
seller cannot ask below pˆ∗ and the buyer cannot bid above pˆ∗. In such situations, the
extra-marginal buyer and seller modify their aggressiveness functions to that of Figure
5.3. This reflects the fact that the extra-marginal trader cannot be aggressive and its
degree of aggressiveness, r, is clipped at 0 such that it will submit its limit price to
maximise its chance of transacting. For this case, Equations 5.4 and 5.5 describe that
aggressiveness function precisely:
FIGURE 5.3: Aggressiveness for the extra-marginal traders for different θ. Solid lines
represent the buyer’s function, and the dashed lines, the seller’s function.
For an extra-marginal buyer i,
τ =
{
`i(1− reθ(r−1)) if r ∈ (−1, 0)
`i if r ∈ (0, 1)
(5.4)
For an extra-marginal seller j,
τ =
{
cj + (pmax − cj)re(r−1)θ if r ∈ (−1, 0)
cj if r ∈ (0, 1)
(5.5)
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We next look at the adaptive component of the AA strategy, where the agent learns its
degree of aggressiveness and its aggressiveness model.
5.2.3 The Adaptive Component
The adaptive component consists of the short-term and long-term learning mechanisms
that update r and θ respectively. In the following subsections, we describe each of these
in more detail.
5.2.3.1 Short-Term Learning
In the short-term mechanism, the agent uses a set of learning rules (summarised in
Figure 5.4) to update its aggressiveness, every time a bid or an ask is submitted or a
transaction occurs in the market. It performs this in order to better fit the prevailing
market conditions. Specifically, a simple continuous learning algorithm, the Widrow-
Hoff algorithm (initially adopted in the ZIP strategy), is used to increase or decrease the
aggressiveness, r(t), at time step t (see Equation 5.6).
In more detail, the aim here is to adapt the agent’s aggressiveness to the current desired
aggressiveness, δ(t), which represents the degree of aggressiveness that would allow the
buyer to bid the minimum of its limit price and a price slightly higher than the outstand-
ing bid or the seller to ask the maximum of its limit price and a price slightly lower than
the outstanding ask. Here, δ(t) is a factor of rshout, the degree of aggressiveness that
would form a price equal to the bid b, if the agent is a buyer and the last event was a bid,
or to the ask, a, if the agent is a seller and the last event was an ask, or to the transaction
pT , whether the agent is a buyer or a seller and if the last event was a transaction (see
bidding rules in Figure 5.4). When the agent is decreasing its degree of aggressiveness
(to be more profitable), it sets δ(t) to slightly lower than rshout (λ = −0.05) so that
the target price is higher than the outstanding bid or lower than the outstanding ask.
When it is increasing its degree of aggressiveness (to improve its chance of transact-
ing), it sets δ(t) to slightly higher than rshout (λ = 0.05). The algorithm then enacts a
continuous-space learning process that backprojects a fraction of the error between the
desired degree of aggressiveness, δ(t), and the degree of aggressiveness, r(t), onto the
same degree of aggressiveness, r(t). As r(t) updates, it gradually follows the chang-
ing δ(t) at a rate dependent on the learning parameter β1. A reasonable value of β1 is
chosen, but λ and β1 are not fundamental to the results we report here. Specifically,
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r(t+ 1) = r(t) + β1(δ(t)− r(t))
δ(t) = (1 + λ)rshout, λ = {−0.05, 0.05} (5.6)
where β1 ∈ (0, 1) is the learning rate of the algorithm which influences the rate of
change of r(t) and, hence, of the target price τ .
Learning Rules for Buyer i:
if (transaction occurs at price pT )
if (τ ≥ pT ) buyer must be less aggressive
else buyer must be more aggressive
else if (bid, b, submitted)
if (τ ≤ b) buyer must be more aggressive
Learning Rules for Seller j:
if (transaction occurs at price pT )
if (τ ≤ pT ) seller must be less aggressive
else seller must be more aggressive
else if (ask, a, submitted)
if (τ ≥ a) seller must be more aggressive
FIGURE 5.4: Short-Term Learning Rules.
The learning rules employed here are broadly similar to those of the ZIP strategy. We
employ its learning mechanism because it has been shown to effectively exploit market
information. However, rather than updating a profit margin, we employ the mechanism
to update the agent’s degree of aggressiveness. We also simplify the adaptive mech-
anism by not considering a momentum-based update, since the manner in which the
aggressiveness is updated with respect to the competitive equilibrium price minimises
any high-frequency change in the bid or ask prices. In more detail, when the buyer’s
target price is greater than the transaction price, this implies that the buyer can transact
and so it should try to be more profitable in the next round by being less aggressive.
If its target price is less than the transaction price, this suggests that the buyer cannot
transact at its target price, and thus should increase it by being more aggressive. Sim-
ilar intuitions apply for the seller’s learning rules. An example of how the degree of
aggressiveness changes in a specific scenario is given in Figure 5.6.
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5.2.3.2 Long-Term Learning
As described in Subsection 5.2.2, θ influences the bidding behaviour. Given this, we
now describe how we can learn such a parameter on a long-term basis, after every trans-
action, to improve the efficiency of AA. The underlying intuition here is that different
values of θ are best within different market conditions and, in particular, the best values
of θ depend on the price volatility. Given this, we update θ (after every transaction)
through a learning process based on the price volatility, which we measure as an ap-
proximation of Smith’s α-parameter (see Section 2.1), given that the agent only has
an estimate of the competitive equilibrium price. Equation 5.7 describes the learning
mechanism:
θ(t+ 1) = θ(t) + β2(θ
∗(α)− θt)
α =
√
1
N
∑T
i=T−N+1(pi − pˆ∗)2
pˆ∗
(5.7)
where β2 ∈ (0, 1) is the learning rate of the algorithm, that determines how θ adapts. In
particular, θ∗(α) is a function (see Figure 5.5) that determines the desired θ parameter
given the current price volatility3, α, calculated over a window of the N latest prices.
pi is the price of transaction i, and T is the most recent transaction. θ∗(α) is given
by Equation 5.8 and is shown in Figure 5.5. Based on simulation results for different
environments, we chose this particular function as it approximates4 well the optimal θ
parameter that maximises performance given the price volatility:
θ∗(α) = (θmax − θmin)(1− (α− αmin)/(αmax − αmin))
e2((α−αmin)/(αmax−αmin)−1) + θmin (5.8)
where [θmin, θmax] is the range over which we update θ, αmax is the maximum α that
occurs in the market, and αmin is the minimum α.
Given the mechanism, we now consider an example of how θ changes in a specific
scenario in Figure 5.6. In particular, θ updates after every transaction, as specified by
3The price volatility is calculated in the same manner as Smith’s coefficient of convergence α.
4Our function is only an approximation since it is averaged over the optimal θ for a number of different
market environments. The exact environment and thus, the exact optimal θ, are unknown a priori.
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FIGURE 5.5: Function θ∗(α) gives the desired θ∗.
Equation 5.7, fixed at -4 for the first few transaction prices (until a reasonable estimate
of the competitive equilibrium price is obtained) and then updated to settle at θmax
(around 2) as the transaction prices converge to the competitive equilibrium price (at
2.65). When a market shock is identified by the sudden increase in α (at transaction
54), θ gradually decreases to θmin (around -8) to give a faster update of the target price
τ (see Subsection 5.2.2). As the agents’ behaviours gradually adapt to the new market
demand and supply and the transaction prices converge towards the new competitive
equilibrium price (at 3.82), θ gradually increases back to a high value (around 2) that is
more suitable for a low price volatility.
Having looked at the aggressiveness model (that outputs τ given r and θ), and the adap-
tive component (that updates r and θ), we now need to describe the bidding component
where the agent forms a bid or an ask to submit in the market, based on the current
market conditions, its limit price and τ .
5.2.4 The Bidding Component
In the bidding component, the agent employs a set of bidding rules to decide whether
or not to submit a bid or an ask, and at what price if it decides to do so. If the buyer’s
(seller’s) limit price is lower (higher) than the current obid (oask), it cannot submit any
bid (ask), and waits for the beginning of the next round. On the other hand, if the agent
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FIGURE 5.6: The history of transaction prices and pˆ∗ (top plot), the short-term learn-
ing of r (middle plot) and the long-term learning of θ (bottom plot). Note that we
have a market shock after transaction 54, with θ updated to match the change in price
volatility.
can submit a bid or ask in the market, it considers its set of bidding rules to form a
price. In this, we identify two cases when an agent bids: during the first trading round,
where it cannot estimate the competitive equilibrium price, and the subsequent rounds
where it can. In particular, Figure 5.7 gives the bidding rules, and equations 5.9 and
5.10 describe the price formation process in detail in the two cases:
bidi =
{
obid + (min{`i, oask} − obid)/η if first round
obid + (τ − obid)/η otherwise
(5.9)
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Bidding Rules for Buyer i:
if (`i ≤ obid) submit no bid
else
if (first trading round) submit bid given by Equation 5.9
else
if (oask ≤ τ ) accept oask
else submit bid given by Equation 5.9
Bidding Rules for Seller j:
if (cj ≥ oask) submit no ask
else
if (first trading round) submit ask given by Equation 5.10
else
if (obid ≥ τ ) accept obid
else submit ask given by Equation 5.10
FIGURE 5.7: Bidding Rules.
askj =
{
oask − (oask −max{cj, obid})/η if first round
oask − (oask − τ)/η otherwise
(5.10)
where η ∈ [1,∞) is a constant that determines the rate of increase (decrease) of the bids
(asks).
At the beginning of the first trading round, the agent has no information other than its
limit price. Now, because if the buyer submits too high a bid, it can transact at a not very
profitable price (with respect to p∗), it starts with low bids that progressively approach
the minimum of its limit price, `i, and the outstanding ask, oask, (see Equation 5.10)
to explore the market. Similarly, the seller, j, submits an ask towards the maximum
of its cost price, cj , and the outstanding bid, obid, (see Equation 5.9). Thus, the agent
effectively reduces the bid-ask spread with an exponentially decreasing trend (since the
bid increase should be decreasing to reflect the decreasing bid-ask spread) determined
by η and its limit price. Here, a low η implies a faster rate of convergence of bids or asks
until they are matched at a transaction price and, conversely, a high η implies a more
conservative bidding approach and a slower convergence. With the latter, while being
more profitable if it transacts, the agent risks missing out on a transaction if other agents
adopt a more conservative strategy (similar to that of an AA agent with a lower η).
However, with a lower η, the agent might be too hasty, and adopting a more conservative
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approach might be more profitable. In our simulations, we choose a value of 3 for
η, which was observed to be a good compromise over a multitude of environments.
Furthermore, the buyer can only submit a bid if its limit price is higher than obid, or
otherwise, it remains idle until the beginning of the next trading round. We use similar
intuitions to design the behaviour of the seller.
After the first trading round, the agent has an initial estimate of the competitive equi-
librium price, which it subsequently updates after each transaction. Initially, we set the
agent’s aggressiveness factor, r, to 0 (meaning it adopts a neutral attitude) because of
the lack of market information. Based on the target price, τ , and the set of bidding rules
that dictate how the agent should react to the current market conditions, the trader then
forms a bid or ask to submit in the market. In more detail, if the target price is higher
than the outstanding ask at any time during the bidding process, the buyer accepts the
outstanding ask (which is a better offer than it was targeting). Otherwise, it submits a
bid, given by Equation 5.9, that approaches the (changing) target price in a similar man-
ner as in the first trading round. We use similar intuitions to design the seller’s bidding
rules. Here, if the target price is lower than the outstanding bid, the seller accepts the
outstanding bid. Otherwise, it submits an ask given by Equation 5.10. Furthermore, as
in the first trading round, η affects the bidding process in a similar manner and is set to
3 throughout the trading day.
5.3 Summary
In this chapter, we described a novel predictive and history-based bidding strategy
that software agents can use to bid in Continuous Double Auctions. The adaptive-
aggressiveness strategy is principally based on a short-term and a long-term learning
of the agent’s bidding behaviour. For the short-term learning, the motivation was to
immediately respond to fluctuations in the market conditions, and the agent updates
the aggressiveness of its bidding behaviour based on market information observed af-
ter every bid or ask appears in the market. The motivation for the long-term learning
mechanism, on the other hand, was to respond to more systematic changes in the market
conditions and, in particular, to market shocks. To achieve this, our strategy updates an
aggressiveness model that determines how the agent’s degree of aggressiveness influ-
ences its choice of bids or asks to submit in the market, based on market information
observed after every successful transaction.
This work addresses our research aim to develop more efficient strategies since, as we
will empirically demonstrate in Chapter 7, our AA strategy outperforms the state of the
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art in a wide range of different market environments. Before we do this, however, in the
next chapter, we describe a framework for analysing the strategic interactions of such
strategies in the CDA.
Chapter 6
A Framework for Analysing Strategic
Behaviours
As discussed in Section 1.1, because of the complexity of the CDA and the dominance
of heuristic strategies, it is very difficult to determine a priori which strategies will be
effective in which situations. This is a serious concern for agent designers because they
have no principled way of selecting which strategy to adopt; this is important because
the various strategies can perform very differently in different market settings. More-
over, it is also a concern for market designers because they want to deploy a mechanism
that is efficient and stable, but this depends on the strategies that the various participants
adopt. Thus, we require a method of determining which strategies are more likely to be
adopted in the market (see research aim 4). Walsh et al. propose such a method with an
EGT model that analyses the evolution of an agent’s strategy in the market. However,
as discussed in Subsection 2.3.5.2, their model is constrained by a major assumption
that buyers and sellers adopt the same behaviour in the market.
To address this shortcoming, we propose a two-population EGT model to analyse the
complex interaction of buyers and sellers in the market. Specifically, we consider a
game with two distinct populations, each endowed with a separate set of heuristic strate-
gies. The two populations correspond to the two different types of trading agents, the
buyers and the sellers, and they are endowed with distinct sets of strategies. Thus, our
model makes no assumption that an agent must have the same strategy for buying and
selling, although if this is the best thing to do, then, our model will converge to it. In
developing this new model, we advance the state of the art as follows. First, we provide
a novel analytical model that dissects the buyer and seller trading roles in the market
and allows us to analyse the market efficiency and stability from a buyer’s and a seller’s
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perspective. Second, to illustrate the effectiveness of our model, we analyse the CDA
with the state of the art strategies and discuss how such an analysis of the evolution
of buyers’ and sellers’ strategies can indeed be used to evaluate strategies in heteroge-
neous populations. Finally, to demonstrate the benefits of our model over Walsh et al.’s,
we compare a one-population EGT analysis against a two-population one and identify
strategic interactions between buyers and sellers that cannot be observed with the for-
mer.
6.1 A Two-Population EGT Model
In a two-population game, a player i from population P selects its strategy from a set
of SP strategies, where a strategy is a policy that determines the agent’s action(s) in
the game. The payoff to each player is then a deterministic mapping of the strate-
gies of the players from the two populations and is usually read off a correspond-
ing payoff table. For generality, we assume that each player has a mixed strategy,
xi = (xi1, . . . , x
i
j, . . . , x
i
SP
) (where xj is the probability that it plays pure strategy j)
that it plays in the game. Then, as rational behaviour dictates that each player will
change its mixed strategy for a higher payoff, we have an evolution of behaviours as all
the players in the game concurrently change their mixed strategy. EGT, then, allows us
to analyse such an evolution. While EGT has commonly been used to analyse simple
games (see Subsection 2.3.5.2), here, however, we are interested in more complex two-
population market games with Ab buyers and As sellers, endowed with a set of Sb and
a set of Ss heuristic strategies respectively.
We address this problem by abstracting the complex market game to a simple normal-
form game, as per Walsh et al.’s model and, we do so as follows. Playing the complex
buyer and seller strategies in the game can be considered as high-level actions similar to
the actions in a normal-form game. The payoff to a buyer or a seller for such actions is
then the total profit that they have extracted at the end of the game (which can last over
several trading days). In such cases, the payoffs to buyers and sellers are usually referred
to as being heuristic, because they are the result of the complex, non-deterministic in-
teraction of trading agents in the game. Thus, our analysis begins with the computation
of the heuristic payoff table and, thereafter, we analyse our market games, in terms of
equilibria and dynamics, using a two-population EGT analytical approach, as the novel
step of our model.
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6.1.1 Computing the Heuristic Payoff Table
First, we describe how to calculate the entries of the heuristic payoff table with the ex-
pected return to each agent as a function of the strategies played by all agents. Now, for
a two-population, normal-formal game with Sb buyer strategies, Ss seller strategies, Ab
buyers and As sellers, we require
(
SAbb × SAss
)
entries in the table. However, because
the table size increases exponentially with the number of strategies, some simplifica-
tions are necessary to make the analysis tractable. In particular, Walsh et al. restrict
their analysis to symmetric mixed-Nash equilibrium when they assume that each agent
from the single population has the same mixed strategy, and hence, expects the same
payoff when playing the same pure strategy. In our case, when considering two popula-
tions, the size of the payoff table then reduces considerably to
(
Ab+Sb−1
Ab
)
× (As+Ss−1As ).
For example, for a market game of 10 buyers and 10 sellers, each endowed with 2
different strategies, the size of the payoff table reduces from 1.05 × 106 to 121 (from
asymmetric to symmetric payoffs in each population).
For the exhaustive set of strategy profiles1, we calculate the different payoffs for the
buyer and the seller to the different strategies in the market (see Appendix A for the
complete heuristic payoff table of this particular scenario). Because of the non-deterministic
nature of the table, we require a statistically significant number of independent runs for
each profile2. Given the heuristic payoff table (which represents the most computation-
intensive part of our analytical approach), we can now proceed to the equilibrium com-
putation and the dynamics analysis of the market game. In the former, we describe
the ideal static properties of the population proportions using the different strategies
in the system (i.e. the mixed-Nash equilibria of the game). In the latter, we detail
how to calculate the dynamics p˙ = (p˙1, . . . , p˙Sb) and q˙ = (q˙1, . . . , q˙Ss) of the game,
which describe how the buyer and seller population distributions, p = (p1, . . . , pSb)
and q = (q1, . . . , qSs), change3. Here, because we are considering very large popula-
tions, we can validate that the population distributions, p and q, are equal to the mixed
strategies of the buyers and sellers. Hereafter, we will refer to these terms as the mixed
strategies of the two populations.
1A strategy profile [ρb, ρs] defines the number of buyers ρb = (ρb1, . . . , ρ
b
Sb
) and sellers ρs =
(ρs1, . . . , ρ
s
Ss
) using the different buyer and seller strategies respectively. An example of the 121 strategy
profiles for the above 10 buyers and sellers game would be [(1, 9), (2, 8)], where we have 1 buyer using
buyer strategy 1, 9 buyers using buyer strategy 2, 2 sellers using seller strategy 1, and 8 using seller
strategy 2.
2Non-parametric tests (Hollander and Wolfe, 1973) on the runs for the different profiles showed that
2500 runs was sufficient for statistical significance at the 95%-confidence-interval.
3The change is subject to the constraints that
∑Sb
h=1 ph = 1 and
∑Ss
k=1 qk = 1.
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6.1.2 The Equilibrium Analysis
Having described how to calculate the mixed-Nash equilibrium given the heuristic pay-
off table, it is now possible to formulate our solution as the global minimum of a real-
valued function, v(p, q) (given in Equation 6.1) on a polytope, whose fixed points ap-
proximate the mixed-Nash equilibria, (pnash, qnash) (McKelvey and McLennan, 1996):
v(p, q) =
∑Sb
h=1(max
[
ub(e
h, p, q)− ub(p, p, q), 0
]
ph)
2 +∑Ss
k=1(max
[
us(e
k, q, p)− us(q, q, p), 0
]
qk)
2 (6.1)
where ub(eh, p, q) represents the expected payoff to a buyer adopting pure strategy h
when the other buyers adopt a mixed strategy p and the sellers a mixed strategy q.
ub(p, p, q) =
∑Sb
i=1 ub(e
i, p, q)pi is the average payoff to a buyer in the market. Sim-
ilarly, us(ek, q, p) is the expected payoff to a seller adopting pure strategy k when
all buyers adopt mixed strategy p and the rest of the sellers adopt mixed strategy q.
us(q, q, p) =
∑Ss
j=1 us(e
j, q, p)qj is the average payoff to a seller in the market. Now,
when calculating the expected payoff of a buyer using a pure strategy h, we consider a
significant number of games where one buyer adopts pure strategy h, (Nb − 1) buyers
adopt mixed strategy p and Ns sellers adopts mixed strategy q. The individual profit
of all agents using the pure buyer strategy h, is then averaged over all the games as
the required payoff. A similar procedure applies when calculating a seller’s expected
payoff.
Now, solving such a non-linear minimisation problem is non-trivial and, indeed, can be
computationally demanding. Thus, we use a non-linear minimisation algorithm based
on the Nelder-Mead method (Nelder and Mead, 1965) and provided by the Matlab opti-
mization toolbox to solve the problem of finding the zero-points that minimise v(p, q).
Furthermore, because the toolbox can only find local minima, we repeatedly restart the
algorithm at random points (p and q) a number of times until no new minima is found
for 30 runs (as per (Walsh et al., 2002)).
Having looked at the static perspective of our analysis of the market game, we now
consider the dynamic perspective.
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6.1.3 The Dynamics Analysis
To analyse the dynamics of the market, we adopt the method used by Walsh et al. and,
specifically, we use replicator dynamics. As discussed in Subsection 2.3.5.2, the repli-
cator dynamics is appropriate because it has been shown to be a good approximation
to an agent learning model, such as reinforcement learning (Tuyls and Nowe, 2005),
which we would typically find in such markets. The following equations describe how
we calculate the dynamics, p˙h for pure buyer strategy h and q˙k for pure seller strategy
k:
p˙h =
[
ub(e
h, p, q)− ub(p, p, q)
]
ph (6.2)
q˙k =
[
us(e
k, q, p)− us(q, q, p)
]
qk (6.3)
As in the one-population EGT analysis (see Subsection 2.3.5.2), to observe the dynam-
ics of the game, we look at the trajectories (see Definition 2.25) and identify all the
attractors and saddle points, as well as the basins of attraction. Specifically, we calcu-
late a trajectory by starting with any pair of mixed-strategies (p, q), and calculate the
dynamics, p˙ and q˙, given by equations 6.2 and 6.3 respectively, as we progress along
that trajectory which converges to an attractor or diverges from a saddle point. Fur-
thermore, as discussed in Subsection 2.3.5.2, by considering the area of the basin of
attraction of each attractor, we can calculate the probability that an attractor will be
eventually adopted assuming that there is a uniform probability distribution over the
starting points.
Given this framework to analyse buyers’ and sellers’ behaviours, we next analyse the
evolving behaviour of the CDA.
6.2 Applying the Model to the CDA
Having detailed our analytical model, we now apply it to the CDA, the subject of this
thesis. While our analysis is feasible for any number of buyers and sellers and any
number of strategies, a visual representation of the trajectories of the replicator dynam-
ics and the equilibria is only possible when considering at most a set of two strategies
in either population (because we can effectively plot the replicator dynamics in a two-
dimensional space) and so this is the case to which we limit ourselves here.
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In this section, we first demonstrate how we analyse the evolution of buyer and seller
strategies in the CDA using our EGT model for a particular scenario. Second, we com-
pare a two-population EGT analysis of the CDA against the comparable one-population
one so that we can clearly see the benefits of our approach.
6.2.1 The Analysis
Here, we analyse the evolution of buyer and seller behaviours assuming they can choose
between two strategies. First, we generate our heuristic payoff table and we then go on
to perform the actual EGT analysis for a particular dynamic scenario.
As we are considering a set of only 2 strategies in either population, we can plot the
replicator dynamics, (p˙1, q˙1), as vectors at different (p1, q1) in a two-dimensional figure.
In such cases, the horizontal axis represents the buyer population proportion, p1, and the
vertical axis, the seller population proportion, q1. Then, the different vertices correspond
to different pure buyer and seller strategies. An example of an EGT analysis is given
in figures 6.1 and 6.2. The former plot gives the replicator dynamics of the analysis,
with the vertices corresponding to different pure strategies, and its shading denotes the
magnitude of the dynamics, (|p˙1| + |q˙1|), given the mixed strategies of the buyers and
sellers. As the magnitude of the dynamics decreases (and the shading is darker), there is
less and less incentive to deviate to another strategy, until the magnitude is 0 at a mixed-
Nash equilibrium and, then, it does not pay off to deviate to another buyer or seller
strategy. Finally, the latter plot gives the magnitude of the buyer’s and seller’s dynamics,
with a mixed-Nash equilibrium occurring when the magnitude of both dynamics is 0.
We consider these magnitudes to compare the buyer’s and seller’s payoff difference
when deviating to the more efficient strategy.
More specifically, here we analyse the CDA in a dynamic market where buyers and sell-
ers can choose between the GDX and AA strategies (which we empirically demonstrate
to be the two most efficient CDA strategies in Chapter 7). Figure 6.1 is the dynamics,
and Figure 6.2 the magnitude of the dynamics in such a scenario. While we are not
concerned with the specificities of the scenario we are considering, the purpose of this
exercise is to show what the EGT plot reveals.
In this scenario, we have three attractors A (at pure strategy AA), B (at pure strategy
GDX) and C, and two saddle points D and E. Specifically, the area of the basin of
attraction of A is 0.78, that of B is 0.12 and that of C is 0.10. Based on this, we infer
that there is 78% chance that AA will eventually be adopted by all buyers and sellers
in the market, a chance of 12% that GDX will eventually be adopted by all buyers and
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sellers and, finally, a chance of 10% that all buyers will adopt GDX and all sellers will
adopt AA. Furthermore, if we aggregate these results, there is 12% chance that GDX
will eventually be adopted by all buyer and sellers, and 10% chance that, eventually, all
buyers will adopt GDX and all sellers will adopt AA. We can further infer that there is
88% chance the sellers will adopt AA, 12% chance they will adopt GDX, and there is
78% chance the buyers will adopt AA and 22% chance they will adopt GDX.
Now, when we consider the trajectories when GDX buyers are in the minority (right-
hand part of the dynamics plot), we observe that the sellers nearly always deviate to AA.
As GDX becomes more popular among buyers (with trajectories flowing towards left,
i.e. GDX), sellers now deviate to either GDX or AA (shown by the trajectories flowing
either to the top at AA or to the bottom at GDX), depending in which basin of attraction
they are. When we consider the magnitude of the buyer’s and the seller’s dynamics
(see Figure 6.2), we observe that the latter is larger than the former specifically when
AA buyers are in the majority (when p1 is close to 1). This implies that there is, then,
a fast convergence of the seller’s strategy to AA, suggesting that AA sellers are most
profitable when competing against AA buyers and the strategies quickly evolve to AA.
Furthermore, we observe that there is marginally less economic incentives to deviate
to another strategy when GDX is in the majority (shown by the low magnitude of the
buyer’s and seller’s dynamics). Thus, it takes longer for the strategy to evolve to either
the mixed-Nash equilibrium B or C.
6.2.2 Comparison with the One-Population EGT Model
We have previously argued that our two-population model offers better insights into the
behaviour of the CDA (see Subsection 2.3.5.2). Now, in order to see this directly, we
compare the two in a given scenario. The EGT plot using the two-population model is
the scenario we considered above and the corresponding one-population model is given
in Figure 6.3. As we are considering only two strategies here, the dynamics is given by
a one-dimensional plot, where GDX is the pure strategy at 0 and AA is the pure strategy
at 1.
From Figure 6.3, we observe two attractors A′ at 1 and B′ at 0, and a saddle point C′ at
0.30. By considering the space of trajectories that converge to either attractors, we can
infer that there is 30% chance that all agents (buyers and sellers) will eventually adopt
the pure strategy GDX, while there is a chance of 70% that all agents will eventually
adopt the pure strategy AA. We also observe that AA is more efficient than GDX (hence
the trajectory towards AA) when in the majority (shown by the higher magnitude when
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FIGURE 6.1: The replicator dynamics for a dynamic market with AA and GDX buyers
and sellers. Here, we have three attractors: A at (1,1), B at (0,0) and C at (0,1) and two
saddle points: D at (0.19,1) and E at (0,0.40). The dotted line denotes the boundary
between the basins of attraction.
FIGURE 6.2: The magnitude of the buyer’s and seller’s dynamics.
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FIGURE 6.3: A one-population EGT analysis. We have two attractors: A′ at 1 and B′
at 0 and a saddle point: C′ at 0.30.
close to 1, i.e. AA) while GDX is more efficient than AA when in the majority (shown
by the higher magnitude when close to 0, i.e. GDX). At the saddle point C′, the strate-
gies are equally efficient and, thus, it does not payoff for an agent to deviate to another
strategy.
Now, we observe certain similarities with the dynamics of the two-population model.
Specifically, we also have two attractors at the pure strategies, AA and GDX, with a
probability of 0.78 and 0.12 that they will be adopted respectively. While the one-
population model incorrectly predicts the probabilities of the outcomes, it cannot predict
that if buyers and sellers can adopt different strategies, there is then a probability of
0.10 that the sellers will adopt AA while buyers will adopt GDX (at the attractor C). It
cannot detect this because it assumes that buyers and sellers adopt the same behaviour.
Furthermore, the two-population model shows that buyers and sellers do not adopt the
same strategies and, thus, this assumption should not be made as it oversimplifies the
problem such that the analysis is not significant.
6.3 Summary
This chapter advances the state of the art by developing a novel analytical model of
marketplaces with multiple buyers and sellers. Our model removes a key restriction
of the previous state of the art, namely that agents adopt the same strategy as a buyer
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and as a seller. In so doing, our approach provides a better market analysis in terms
of how buyers’ and sellers’ strategic behaviours evolve in the market. We first gave
a detailed analysis of such an evolution in the CDA given a particular scenario with
AA and GDX strategies. We then gave an analysis of the same scenario using Walsh
et al.’s one-population model to compare the dynamics. From this, we observed that
the latter failed to identify how buyers and sellers can adopt different strategies given
that they are more profitable in doing so. While the one-population model does give an
approximation, though poor, of how the market behaves, its assumption means that it
ignores all cases when it is economically more beneficial to select different strategies
as a buyer and a seller. As shown in our two-population model, buyers and sellers do
indeed adopt different strategies when they are more profitable in doing so, and such is
the case in practice when no such assumption holds. The consequence of this is that the
analysis of the one-population model is not significant in practice, a limitation which
our new two-population model addresses.
Having outlined the methodology, we will now deploy it, in the next chapter, to evaluate
the effectiveness of the AA strategy (and in so doing, we will complete our research aim
3).
Chapter 7
Analysing the Effectiveness of the AA
Strategy
In this chapter, we first describe the methodologies for evaluating strategies in homoge-
neous and heterogeneous populations to meet our last research aim. Then, we use these
methodologies to benchmark our novel AA strategy against the state of the art ZIP and
GDX strategies. By so doing, we empirically demonstrate that AA is the most efficient
bidding strategy for the CDA and, thus, satisfying our third research aim.
7.1 The Experimental Setup
There are three parts to the experimental setup for benchmarking a strategy for the
CDA: (i) the market setup, (ii) the agent setup and (iii) the methodology to evaluate the
strategy or strategies adopted in the market. First, we describe the market and agent
setup, invariant of the strategies adopted and, thus, of the type of population. We then
describe how we look at markets with different symmetric and asymmetric demand
and supply, and with market shocks. Second, we describe the methodologies for both
homogeneous and heterogeneous populations, giving the metrics we use in either case
to analyse the performance of a strategy in the market. Furthermore, we also discuss
how we ensure the statistical significance of our results.
First, we describe the market setup, that is how we simulate the market and its CDA
mechanism. We consider a discrete-time simulator of such a CDA model, and at each
time step, an agent is randomly triggered to submit a bid or an ask (between 0 and
pmax) in the market. In line with previous work, we impose a deadline on the duration
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of a trading day with the auction closing after 1000 time steps. At the beginning of a
trading day, buyers and sellers are endowed with a set of limit prices that correspond
to goods to buy and sell respectively. For controlled experiments, we specify the limit
prices to induce a desired demand and supply for the market. In particular, limit prices
are drawn from uniform distributions Ub and Us for buyers and sellers respectively. We
choose a uniform distribution to obtain an expected linearly decreasing demand curve
and an expected linearly increasing supply curve which are commonly used in market
models. For the purposes of this thesis, we consider the following different uniform
distributions to model representative (symmetric1 and asymmetric) markets similar to
those considered in previous studies (e.g. (Cliff, 2005; Cliff and Bruten, 1997; Tesauro
and Das, 2001)):
• Market 1 (M1): Ub = U(1.5, 4.5)2 and Us = U(1.5, 4.5). This is a symmetric
market that has an expected equilibrium at 3.0.
• Market 2 (M2): Ub = U(1.5, 4.5) and Us = U(2.8, 3.2). This is an asymmetric
market with a flat supply curve. The equilibrium is expected at 3.0.
• Market 3 (M3): Ub = U(2.8, 3.2) and Us = U(1.5, 4.5). This is an asymmetric
market with a flat demand curve. The equilibrium is expected at 3.0.
• Market 4 (M4): Ub = U(2.5, 5.5) and Us = U(2.5, 5.5). This is a symmetric
market that has an expected equilibrium at 4.0.
By considering limiting cases with a flat demand or supply, we want to see how such
extreme asymmetry in Markets M2 and M3, will affect the efficiency of buyer and
seller strategies in the CDA. The purpose of Market M4 is to observe how the strategies
perform when the competitive equilibrium changes during a market shock.
In particular, we look at different experiments with markets M1, M2, and M3, and
market shocks MS14, MS21, MS31 andMS233. In the static environment, we only look
at these three markets as we would have the same behaviour in M4 as we would in M1
since there is only an upward shift in the demand and supply and the absolute differences
between the agents’ preferences remain the same. In the dynamic environment, on
the other hand, we are mostly interested in how the strategies adapt from their best
behaviour in one market to their best behaviour in the new market. Now, if we have
1In a symmetric market, the ratio of gradient of the demand curve and that of the supply curve is -1.
M1 is an example of a symmetric market (see Figure 7.1).
2U(u, v) is a uniform distribution between u and v.
3MSxy refers to a scenario with a market shock from the demand and supply in Mx to that in My.
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FIGURE 7.1: Demand and supply of Markets M1, M2, M3 and M4.
more than one market shock, as in scenario MS214, we would observe how the strategy
adapts fromM2 to M1 and finally to M4. Now, we would observe the same behaviour in
MS21 and MS14 as the agent’s behaviour on Day 20 of MS21 would be the same as on
Day 10 in MS14. However, the observations from MS21 and MS12 would be different.
Indeed, in the former, we would observe how the agent adapts from the flat supply of
M2 to the normal supply of M1, while in the latter, we would observe how it adapts
from a normal supply to a flat supply. Because the dynamics is broadly similar in many
cases, we only analyse in detail a subset of the single market shocks, and generally look
at how the agent adapts from an extreme to a normal demand or supply, or to a change
in the competitive equilibrium price. A brief analysis of all of the remaining cases is
given in Appendix B.
The market is populated by a set of 10 buyers and 10 sellers in both the homogeneous
and heterogeneous scenario. Each agent is endowed with a limit price corresponding
to a unit of good to buy or sell. For the static scenario, the CDA lasts 10 days. For
the dynamic scenario, the CDA lasts 20 days with the market demand and supply kept
constant during the first 10 days and changed thereafter, effectively inducing a market
shock on Day 11 (see Figure 7.2 for an example). For the homogeneous scenario,
we can avoid redundancy in our experiments when evaluating the strategies within a
static environment for markets M1, M2 and M3, by looking at the performance of the
strategies before the market shocks for the dynamic cases. Given the market setup, we
consider a statistically significant number of runs, namely 2500 runs, of the CDA, each
lasting 10 or 20 trading days.
Chapter 7 Analysing the Effectiveness of the AA Strategy 125
FIGURE 7.2: Example of a transaction history with scenario MS14.
We validate our results at the 95%-confidence-interval by running the non-parametric
Wilcoxon rank sum test (Hollander and Wolfe, 1973) on the daily efficiency of the
strategies and on the difference between the actual and the expected payoff in heteroge-
neous populations. We chose such a test because we cannot ensure the normality of our
data set and because we want to ensure statistical significance of our dynamic analysis
particularly around mixed-Nash equilibria where that difference is significantly smaller.
Furthermore, we provide error bars at the 95%-confidence interval in the daily efficiency
of strategies within homogeneous populations (as shown in Figure 7.3).
We now look at the agent setup. Each buyer and seller is endowed with a limit price
corresponding to a unit of good to buy or sell to induce the market demand and supply
in M1, M2, M3 or M4. For the setup of the AA agents, based on simulations, we set
the size of window of transactions over which we calculate pˆ∗, N to 5, the parameter η
in the bidding layer (see equations 5.9 and 5.10) to 3.0, λ to 0.05 when increasing the
degree of aggressiveness and to -0.05 when decreasing the degree of aggressiveness.
The learning rate β1 and β2 are drawn from a uniform distribution U(0.1, 0.5) (similar
to the unoptimised parameters of the original ZIP strategy). For GDX agents, γ is set to
0.9 based on Walsh et al.’s simulations and, finally, the ZIP agents are initialised with
the set of parameters evolved in (Cliff, 2001) (as discussed in 2.4).
Given the experimental setup, we now proceed to evaluating the strategies in homoge-
neous and heterogeneous populations, in turn.
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7.2 Homogeneous Populations
First, we evaluate the performance of the ZIP, GDX and AA strategies in homogeneous
populations given the methodology we describe in Subsection 2.3.5.1. In Figures 7.3
to 7.6, we look at the performance of the AA strategy and the benchmarks GDX and
ZIP in the different markets highlighted earlier, and Table 7.1 (see Page 127) details
the efficiency of the buyers and the sellers, and of the overall efficiency of the strategy
in these markets. Note that apart from the symmetric Market M1, buyers and sellers
do not expect the same profit due to the asymmetric nature of the demand and supply,
and, thus, the efficiency of the strategy is not the average of the buyers’ and sellers’
efficiency. By dissecting the efficiency of the buyers and the sellers, we can observe
whether the buyers or the sellers are performing better given the particular demand and
supply. We now consider the static and dynamic scenarios in turn.
7.2.1 The Static Scenario
We first analyse the efficiency of the strategies within a static environment, with markets
M1, M2 and M3. In M1 (see Day 1 to 10 in Figure 7.3), we can see that our strategy
outperforms both benchmarks on every trading day, with an average efficiency of 0.997.
We also note that with AA agents, the transaction prices converge faster (with a lower
α) and, on average, remain closer to p∗ than with GDX or ZIP agents (AA has the
smallest α on Day 10). On the first day, we observe that AA has the highest efficiency
because the AA agents assume that there is no information on the first round and adopt
a conservative approach (submit bid and ask with a slowing increasing trend) and they
have a faster update of their target price. ZIP makes no such assumption and starts
with a random profit margin, while GDX suffers from the lack of information (bids,
asks and transaction prices). After a few days, the efficiency of all three strategies
converges to some value, which is highest with AA agents, and lowest with ZIP. This
validates our market setup of 10 days for each market, since we can observe that even
if we would consider a larger number of days, the efficiency of the subsequent days
would not change. Furthermore, it also validates our analytical method to look at daily
efficiency, since we can observe that the efficiency is different on different days for
different strategies. Moreover, the daily efficiency converges to different maxima for
each strategy, suggesting that the AA strategy is best at learning to be more efficient in
the market. With the traditional analytical method (as detailed in Subsection 2.3.5.1),
we would only calculate the average efficiency over all the trading days and would not
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AA GDX ZIP
Scenario buyer seller all buyer seller all buyer seller all
M1 0.969 1.025 0.997 0.981 0.998 0.990 1.010 0.960 0.982
M2 1.212 0.459 0.992 1.145 0.708 0.981 1.143 0.660 0.971
M3 0.389 1.247 0.996 0.595 1.161 0.981 0.896 1.069 0.960
MS14 1.044 0.981 0.992 1.022 0.989 0.988 1.033 0.980 0.979
MS21 1.088 0.754 0.993 1.054 0.876 0.987 1.085 0.817 0.974
MS31 0.667 1.159 0.997 0.778 1.103 0.988 0.932 1.049 0.968
MS23 0.968 1.250 0.994 0.894 1.228 0.980 1.015 0.863 0.968
TABLE 7.1: Efficiency of strategies in homogeneous environments (over all trading
days).
observe the fact that efficiency is capped after a few trading days to a maximum, while
strategies like AA and GDX learn to be efficient at a much faster rate than ZIP.
In markets M2 and M3 (see days 1 to 10 in Figures 7.4 and 7.5), we also observe that
AA is the most efficient (99.7% in M1, 99.1% in M2 and 99.6% in M3). In particular,
it does much better than the other strategies in asymmetric markets than it does in the
symmetric Market M1 (around 2.1% better in asymmetric cases compared to 1.1% bet-
ter in the symmetric case – see Table 7.1). This is because the competitive equilibrium
price does not change significantly4 and, thus, the target price remains close to p∗ on
Day 11. However, in these asymmetric markets, the α-parameter of AA is the highest,
while being lowest in the symmetric market. We explain this difference by separately
considering the buyers’ and the sellers’ efficiencies (see Table 7.1). In Market M2 (with
a flat supply curve), the fact that the buyers’ efficiency is higher than the sellers’ means
that the transaction prices are, on average, less than p∗, with the buyers having more
profitable transactions. This, in turn, indicates that the buyers are more successful at
driving the market price (i.e. forcing transaction prices to be lower and be more prof-
itable from their perspective) when the supply is flat. We make similar observations
with Market M3 which has a flat demand curve. While α is still highest for AA, the AA
sellers’ efficiency is higher than the AA buyers’, indicating that sellers are driving the
market price to be higher than p∗, and are being more profitable from their perspective.
As with M1, the daily efficiency converges with all three strategies, with AA still having
the highest efficiency on Day 10.
4The competitive equilibrium price still changes as we are dealing with uniformly distributed limit
prices, and the non-deterministic demand and supply is expected to be as in M1 to M4.
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FIGURE 7.3: Scenario MS14. The market efficiency of AA is 0.992, of ZIP, 0.979 and
of GDX, 0.988. If we consider the static scenario for Market M1, the market efficiency
of AA is 0.997, of ZIP 0.982, and of GDX 0.990.
FIGURE 7.4: Scenario MS21. The market efficiency of AA is 0.993, of ZIP 0.974, and
of GDX 0.987. If we consider the static scenario for Market M2, the market efficiency
of AA is 0.992, of ZIP 0.971, and of GDX, 0.981.
7.2.2 The Dynamic Scenario
We now analyse the daily efficiency of strategies when faced with market shocks. At
the beginning of Day 11, the strategies are all tailored to perform best in Day 10. Now,
with a market shock, the conditions to which those strategies have adapted are different,
forcing those agents to relearn the best strategic behaviour in the market. Essentially, a
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FIGURE 7.5: Scenario MS31. The market efficiency of AA is 0.996, of ZIP 0.968, and
of GDX 0.987. If we consider the static scenario for Market M3, the market efficiency
of AA is 0.996, of ZIP 0.960, and of GDX 0.981.
FIGURE 7.6: Scenario MS23. The market efficiency of AA is 0.994, of ZIP 0.968, and
of GDX 0.980. As in MS21, when we consider the static scenario in the first 10 days,
the market efficiency of AA is 0.992, of ZIP 0.971, and of GDX, 0.981.
robust strategy should be able to rapidly adapt to the new market conditions, since the
longer it takes to do this, the more inefficient it is.
In scenario MS14 (see Figure 7.3), the market demand and supply structure remains the
same, with an increase in the competitive equilibrium price p∗. In this case, on average,
AA still outperforms the benchmarks with an efficiency of 0.992. Because there is a
significant shift of p∗, we observe a significant decrease in the efficiency of the AA
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strategy, as p∗ has to be re-estimated gradually (as transaction prices diverge from the
old equilibrium and converge to the new one). However, with the higher α, and thus a
lower θ, the AA target price changes at a faster rate than it would with a fixed θ (see
Subsection 5.2.2), forcing transaction prices to converge at a faster rate to the new p∗.
Here, we also observe that the efficiency of the benchmarks, GDX and ZIP on Day 11, is
only slightly better than AA, though the latter’s efficiency improves after a few trading
days to be better than the benchmarks. This can be explained by the fact that pˆ∗ is a
fundamental parameter of the AA strategy, such that a significant change in p∗ affects
its performance. Furthermore, AA and GDX have the highest α because p∗ is central to
the AA’s aggressiveness model, and because GDX’s belief function approximates a step
function at p∗. On the other hand, ZIP does not consider p∗ explicitly when it forms a
bid or an ask. In fact, it only considers its latest profit margin on Day 10 when starting
to bid (with a new limit price given the market shock) on Day 11.
In scenario MS21 (see Figure 7.4) where p∗ does not change significantly, we initially
have a flat supply followed by a symmetric demand and supply. Again, AA performs
best with the highest average efficiency and it is the most efficient strategy with the
fastest adaptivity to the new market conditions (with the lowest α). Indeed, GDX and
AA have the lowest α, which is considerably smaller than in scenario MS14 where p∗
changes significantly. ZIP suffers the most from a market shock, with a significant drop
in efficiency and slow adaptability. This is because ZIP reuses the same profit margin
at the beginning of the following day, and given the significant change in preferences
(limit prices) after a market shock, its profit margin is no longer tailored for the new
market, and the decrease in efficiency then depends on how different the preferences in
the two consecutive markets are. Thus, the decrease is considerable as we are looking
at an extreme change for the sellers’ preferences. We observe similar behaviour for the
three strategies in scenario MS31, with AA outperforming the other strategies.
Furthermore, AA outperformed the benchmarks with the best margin in scenario MS23
(see Figure 7.6), where the market goes from a flat supply to a flat demand. ZIP suffers
considerably here as the profit margin, which had been tailored to Market M2, is now
used in Market M3 at the beginning of Day 11. With the supply curve now ranging from
1.5 to 4.5 (rather than between 2.8 and 3.2), the same set of sellers’ profit margins gives
a wider range of asks that are no longer profitable in the market. On the other hand,
GDX and AA do not suffer such a drastic change in α as ZIP does. Indeed, we observe
that the magnitude of the peak in α on Day 11 for GDX and AA in MS14 is about
twice that in MS21 and MS31 where we change either the demand or the supply curve,
while there is no peak when we change both the demand and supply curves in MS23.
We explain this by considering the limit prices of buyers and sellers. Indeed, in MS14,
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even though the market demand and supply remain the same, the buyers’ and sellers’
individual preferences change drastically, with the extreme case where extra-marginal
traders become intra-marginal and intra-marginal traders become extra-marginal. In
MS21 with a flat supply (MS31 with a flat demand) the change in sellers’ (buyers’)
preferences is not as significant as buyers’ (sellers’). Since market behaviour is affected
by both buyers’ and sellers’ behaviours, the change in preferences is then reflected in
the change of market efficiency and α. Thus, in MS23 with no extreme changes in
demand and supply observed in MS14, in demand in MS21 and in supply in MS31, the
drop in efficiency for GDX and AA is even smaller, with no peak in α on Day 11.
7.3 Heterogeneous Populations
Next, we benchmark AA against ZIP and GDX in heterogeneous populations given the
methodology we presented in Chapter 6. We consider the static and dynamic scenarios
in turn.
7.3.1 The Static Scenario
First, we evaluate the strategies in a static scenario with no market shock, and in turn
consider populations with AA against ZIP, and AA against GDX. In Market M1 with
AA and ZIP agents, we have a single mixed-Nash equilibrium at AA (see Figure 7.7),
implying that all buyers and sellers adopt the dominant AA strategy. We also observe
that the dynamics have comparable magnitudes and that the magnitude of buyer’s dy-
namics is higher when AA sellers are in the majority, and that the seller’s dynamics
are higher when AA buyers are in the majority (with higher magnitude here implying
faster convergence to AA). Thus, here, AA agents are most efficient when they are in
the majority. Similarly, with AA and GDX agents in M1, we have a single attractor
(mixed-Nash equilibrium towards which trajectories converge) at A and saddle points
(mixed-Nash equilibrium that trajectories diverge away from) as can be seen in Figure
7.8, with the majority of buyers and sellers eventually adopting the AA strategy (and
only 4% of buyers and 21% of sellers adopting GDX). Here, the magnitude of conver-
gence to A is highest when there is a majority of GDX buyers and sellers, implying that
AA buyers and sellers are most efficient when they are in the minority. We also observe
that buyers and sellers do not necessarily select the same buyer and seller strategy re-
spectively (e.g. when AA buyers and ZIP sellers are in majority, buyers tend to deviate
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to ZIP, and sellers to AA), which would not have been identified with the traditional
one-population model.
FIGURE 7.7: Scenario M1 with AA and ZIP agents. Here, we have a single dominant
strategy at (0,0). The magnitudes of the buyer’s and seller’s dynamics are of compara-
ble magnitude.
FIGURE 7.8: Scenario M1 with AA and GDX agents. The replicators converge to-
wards the single mixed-Nash equilibrium A at (0.96,0.79). Thus, buyers and sellers
are more likely to adopt the AA strategy, with a relatively small proportion adopting
the GDX strategy. The magnitudes of the buyer’s and seller’s dynamics are compara-
ble.
Next, we look at Market M2 with a flat supply. With a population of AA and ZIP (see
Figure 7.9), we have a single dominant strategy, A, with all buyers and sellers adopting
AA. The obvious observation here is that the magnitude of the seller’s dynamics is
considerably smaller than that of the buyer’s. This suggests that there is more economic
incentive for buyers to adopt AA than for sellers to do so. This happens because of the
market’s flat supply, meaning the sellers have considerably lower expected profits than
buyers, and, thus, gain less in profit when deviating to another seller strategy (in contrast
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FIGURE 7.9: Scenario M2 with AA and ZIP agents. Here, we have a dominant strategy
at (0,0). All buyers and sellers eventually adopt the AA strategy. The magnitude of the
seller’s dynamics is considerable smaller than that of the buyer’s.
FIGURE 7.10: Scenario M2 with AA and GDX agents. Here, we have two attractors:
A at (1,1) and B at (0.92,0), and a saddle point C at (0.93,0.10). The area of the basin
of attraction for A is 0.884, and for B is 0.116. The magnitude of the seller’s dynamics
is higher when GDX buyers are in majority, and considerably lower as AA buyers are
represented more.
with the buyer case). Furthermore, we observe that when the majority of buyers adopt
ZIP, the sellers tend to adopt ZIP, and when the majority of buyers adopt AA, the sellers
tend to adopt AA.
Now, with a population of AA and GDX in M2 (see Figure 7.10), we have two equilib-
ria, A at (0.92, 0) and B at (1, 1). Because the basin of attraction of A is considerably
larger than that of B, there is an equally larger probability (0.884 compared to 0.116)
that the mixed-Nash strategy A will be adopted (and all agents will eventually select
AA). Thus, there is still a small probability of 0.116 that 8.0% of buyers will adopt
GDX and all sellers will adopt GDX, such that AA is not dominant. When we consider
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the magnitude of the dynamics, we observe that the sellers’ magnitude is considerably
smaller than the buyers’, and we explain this with the same intuition as with AA and
ZIP in M2. Furthermore, when GDX buyers are in majority, the sellers are more in-
clined to adopt GDX, and when AA buyers are in majority, sellers tend to adopt AA,
though if GDX sellers are in the majority, then sellers are likely to adopt GDX.
Now, because of the reflective nature of M2 and M3, we only report on our analysis of
the strategic performance in M2. However, we observe reflective behaviours in M3 (see
Appendix B), with the magnitude of the buyers’ dynamics being considerably smaller
than the sellers’ in this case.
7.3.2 The Dynamic Scenario
We now turn to the performance of the strategies in dynamic environments with market
shocks. In particular, we look at scenarios MS14 and MS21, and provide some further
results for MS31 and MS23 in the appendix (which further validate our claim that AA
is better than both ZIP and GDX).
In scenario MS14 with AA and ZIP strategies (see Figure 7.11), we have two attractors
at A and B, and a saddle point at C. The basin attraction of A is considerably larger
than that of B, with the higher probability of 0.978 that all the buyers and sellers will
eventually adopt the AA strategy. As in M1, the magnitude of the buyer’s and seller’s
dynamics is highest when AA agents are in the majority, which again suggests that AA
is most efficient when it is in the majority. Furthermore, as in M1, we observe that the
magnitude of the buyer’s and the seller’s dynamics are comparable, and this is because
we are still dealing with symmetric markets where buyers and sellers expect similar
payoffs. However, unlike in M1, AA is no longer dominant, and there is now a small
probability of 0.022 that ZIP will be eventually adopted in the market. Similarly, with
AA against GDX in MS14 (see Figure 7.12), we have two attractors at A and B, and a
saddle point at C, and the basin of attraction is much larger for attractor A. As with AA
against ZIP, the market shock causes AA to no longer be dominant, and there is now a
small probability of 0.065 that GDX will be eventually adopted in the market.
In scenario MS21 (see figures 7.13 and 7.14), where the supply changes, we observe
a similar set of attractors as in MS14 (but with a probability of 0.961 that AA will be
adopted against ZIP, and a probability of 0.869 that it will be adopted against GDX).
However, the dynamics of how these equilibria are reached differ, with sellers having
a slight tendency to adopt more ZIP or GDX than in MS14 when AA buyers are in
the minority. In that case, the magnitude of the seller’s replicator dynamics is higher
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FIGURE 7.11: Scenario MS14 with AA and ZIP agents. Here, we have two attractors:
A at (0,0), B at (1,1) and a saddle point, C at (1,0.78). The area of the basin of attraction
of A is 0.978, and that of B is 0.022.
FIGURE 7.12: Scenario MS14 with AA and GDX agents. Here, we have two attrac-
tors: A at (1,1), B at (0,0) and a saddle point, C at (0.0.34). The area of the basin of
attraction for A is 0.935 and that of B is 0.065.
than that of the buyer’s (because of the asymmetric demand and supply, and sellers
expect higher profits than buyers) and thus influence more the dynamics of the CDA.
As the AA buyer strategy becomes increasingly popular, the buyer’s dynamics have
increasingly more weight and increasingly influence the dynamics of the market. In
some cases (in the basin of attraction of equilibrium B), the change in dynamics is not
sufficiently in favour of AA buyers, and the GDX and ZIP buyers then take over.
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FIGURE 7.13: Scenario MS21 with AA and ZIP agents. Here, we have two attractors:
A at (0,0), B at (1,1) and a saddle point, C at (0.68,1). The area of the basin of attraction
of A is 0.961, and that of B is 0.039.
FIGURE 7.14: Scenario MS21 with AA and GDX agents. Here, we have two attrac-
tors: A at (1,1) and B (0,0), and two saddle points: C at (0.55,0) and D at (0.33,0.11).
The area of the basin of attraction of A is 0.869, and that of B is 0.136.
7.4 Summary
In this chapter, we used our methodologies to benchmark5 our AA strategy against ZIP
and GDX in different environments. In so doing, we empirically demonstrated how
AA is the most efficient strategy and outperforms the state of the art in all the cases we
consider. Specifically, within homogeneous populations, the AA strategy outperformed
the benchmarks, in terms of market efficiency, by up to 3.6% in the static case and 2.8%
in the dynamic case. Within heterogeneous populations, based on our evolutionary
5Note that we did not benchmark our strategy against FL or Kaplan because we considered strategies
that would be efficient in both homogeneous and heterogeneous populations. In the future, it would be
interesting to observe whether AA can be exploited by such sniping strategies.
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game theoretic analysis, there was a probability above 85% that the AA strategy will
eventually be adopted by buyers and sellers in the market. Thus, we addresssed two
of our research aims. First, we showed that our new methodologies enabled us to gain
insights into behaviour that would not have been observed using the previous methods.
Examples of such phenomena include that a strategy might be better at selling than at
buying when it is in the majority and that at a mixed-Nash equilibrium, a buyer and
a seller adopt different strategies. This addresses our fourth research aim and, more
specifically, the scenario with AA and GDX in M2 where the buyer and seller agents
adopt different strategies at the mixed-Nash equilbrium. Second, we empirically show
that our novel strategy outperforms the state of the art, meeting our third research aim
for more efficient strategies.
Chapter 8
Conclusions
This thesis has looked at the Continuous Double Auction, a market mechanism where
multiple buyers and sellers compete and where transactions occur whenever a bid and an
ask match, on a continuous basis until the market closes. The CDA is today one of the
most popular market mechanisms, with applications ranging from market-based con-
trol, through decentralised resource allocation, to financial markets. With such valuable
applications, there are strong motivations for a better understanding of and improve-
ments in the CDA mechanism. To this end, this thesis has looked at both the structural
and the behavioural aspects of the CDA and has made research contributions to both.
These contributions are re-capped and matched against our original research aims in
Section 8.1. Thereafter, we outline directions for future research in this area in Section
8.2.
8.1 Research Achievements
We began with our work on the structure of the CDA (see Chapter 3). First, we designed
a decentralised mechanism based on the CDA, to solve a particular task allocation prob-
lem with sellers having a cost structure and buyers having inelastic demand. This ad-
dressed our second research aim of showing how more complex resource allocation
problems than those encountered in the standard CDA can be addressed. Furthermore,
we modified the protocol of the new mechanism to ensure a fair distribution of profits
among buyers and sellers, and this was an example of how we can modify the structure
of a CDA variant to bring about desirable properties, as motivated by our first research
aim. Second, we demonstrated that the structure of our new mechanism was very ef-
ficient (on average 80%, but reaching up to 90% in some cases). To do so, we first
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developed a centralised mechanism with an optimal solution of the resource allocation
problem. The purpose of this centralised solution was to evaluate the decentralised
mechanism with respect to an optimal solution and analyse the trade-off in efficiency
when decentralising the resource allocation task in the system. Furthermore, we devel-
oped a zero-intelligence (ZI2) strategy. The purpose of such a simple behaviour was to
ensure that the efficiency of the mechanism was attributable to the structure rather than
the behaviour. Such a decentralised solution would generally be adopted, instead of the
centralised and optimal solution, when the desirable properties of a decentralised mech-
anism are required and if the trade-off (of an average of 15%), in terms of efficiency, is
below a threshold set by the requirements of the system.
Next, we considered the behaviour of the CDA. As stated previously, this is emergent
and depends on the strategic interactions of buyer and sellers in the market and, thus,
on the strategies they adopt. Given this, the behavioural aspect of research on the CDA
is mainly concerned with bidding strategies and, in particular, with their design and
evaluation. We first considered the design of strategies to meet our third research aim.
We began by developing a multi-layered framework (IKB) for designing strategies for
agents operating in market mechanisms, to assist strategy designers through the sys-
tematic design of strategies for the CDA and its variants (see Chapter 4). Indeed, we
successfully used this framework to engineer the design of our entry to the 2006 Trading
Agent Competition (where it came third) and our adaptive-aggressiveness (AA) bidding
strategy for the CDA (see chapter 5). The AA strategy is based on both short-term and
long-term learning that allows the agent to adapt its bidding behaviour to be efficient
in a wide variety of environments. The principal motivation for the short-term learn-
ing is to update the agent’s aggressiveness to immediately respond to short-term market
fluctuations, while for the long-term learning it is adapt to long-term changes in market
conditions and to enable the agent to perform efficiently in dynamic environments in
which the market demand and supply changes suddenly.
We then went on to consider the means of evaluating bidding strategies in both homoge-
neous and heterogeneous populations in line with our fourth research aim. Because an
EGT approach is best for the latter, we first addressed the issues with the existing state
of the art and developed a novel EGT framework to analyse the evolution of both buy-
ers’ and sellers’ behaviours in the market. This work is reported in Chapter 6. Such a
framework allows a strategy designer to evaluate the efficiency of his strategy while, for
the system designer, it gives insights into how the behaviour of the system is changing
and what it is most likely to evolve into.
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Finally, in Chapter 7, we employ the newly developed methodologies to benchmark
AA against the state of the art CDA strategies in different static and dynamic environ-
ments, in both homogeneous and heterogeneous populations. In so doing, we empiri-
cally demonstrate how AA is the most efficient strategy and outperforms the state of the
art in all the cases we consider. This thus satisfies our research aim for a more efficient
strategy for the CDA. Specifically, within homogeneous populations, the AA strategy
outperformed the benchmarks, in terms of market efficiency, by up to 3.6% in the static
case and 2.8% in the dynamic case. Within heterogeneous populations, based on our
evolutionary game theoretic analysis, there was a probability above 85% that the AA
strategy will eventually be adopted by buyers and sellers in the market. Now, a more
efficient strategy implies more efficient resource allocation systems for homogeneous
populations, as well as more economic benefits in heterogeneous populations. Further-
more, such benefits would incentivise human traders to purchase such a strategy that
their agents could use.
When taken together, these contributions are an important step towards improving the
structure and behaviour of the CDA, and to demonstrating that the CDA can be a valu-
able tool for solving decentralised control problems. In making these advances, we have
successfully addressed the research aims set out at the beginning of this thesis. How-
ever, this work has also opened up new research avenues that require future work and,
in the next section, we outline these avenues and highlight potential points of departure.
8.2 Future Work
Research on sophisticated bargaining behaviour for autonomous software agents par-
ticipating in complex marketplaces, such as the CDA, is only now starting to gather
pace. Moreover, because the CDA is such an important tool for decentralised resource
allocation and because there is no optimal analytical solution, further research is still
needed on both the structural and behavioural aspects. Thus, while this thesis addresses
some of the key issues concerning this mechanism, there are still other areas that require
subsequent work. We now highlight some of the most important of these:
• In this thesis, we developed a model to analyse the evolution of buyers’ and sell-
ers’ behaviour in the market and demonstrated its effectiveness. However, we
believe that this model can be further extended to also analyse the evolution of
the structure of the CDA, if that structure were allowed to change to improve some
property of the mechanism (e.g. market efficiency, price volatility or fairness of
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profit distribution). Thus, in our model, we would have two populations corre-
sponding to buyers and sellers, and a third population of mechanisms with differ-
ent protocols. The aim of this extension would be to observe the co-evolution of
the structure and behaviour of the CDA, and identify how the CDA would evolve
under certain circumstances.
• Because the CDA can essentially be considered as an approach to decentralised
control, we intend to develop other CDA variants to solve other complex decen-
tralised resource allocation problems such as with non-linear production functions
or where consumers can form coalitions and bid as a group. Furthermore, we in-
tend to modify the standard CDA model set by Smith and rigorously observed for
the past few decades. In particular, we believe that the CDA should be modelled
to more closely reflect real financial markets and, in particular, the stock market.
One intrinsic difference between Smith’s model of the CDA and the stock market
is that in the former, a market shock occurs over trading days, while in the latter,
a market shock occurs within trading hours during a trading day. Thus, we in-
tend to develop a CDA model where the market is perturbed by sporadic shocks
over trading hours and analyse the implication of such changes on properties of
the CDA such as market efficiency, price volatility or convergence towards the
competitive market equilibrium.
• Given our new model of the CDA, we intend to change (the behaviour of) our
AA strategy for the new structure of the CDA and, thereon, upgrade our AA
strategy for real financial markets such as the stock markets, where considerably
more information has to be factored in (e.g. short-term and long-term history of
transaction prices, volume of transactions and market trends).
With the growing popularity of the CDA and its applications, we envisage considerably
more research on this mechanism. Given this, we believe this thesis highlights the
different areas of research and applications of the CDA and advances the state of the
art in both its structure and behaviour. Furthermore, the CDA is shown to be not just
another auction mechanism, but rather one that can be built upon and modified to solve
complex decentralised problems, and one that has emerged as the dominant mechanism
in trillion-dollar financial institutions.
Appendix A
Examplar Strategy Profile for EGT
Analysis
A strategy profile [ρb, ρs] defines the number of buyers ρb = (ρb1, . . . , ρ
b
Sb
) and sellers ρs =
(ρs1, . . . , ρ
s
Ss
) using the different buyer and seller strategies respectively. Here, we give an ex-
ample of a heuristic payoff table with such profiles and, specifically, we consider the scenario
used in our EGT analysis of Chapter 6. In this case, we have a market with 10 buyers and 10
sellers each having a set of two different strategies, namely AA and GDX in a dynamic scenario
MS31 (see Section 7.1 for more details). Thus, we have a payoff table with 121 strategy profiles.
Here, AA is strategy 1 and GDX strategy 2 and for each strategy profile, we give the payoff of
buyers and sellers using the different strategies, as well as the efficiency of each strategy. Note
that the first and last entries are homogeneous cases for profile (0,10,0,10) with all GDX agents
and (10,0,10,0) with all AA agents respectively.
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Appendix B
Evaluating Strategies within
Heterogeneous Populations
In Chapter 7, we benchmarked the AA strategy against the state of the art ZIP and GDX strate-
gies for different scenarios. Here, we provide an analysis of AA against ZIP and GDX, but also
of ZIP against GDX, in the remaining cases that have not been considered in the main thesis.
For each case, we give the different attractors and saddle points and the probability that each of
these attractors will be adopted.
We observe that AA always outperforms ZIP and GDX in line with our observations in the main
thesis, while GDX always outperforms ZIP.
FIGURE B.1: Scenario M1 with ZIP and GDX agents given a symmetric demand and
supply. The replicators converge towards the single mixed-Nash equilibrium A at (0,0).
The magnitudes of the buyer’s and seller’s dynamics are comparable.
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FIGURE B.2: Scenario M2 with ZIP and GDX agents given a flat supply. Here, we
have a single attractor: A at (0,0). All buyers and sellers eventually adopt the GDX
strategy. The magnitude of the seller’s dynamics is smaller than that of the buyer’s,
though the different when compared to M1 (where the magnitude of buyer’s dynamics
is smaller than that of seller’s) is fairly significant.
FIGURE B.3: Scenario M3 with AA and ZIP agents. Here, we have one attractor: A at
(0,0). AA is a dominant strategy that will eventually be adopted in the market.
FIGURE B.4: Scenario M3 with AA and GDX agents. Here, we have one attractor:
A at (1,1) and one saddle point: B at (0,0.81). AA is a dominant strategy that will
eventually be adopted in the market.
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FIGURE B.5: Scenario M3 with ZIP and GDX agents given a flat demand. Here,
we have a dominant strategy A at (0,0). The magnitude of the seller’s dynamics is
considerable larger than that of the buyer’s because of the flat demand.
FIGURE B.6: Scenario MS14 with ZIP and GDX agents. Here, we have two attractors:
A at (0,0), B at (1,1) and two saddle points: C at (1,0.78) and D at (0.71,1). The area
of the basin of attraction for A is 0.967 and that of B is 0.033.
FIGURE B.7: Scenario MS21 with ZIP and GDX agents. Here, we have two attractors:
A at (0,0) and B (1,1), and saddle points: C at (1,0.69), D at (0.70,1) and E which is
a continuous line of equilibria represented by the dark line. The dotted line is the
boundary between the basins of attraction of A and B. The area of the basin of A is
0.948, and that of B is 0.052.
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FIGURE B.8: Scenario MS31 with AA and ZIP agents. Here, we have two attractors:
A at (0,0) and B at (1,1) and a saddle point: C at (1,0.80). The probability that mixed-
Nash equilibrium A will be adopted is 0.952 and that B will be adopted is 0.048.
FIGURE B.9: Scenario MS31 with AA and GDX agents. Here, we have three attrac-
tors: A at (1,1), B at (0,0) and C at (0,1) and two saddle points: D at (0.19,1) and E at
(0,0.40). The probability that mixed-Nash equilibrium A will be adopted is 0.776, that
B will be adopted is 0.125 and that C will be adopted is 0.099.
FIGURE B.10: Scenario MS31 with ZIP and GDX agents. Here, we have three attrac-
tors: A at (0,0) and B at (1,1) and two saddle points: C at (1,0.76) and D at (0.71,1).
The probability that mixed-Nash equilibrium A will be adopted is 0.962 and that B will
be adopted is 0.038.
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FIGURE B.11: Scenario MS23 with AA and ZIP agents. Here, we have two attractors:
A at (0,0) and B at (1,1) and a saddle point: C at (0.80, 0.95). The probability that
mixed-Nash equilibrium A will be adopted is 0.965 and that B will be adopted is 0.035.
FIGURE B.12: Scenario MS23 with AA and GDX agents. Here, we have three attrac-
tors: A at (0,0), B at (1,1) and C at (0.32.0) and two saddle points: D at (0.37,0.04) and
E at (0.03,0). The probability that mixed-Nash equilibrium A will be adopted is 0.010,
that B will be adopted is 0.902 and that C will be adopted is 0.088.
FIGURE B.13: Scenario MS23 with ZIP and GDX agents. Here, we have two attrac-
tors: A at (0,0) and B at (1,1) and two saddle points: C at (1,0.69) and D at (0.83,1).
The probability that mixed-Nash equilibrium A will be adopted is 0.966 and that B will
be adopted is 0.034.
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